Twentieth century history:

&

  The book is written for the intelligent lay public, and should be judged on that basis. It is unencumbered by the heavy footnoting of works aimed at an academic audience. The formidable organizational problem of a work of such scope is excellently solved by its logical division into numerous short chapters. These set forth conditions at the beginning of the century, carry them up to logical dividing points (usually the two world wars, the Great Depression, and the Cold War turning point of about 1980), and then sum up at the end of the century. Each chapter thus tells a complete, easily understandable story about particular subjects or nations or regions.
  &
  The major organizational defect - and a serious one considering the intended audience and the length of the book - is the dense paragraphing and occasional use of run-on sentence structure. These are unattractive to the eye and pose obstacles to scanning. Nevertheless, the book is full of illuminating details, and Roberts succeeds in providing an excellent resource for many of the interesting and enlightening aspects of 20th century history that one may not have gotten around to studying in greater detail.
  &

Most readers can have no conception of the realities of a century ago.

  Roberts eschews the wisdom of 20/20 hindsight. Unlike many historians, he wisely tempers his judgment of historic figures by acknowledging that they had to act amidst the realities of their times. They were frequently required to make real time decisions based on very incomplete information.
  &
  He cautions that the pace of change in the "developed" world has been so rapid during the last hundred years that most people - including most of his readers - have no conception of the realities of a century ago. They have no understanding of the influences that shaped the lives of their grandparents and great grandparents.
  &
  Roberts correctly describes his "Twentieth Century History" as an effort to "suggest or sketch the outlines of its reality," without pretense of a full description. The "canvas" is so broad that it becomes difficult to "pick out from what happened what mattered most." (Overall, Roberts does an excellent job at this essential and difficult task.)
  &

Reflections and conclusions:

That the 20th century would enjoy great progress was widely expected. It was just the bloody course that the world has traveled to get here from there that is so incredible.

  Roberts' choices of the most notable characteristics of the 20th century:

• Conflicts and bloodshed are inevitably a central theme. "Much of the world still looks dangerously unstable. Nationality, culture, ideology and economics still fragment it."

• Scientific discovery shaped its events. (Among the most notable fields affected: Transportation and communications, health care, information technology, weapons, agriculture.)

• Amongst European peoples, there was a broad reduction in the hold of religions.

• Popular expectations have changed widely. Vast multitudes now expect that they will have enough to eat - and that overall conditions will keep on improving.

• Yet, two world wars conservatively cost 100 million lives (and blighted the lives of billions), and Communism - "mankind's greatest essay yet in social engineering - - - whose goals are still widely defended by many as benevolent - - -," may have cost 50 million more (and also blighted the lives of billions).

• Ancient hatreds continuously emerged - now in such places as Yugoslavia and Rwanda - to be again bloodily fought over.

• Expectations and prophesies made about 100 years ago all "turned out in due course to fall so far short of actuality," that such attempts appear foolish today.

  FUTURECASTS begs to differ with Roberts on this point. As Roberts notes, there were widely held expectations amongst the European peoples of 1901 of great continued progress in science, the learned professions, political freedom, economic freedom, living standards, individual rights - almost all of which have come true widely. FUTURECASTS is encouraged by that fact. It is just the bloody course that the world has traveled to get here from there that is so incredible.
  &
  Granted that there are still vast multitudes that still don't enjoy such advances. The huge majority of these unfortunate peoples struggle without the benefits of functioning capitalist markets. Their failure to progress should thus surprise nobody. Hopefully, the trip that the world will travel between now and the bright future forecast by FUTURECASTS for the end of the 21st century  will not be nearly so troubled.

• Change has been the primary characteristic of the 20th century. Change has been pervasive and extensive like in no other century. (Change will be much more pervasive and extensive in the 21st century.)

  Roberts points out that a population grown four times as large now enjoys longer life spans and, usually, better material conditions. Barbarous actions still take place, but decency, too, has won victories. "Great evils cannot now be launched and carried through without deliberate concealment, denial, or attempts at plausible justification." Some growth of "international law" and "human rights" are now visible.
  &
    Roberts lists some other major changes.

• An "unprecedented and revolutionary growth in the world's wealth."

• "A slow spreading of the dominant lifestyle," featuring somewhat paradoxically a great increase in individual choice.

• The availability of information. The world is increasingly understandable and transparent.

• The advance of women's rights.

• A transformation of the international institutional framework.

• Expectations - not just of progress - but of human happiness and the capacity to manage human destiny.

  Yet, inevitably, the past still remains a large part of our present.
  &

  At the end of the century, crosscurrents abound. Nationalism - not class or religion - dominates the political world. Dynastic rights are almost everywhere abandoned. With the end of the Cold War, representative government and constitutional liberty are increasingly seen as the norm. Modern institutions of national governance are increasingly the norm. Yet a widening variety of international organizations also proliferate. But not empires - which have disappeared - often leaving turbulence and disorder in their wake.
  &
  The ability to generate material wealth and distribute it widely has grown exponentially, but "millions of people still bow under the crushing and seemingly inescapable suffering imposed on them by bad government, poverty and disease." Disorder and international dangers exist, especially amongst the rapidly growing populations of the Islamic world. But this is not due to anything inherent in Islam. (Indeed, it is more accurately understood as being currently typical for peoples with high birth rates in tropical latitudes than for anything having to do with a particular religion.)

  "In a century that has seen the disappearance of European hegemony in all its institutional embodiments, the civilization that Europe originated has made silent conquests as never before, even when its own core values seem fatally sapped by relativism [and the shock of the] continuing human capacity for evil on a horrifying scale."

In the beginning:

European peoples were "the civilized world."

Europeans could reasonably view the previous two or three centuries as a progressive advance intellectually, scientifically, materially, economically, and even morally and aesthetically - and they confidently expected such advances to continue.

Although they had hugely profited from large-scale slave trading for three centuries, "European civilization and its derivatives had already a century earlier provided the only examples of countries ever to have eradicated slavery for themselves."

  Although sometimes deplored, the history of those times is in many ways properly "Eurocentric." Much of 20th century history is the "story of how and why that ceased to be true before it ended."
  &
  To European peoples - both within and outside Europe - this seemed the normal and inevitable state of affairs. They not only considered themselves superior in the sciences, economics and technology, but - as might be expected of the human ego - in their religious and moral practices as well. They could reasonably view the previous two or three centuries as a progressive advance intellectually, scientifically, materially, economically, and even morally and aesthetically - and they confidently expected such advances to continue.
  &
  Indeed, most believed that only Europeans could expect such progress. In this, they were like the Chinese Mandarins of the 18th century.
  &
  Nor were these beliefs without foundation. "The advocacy of individual rights, a free press, a widening suffrage qualification, the protection of women, children (and even animals) from exploitation," all were viewed as proof of European cultural superiority.
  &
  In addition to the obvious scientific and material advances, Europe had just led the world in the abolition of slavery - which had been an almost universal practice for thousands of years. Muslims (who had for centuries - even before the arrival of the Europeans - been enslaving black Africans  - and Europeans, too, when they could get away with it) were still enslaving black Africans almost until the end of the 19th century.

  "Colonial governments and the British Royal Navy were pressing hard on the operations of Arab slave-traders in the African continent and the Indian Ocean; abolition was being imposed on the rest of the world by European force and diplomacy deployed in the good cause."

  Indeed, it was not until 1962, that slavery was legally abolished in Saudi Arabia. Although they had hugely profited from large-scale slave trading for three centuries, "European civilization and its derivatives had already a century earlier provided the only examples of countries ever to have eradicated slavery for themselves."
  &

Empire:

European religious and moral values undermined European domination by "sometimes consciously, sometimes unwittingly, - - - exposing gaps between the performance and pretension of western civilization."

  Europeans dominated the political world through their colonial empires and the new nations that had emerged from them. The influence of European commerce and culture was pervasive. There were many real benefits for non-European peoples, but they were nevertheless underdogs to the Europeans.

  "That western values were often better is, of course, true. Unfortunately, the assumption that this was so usually went with a large obliviousness to side effects they might have and to any merits of native institutions where they were introduced."

  Often, European religious and moral values were unsuitable for indigenous peoples. These values undermined European domination by "sometimes consciously, sometimes unwittingly, - - - exposing gaps between the performance and pretension of western civilization."
  &

Globalization:

 The always perceptive Bismarck had reportedly noted that the fact that the Americans and British spoke the same language was the most important political fact of the age.

  Cultural assimilation of non-European peoples had not yet penetrated beyond small elites. However, the view that great change was in the offing was for the first time in human history widespread.
  &
  Science and technology became a dominating and pervasive influence not just in Europe but worldwide. This pervasive influence grew even though various aspects of science quickly moved beyond the understanding of even intelligent and educated segments of the nonscientific community. Western peoples were more comfortable, healthier, could expect longer lives, and enjoyed great advances in communication - all of which had become possible just in the last few decades. All of this was being slowly spread outwards to non-European peoples, with nothing coming back in return except for such minor things as a few fashions.

  Of course, the whole modernizing movement in Europe can be traced back to the Renaissance and ideas and learning transmitted into then barbaric Europe by early contacts with the then more civilized Moslem world and China. But that's a different story.

  Roberts covers population and migration trends - agriculture - globalization of commerce - industrialization - finance - at the beginning of the century. He then sketches the international political landscape. This was dominated by nationalistic influences within Europe - the European empires in Asia and Africa - and the theocratic emphasis of the Muslims.
  &
  Also covered are developments in the United States - the world's greatest debtor nation - and already a young giant - still reluctant to become engaged upon the European stage. However, the always perceptive Bismarck had reportedly already noted that the fact that the Americans and British spoke the same language was the most important political fact of the age.
  &

The many miracles of capitalism:

Technology driven by capitalist incentives "cut into the iron timetables of domestic routine and drudgery."

 Capitalism created an economic basis for the reduction of the servitudes of women. It offered increasing ways of earning a living that had not existed a century before. Typists, secretaries, telephone operators, factory hands, department store clerks, and teachers - earned their own wages working outside the family - rather than laboring in the unpaid service of family (or frequently in addition to laboring in the unpaid service of family). Demands for education and professional training for women were growing.
  &
  Technology driven by capitalist incentives "cut into the iron timetables of domestic routine and drudgery." Piped water, gas for heating and lighting, and the growing influence of electric appliances and a variety of other household conveniences (soaps, ice boxes) spread slowly throughout the developed nations.

  The gap between the status of women in capitalist nations and non-capitalist nations continued to widen throughout the century. Women's liberation was unthinkable without capitalism.

General developments during the 20th century:

European technological, political and economic supremacy have ebbed, but have been superseded by even greater success for European culture and civilization - "taken up and exploited as never before by non-Europeans, often at one remove, through a generalized 'Westernization.'"

  Roberts describes the persistent failures of third world nations to keep up with the agricultural productivity gains of rich nations despite the availability of cheap labor and fertile land. However, he ventures no explanation. Without a plausible explanation, the descriptive effort is of little use.
  &
  Is it so difficult to understand that the difference lies not in production but in the factors that affect ownership and distribution? The absence of private property rights - capitalist market mechanisms and middleman distribution networks and infrastructure - rule based and commerce friendly legal systems - and political systems dependent on local commerce for their funds - all provide obvious explanations for productive failure - in agriculture as well as in industry and services.

  Great and accelerating technological and medical advances continued from the 19th century and throughout the 20th century, transforming life almost everywhere. Ordinary people became mobile and increasingly interrelated. Literacy progressed, connecting ordinary people to their world and to worlds of culture and the arts. Governance and war were transformed by these advances. The scientific age changed attitudes towards religion and the material world.
  &
  By the end of the 20th century, European supremacy in these spheres had ebbed. Increasing numbers of nations outside Europe had risen to the status of "developed." However, this supremacy has been superseded by even greater success for European culture and civilization - "taken up and exploited as never before by non-Europeans, often at one remove, through a generalized 'Westernization.'"

  "Discussion of such questions [the definitions of "European"] is liable to be passionate and confused; there are too many interests cluttering it up for things to be otherwise."
  &
  Repeatedly, Roberts has to devote page space to justify the obvious - such as the dominating role of Europe at the beginning of the 20th century in many spheres of life - and the spread of various aspects of "Western" culture at the end. In this sense, his history is "Eurocentric" - because that is the only accurate way to reflect reality.

European politics:

The dominant political arrangement was constitutional monarchy with substantial political powers still held by hereditary monarchs and aristocracy.

A wide variety of more peaceful socialist movements thrived as - contrary to Marxist expectations - improvements in the economic and political status of labor continued to make headway against conservative opposition.

  Roberts provides a good summary of socialist ideology - of which the Marxist version was the most influential.

  "Marxism's religious and mythical appeal mattered more, even if intellectuals preached endlessly about the 'scientific' nature of the doctrines they called Marxist, deliberating their niceties like medieval schoolmen."

  However, a wide variety of more peaceful socialist movements thrived as - contrary to Marxist expectations - improvements in the economic and political status of labor continued to make headway against conservative opposition. But in Russia, conservative forces were more successful in blocking economic and political gains for labor, and there the Marxists remained the majority (Bolshevik) socialist movement.
  &
  However, it was nationalism that most moved the masses.
  &
  Political divisiveness in the major democracies led observers to believe these nations would be unable to react strongly in the event of war. This mistake occurred repeatedly during the 20th century.

  During WW I and later during the Cold War, that belief proved totally false. During WW II, it was true only of France, and that was due much more to that nation's horrendous ordeal during WW I than to anything inherent in its system of government.

  The author outlines the political ferment and divisiveness prior to WW I within the major European nations, which some handled better than others. "But all the constitutional states shared a flexibility in approaching their problems in comparison with more authoritarian regimes."

  "For all its impressive appearance, Imperial Germany was not in the end an efficient state in any but a merely bureaucratic sense. It had not by 1914 been able to deliver lasting solutions to national problems inevitably posed by its social and economic development." (Here, Roberts confuses "efficiency" with "flexibility." Germany was as efficient as any state is likely to be, but its autocratic system simply couldn't adapt to changing conditions.)

Germany experienced a slow breakdown of authority at the top. Increasingly captured by narrow economic, political and military interests, government policy became increasingly driven by events.

  With the passing of the "all competent Bismarck," Germany was afflicted with incompetent leadership. It experienced a slow breakdown of authority at the top. Increasingly captured by narrow economic, political and military interests, government policy became increasingly driven by events. The system was simply incapable of judging and removing incompetent leaders - or of the exercise of central control in the broader national interest.

  There was no political mechanism - such as exists in a multiparty democracy - to periodically "kick the bastards out" and force political parties to support candidates who had at least the appearance of competence and some semblance of concern for the interests of the wider citizenry.

  Indeed, in the three major dynastic empires - Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary - "the personality and temperament, and the incapacity or capacity, of the monarch was likely to be a decisive factor." All had problems with divisive class and ethnic groups, but the problems in Russia and Austria-Hungary were much worse than in Germany. Despite rapid economic growth, Russia was still comparatively weak and her people remained largely impoverished.
  &

Imperial rivalries:

There is no evidence whatsoever that the loss of empire in any way reduced the economic prospects of the imperial powers.

Imperial rivalries cannot explain WW I, although it contributed to it psychologically.

   Russia, Britain and France - the European nations that had quarreled most over imperial concerns - were in fact on the same side in WW I. "Overseas rivalry cannot explain that conflict, though it contributed to it psychologically."

  "There was very little going on that appeared to threaten an international order still focused above all on Europe and its affairs as the century began."

The "modernizing" forces introduced by the Europeans would ultimately build sufficient indigenous strength and cohesion to make continued European domination untenable.

A rich ferment of still puny nationalistic groups was evident everywhere, and acts of violence periodically served to concentrate minds on the realities and limitations of imperial rule.

  Conditions in major Asian nations at the beginning of the 20th century - independent Japan, sorely buffeted China, French Indochina, Dutch Indonesia, and the British Raj - are set forth in an excellent survey. Roberts highlights the forces - especially the "modernizing" forces introduced by the Europeans - that would ultimately build sufficient indigenous strength and cohesion to make continued European domination untenable. However, he is carefully mindful that - except for Japan - none of this had as yet progressed far enough to trouble or affect the politics of the European great powers.
  &
  European ideas such as nationalism, humanitarianism, and privately owned property, disturbed traditional arrangements and subtly undercut imperial interests. Resentments over Christian missionaries who were undermining established religions focused opposition. Western education opened non-western eyes to the realities and possibilities of their world.
  &
  In China, the 1911 revolution ended 2000 years of imperial history. "Inseparably intertwined, Confucianism and the imperial order went under together."

  This process wasn't quite that neat. Confucian attitudes are to this day still extensive among Chinese both inside and outside China. The rule of Mao Tse-tung was very much like that of a traditional Chinese emperor. The extended family is still of central importance to Chinese life.

  The Middle East - especially Egypt and the crumbling Ottoman Empire - are also covered. A rich ferment of still puny nationalistic groups was evident everywhere, and acts of violence periodically served to concentrate minds on the realities and limitations of imperial rule.
  &

The Great War:

"Our hindsight, and the enormous historical effort which has been poured into seeking out the origin of that disaster - - -, stand in the way of seeing things with their eyes."

  "[1914], a date that is of significance on any reading of the history of this century, - - - was, nonetheless, one whose approach awoke little concern at all in the minds of the vast majority of human beings until the very last moment."
  &
  "[The prewar era was one that] no statesman or diplomat alive in 1901 dreamed would shortly come to an end. Far less could they then have believed that a whole civilization would be mortally wounded in the process. Our hindsight, and the enormous historical effort which has been poured into seeking out the origin of that disaster - - -, stand in the way of seeing things with their eyes."

Germany's growing industrial and military power increasingly drove the old imperial rivals into each others arms.

  As Roberts portrays it, the logic for war was created by the circumstances mainly of the moment, some of which were accidental. Since the middle of the 19th century, European diplomacy had successfully avoided war over the pickings from the degenerating Ottoman Empire, the partition of Africa, the fate of China and other Asian regions.

  "For most of the time, the six great powers [Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Italy] settled between them the affairs of the globe outside the western hemisphere - - - and there seemed no reason why they should not go on settling them successfully."

  The military planners and the diplomats who formed and maintained the alliances and lesser arrangements that divided Europe made their plans on the assumption of conflict. However, the day to day affairs of Europe were conducted on many levels - most of which had no bearing on possible conflict. Britain's imperial rivalries had always been with France and Russia. However, Germany's growing industrial and military power increasingly drove the old imperial rivals into each others arms.

  Railroads made overland transportation efficient enough to unlock the economic and military potential of continental land masses. This provided the basis for the rise of great Eurasian continental powers - first Germany, then the Soviet Union, and now China.

Suddenly, a myriad of hitherto intractable imperial problems could be resolved.

Germany's growing battle fleet - there was nobody else but Britain for such a fleet to challenge - served to solidify the encirclement it feared.

  The earlier Franco-Russian alliance had been at first as much concerned about possible conflict with Great Britain as with Germany. In 1902, imperial concerns caused Great Britain to enter into its first peacetime alliance in over a century - with Japan - to guard against Franco-Russian activities in the Far East.
  &
  However, a far-sighted French diplomat, Déclassé, realized that France could no longer afford imperial conflicts with Great Britain and would need British help to sustain France's position at home in Europe. Fear of Germany and the Central Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy was driving an end to old imperial rivalries (much as fear of the Soviet Union would play a positive role in driving France and Germany and the rest of Western Europe together in the middle of the century).
  &
  Suddenly, problems over Morocco, North Africa, Egypt, the Suez Canal, West Africa, the Newfoundland fishing grounds, Siam, Madagascar, and the South Pacific could all be resolved. Russia and Britain followed, settling for a draw in "The Great Game" in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet.
  &
  With the compromise and accommodation of old grievances, the way was open for the establishment of the special relationship between the two great European democracies - France and Great Britain - that would be a feature of European history for the rest of the century (despite the continuation of suspicion and old resentments). The German military and naval buildup had created what Germany feared most - the establishment of a Franco-British pact - albeit one that was not yet a military alliance. Germany's growing battle fleet - there was nobody else but Britain for such a fleet to challenge - served to solidify the encirclement it feared.
  &

  In Balkan lands newly freed from the Ottoman Empire - and in the Hungarian half of Austria-Hungary - ethnic and religious rivalries were especially intense (then as now). Massacres between Serb and Moslem peoples periodically kept the pot boiling, and Austria-Hungary stood in the way of ambitions for a "Greater Serbia." Greeks, Romanians, Albanians and Bulgarians also sought advantage from the disintegration of Ottoman control. However, great power diplomacy succeeded in settling successive outbreaks, and the danger seemed most likely limited to no more than local conflicts between inconsequential small Balkan states.
  &
  Roberts points out that the emphasis on western modernization by the "Young Turks" who took over the Ottoman Empire was typical of many non-western countries. It was pursued for purposes of the development of economic and military power rather than for purposes of achieving western modernization.

  Japan was undoubtedly the first - and the most successful - example. Today, this continues in China and elsewhere in the non European world. They seek to grasp western economic and military power without having to surrender western political freedoms to their peoples - an interesting experiment that FUTURECASTS believes will ultimately fail almost everywhere.

  The Young Turks would fail to hang on to what remained of the Ottoman Empire. However, they had much better success in the development of Turkey when it was no longer burdened with empire.
  &

Complex ties and mutual interests made it unlikely that any conflict involving great powers could be confined. Special relations between small states and larger patron states created possible sources of uncontrollable hostilities.

  In 1901, there was no interest in great power conflict. The primary concerns of most of the great powers lay in their far flung non-European empires. However, Roberts emphasizes the psychological shift in the attitudes of some of the great power leaders, who thereafter slowly began to imagine that European conflict might offer better prospects than continued troubled peace.
  &
  The complex ties and mutual interests in Europe made it increasingly unlikely that any conflict involving great powers could be confined to just two or three of them. Special relations between small states and larger patron states were strengthened and created possible sources of uncontrollable hostilities. Nationalistic and patriotic emotions aroused by mass media made public opinion a new factor affecting national decision making. War was glorified - and nobody had any idea of the horrific realities of modern war.
  &

Russia felt that it had to support Serbia in its territorial disputes with Austria-Hungary - which resented Serb involvement in unrest amongst the large Slavic minority in Austria-Hungary.

  Russia was greatly concerned by German influence in Constantinople. Russia's immediate interests - as well as Russia's own ambitions to control Constantinople and the Straits - were threatened. The vast majority of Russia's grain exports - the source of most of its foreign exchange - passed through the Straits. Russia felt that it had to support Serbia in its territorial disputes with Austria-Hungary - which resented Serb involvement in unrest amongst the large Slavic minority in Austria-Hungary.
  &
  Russia began a major effort to modernize its army. She eliminated the last legal restraints on her peasant farmers - her kulaks - resulting in a great increase in agricultural production. However, Russia "was still a modernizing, not yet a modern, state."
  &
  Germany began to fear Russia's growing military strength. There was some opinion that Russia would become unbeatable with the completion of her strategic railway system - scheduled for 1918.
  &
  Nevertheless, war still looked far from inevitable. Several incidents and outbreaks of conflict - in the Balkans and North Africa - were ultimately settled by great power intercession. Italy had already shown a preference for war as a means of grabbing territory, but England and Germany worked well together on the Balkan conflicts.
  &

Bellicosity, a sense of strength, and resentment at encirclement, and hopes for territorial gains against Russia, among other factors, now made a great power conflict thinkable in Germany.

Germany assured Austria-Hungary "enthusiastic" support if it moved against Serbia.

  However, Germany was psychologically becoming increasingly ready for war. Indeed, English efforts to smooth relations only raised doubt over England's willingness to support France and Russia in the event of war. Bellicosity, a sense of strength, and resentment at encirclement, and hopes for territorial gains against Russia, among other factors, now made a great power conflict thinkable.

  "The ambiguities which surrounded the actual location of power and decision-making in Germany made matters worse, for particular interests exercised great influence, and the Emperor Wilhelm himself was an unpredictable, destabilizing force in policy-making."

  In 1914, Germany prepared for war with Russia and France - which by that time was believed to be inevitable. She strengthened her position in Constantinople, assisted in Turkish military modernization, and assured Austria-Hungary "enthusiastic" support if it moved against Serbia. A political assassination provided the trigger, and Austria-Hungary moved against Serbia despite the latter's attempts to meet the Dual Monarchy's demands. Thus does Roberts convincingly place most of the blame for the outbreak of The Great War with the German leadership.
  &
  The German "Schlieffen Plan" for a giant outflanking maneuver  through Belgium implicitly accepted the likelihood of a larger war with England. England was not yet committed to join militarily on the side of France and Russia - but would certainly act to try to preserve Belgian neutrality. If France could be knocked out quickly, that might not matter. "The plan and its strategy had never come before (let alone been considered by) civilian ministers."

  This was a characteristic of Germany's war plans. In WW II, Germany would again gamble on a quick knockout of major adversaries - successfully in France and unsuccessfully in the Soviet Union. For all its military might, Germany simply didn't have the military or economic endurance to prevail in a long conflict with a British Empire allied with a major European land power. In both wars, strategic miscalculations caused by incompetence at the very top undermined real chances for German success.

  Nevertheless, it is really impossible to truly understand subsequent European history, without understanding what actually happened militarily in WW I - something that Roberts can't come close to dedicating enough page space to achieve. Fortunately, there are numerous excellent military histories of the war and of its individual battles. It is essential to read a few of these. (A few are as much as most could stand.)
  &
  One must immerse oneself in the massive horrors, incompetence and frustrations of the conflict to achieve some accurate understanding - not just with the brain but also with the gut - of the war's deep psychological impacts in Europe - and the extent to which that affected subsequent events.

The Treaty of Versailles:

It was a "thorough Balkanization."

U.S. isolationism and Bolshevik revolutionary proclivities inevitably doomed all hopes for a stable peace.

  The League of Nations was established. It was a Wilsonian concept, but the U.S. did not join. The League had a few successes and many failures.

  "The hopes entertained of the peace settlement turned out to be not merely unrealistic, but to be undermined by revisionists and in the end blown away by events. - - - [However,] when it failed, it was for reasons that were for the most part beyond the control of the men who made it."

  The truth was soon apparent that, as Roberts points out, "the old imperial policemen were now too weakened" to control events even within Europe, much less in the rest of the world. U.S. isolationism and Bolshevik revolutionary proclivities inevitably doomed all hopes for a stable peace.
  &

Tariffs and exchange controls were raised everywhere to protect weak industries - thus guaranteeing that all would remain weak and impoverished.

U.S. tariffs prevented debtor nations from meeting their U.S.  obligations by selling goods to the U.S.

  Everywhere, previous commercial flows had been disrupted. Wars continued to ravage the new Central European and Balkan states for several years after the Treaty of Versailles. Among the small new states, "some were so weak economically that they dared not even allow such rolling stock as was left on their railways to cross frontiers in case it should not come back, so that goods had to be unloaded and reloaded at border stations." Savings were wiped out by inflation, and men could not find jobs to provide for their starving families.
  &
  Tariffs and exchange controls were raised everywhere to protect weak industries - thus guaranteeing that all would remain weak and impoverished. Currencies collapsed - Germany suffered hyper inflation.
  &
  U.S. loans soon eased this situation, as the U.S. continued to strengthen its position - gained during the war - as the world's premier creditor nation. However, U.S. tariffs prevented debtor nations from meeting their obligations by selling goods to the U.S., making the system increasingly unstable. Japan, too, had prospered during the Great War, with GDP growing about 40%.
  &
  Poverty, hardship, unemployment and widespread political struggles made an unwelcoming environment for the new democracies that arose out of the peace treaties. They were widely fragile, and only Ireland and Czechoslovakia survived.

  However, even these early unsuccessful efforts at democracy and plebiscite should not be totally dismissed as failures. They undoubtedly planted seeds of political freedom in places where it had never existed before.

Soviet Russia:

Ruthlessness and violence was also inevitably used against Communist party members themselves in the struggle for control after Lenin's death.

The Soviet Union became a catalyst and source of arms and other support for world revolution - a facilitator for the demise of the old European empires (other than that of the Soviet Union itself).

  Of course, ruthlessness and violence was also inevitably used against Communist party members themselves in the struggle for control after Lenin's death. The last men standing were Stalin and his unquestioning supporters.

  "Stalin was to carry out the real revolution to which the Bolshevik seizure of power had opened the way and would create a new elite on which a new society could be based."

    Roberts indulges in some interesting "what if" speculation about the Soviet Union - something he avoids elsewhere. What if the Dardanelles campaign had succeeded and enough aid had gotten through to permit Russia to survive the war? Russia would have remained open to outside investment and would have recovered economically much more quickly. Would a Tsarist Russia have been more or less likely to have survived Nazi attack in WW II? All that is certain is that the collapse of Tsarist Russia and the Bolshevik triumph "settled much of the history of the world in the rest of the century."
  &
  Soviet influence on 20th century history would visit many horrors on hundreds of million of people, but it was not all negative. As Roberts points out, the Soviet Union became a catalyst and source of arms and other support for world revolution - a facilitator for the demise of the old European empires (other than that of the Soviet Union itself). 

  It would also be the driving force behind the ending of old free world rivalries. It also reinforced arguments in favor of  the unification of interests in Western Europe and free trade throughout the free world. It also forced the U.S. to reluctantly accept its essential leadership role.

  However, before WW II, it was nationalism - not communism - that most undermined the old empires and other international relationships - although almost everywhere, communist parties gained strength and were active.
  &

Between two wars:

The abandonment of liberal ideals - of rationality, individualism, property rights, objective moral criteria - by many in Western intellectual and artistic circles occurred just as history was demonstrating what the practical alternatives were - in Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, Brezhnev, the Japanese militarists, and a host of lesser 20th century paranoid thugs.

  China, under Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang, began to move beyond western control in the 1920s. India did not become unmanageable until the Depression, but a split between Muslims and Hindus was already evident. Despite the growing influence of Gandhi, tendencies towards divisiveness and violence among Indian factions grew. The Government of India Act of 1935 left only defense and foreign affairs in the hands of the Viceroy.
  &
  The United States intervened militarily 20 times in Latin America in the first two decades of the century, and established two protectorates. However, it intervened just twice in the third decade, and not at all in the 1930s. FDR's "Good Neighbor" policy did much to repair relations - in time to assure widespread support in Latin America during WW II.
  &
  Then - (as now) - there were those who oppose liberal ideas of political and economic freedom and individual rights. Marxist and Freudian concepts were invoked at intellectual levels. Fascism, communism and nationalism were used to sway the masses. "Intellectual and cultural relativism combined with [those forces] to strike - - - at the core assumptions of liberal civilization, the moral and mental autonomy of the individual."

  "The liberal certainties of the autonomy of the individual, objective moral criteria, rationality, the authority of parents, and an explicable mechanical universe all seemed to be crumbling away."
  &
  Liberal civilization was being sapped by numerous forces just as a host of bullies and barbarians were taking the world stage. The abandonment of liberal ideals - of rationality, individualism, property rights, objective moral criteria - by many in Western intellectual and artistic circles occurred just as history was demonstrating what the practical alternatives were - in Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, Brezhnev, the Japanese militarists, and a host of lesser 20th century paranoid thugs.

  Nevertheless, outside intellectual circles, most of the peoples of Europe enjoyed a return to near normalcy by the last half of the 1920s. A variety of diplomatic efforts and treaties tried to smooth out some of the harsher edges of the Treaty of Versailles, bring Germany back into normal European relations - and renounce "aggressive" war. Normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and non-communist nations proceeded, but distrust remained.
  &

The Great Depression:

The New Deal provided considerable hope - and some real accomplishments - but failed to end the Depression.

  Receiving the blame for the Depression (and rightly so), the Republican party lost its 70 years status as the majority party of the United States. FDR was the first Democrat to receive a majority of the popular vote since the Civil War. The New Deal provided considerable hope - and some real accomplishments - but failed to end the Depression.

  "It provided the most important extension of the power of the federal authorities over American society and the states that had ever occurred in peacetime and one that was to prove irreversible. The New Deal changed the course of American constitutional and political history as nothing had done since the Civil War."

Professional economists have simply failed to come up with a convincing explanation for the Great Depression - leaving a blank spot that historians can't confidently fill. At least, Roberts doesn't parrot any of the absurd ideological or Keynesian explanations.

  Roberts' sketch of the factual aspects of the Great Depression is generally good, but lacks the sense of real comprehension that he generally provides in other sections of his book. By 1932, for example, he notes that U.S. industrial production had fallen about 47% from 1929 levels. British production fell only about 16%. (Roberts neglects to point out that British industrial activity was already performing poorly in 1929, while the U.S. was then in the midst of an unprecedented boom.) He notes that "the armament program ended a depression still left unmastered by Roosevelt's New Deal." (This is partially true, but a gross and misleading oversimplification.)

    Roberts offers no hint of the causes of the Great Depression. It just happened - the onset of a business collapse without end - like a rock falling from the sky - and is presented with even less explanation and understanding.
  &
  This is not actually his fault. Professional economists have simply failed to come up with a convincing explanation - leaving a blank spot that historians can't confidently fill. Many economists were - and are -  ideological advocates of government economic management, industrial policy, or even socialist ownership of productive assets. In order to justify policies that place levers of economic power increasingly in government hands, they have succeeded in placing the blame for the Depression on some fictitious  inherent instability of capitalism. At least, Roberts doesn't parrot any of the absurd ideological or Keynesian explanations.
  &
  Government policies of incredible stupidity (WW I - vindictive and unrealistic peace treaties - war debts and reparations - trade war protectionism - farm subsidies - dysfunctional banking regulation) caused the Depression, and government policies - especially New Deal policies (continued trade war protectionism - price and wage controls) - stubbornly and stupidly implemented and maintained - prevented recovery and actually made matters worse. However, this is anathema to those advocating various forms of government economic management. The obvious noxious role played by such government policies is determinedly ignored  by most economists and historians to this day. The myth of inherent capitalist instability - a Marxist creation - is determinedly maintained.
  &
  You can't justify government economic management - you can't convince the public to increasingly place levers of economic control in government hands - by referring to such huge examples of government stupidity. However, since the Republicans were primarily to blame for that stupidity - just as with the S&L crisis a half century later - there was no political force that could defend the truth.

World War Two:

 "It is now even more difficult to sense - let alone explain - the extraordinary fact of the positive admiration and attraction excited abroad by both Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union."

  Meanwhile, Stalin went to war against the Russian people and anyone in the Communist party suspected of even an iota of independent thought. Estimates of deaths from purges and disease and starvation range as high as 17 million, as Stalin took control of every aspect of economic, political and intellectual life. Nine out of ten generals were purged, as were a significant percentage of the rest of the officer corps.

  "A new party elite replaced the old one; by 1939 over half the delegates who had attended the party Congress of 1934 had been arrested."

  But Russia remained on the road to industrialization, with great advances in production, education, science, and the freeing of women for wage labor. However, its subversive efforts against other nations - although mostly unsuccessful - were realistically threatening (especially during the Great Depression), and left other European powers with grave doubts as to whether Stalin or Hitler posed the greatest danger.

  "It is now even more difficult to sense - let alone explain - the extraordinary fact of the positive admiration and attraction excited abroad by both Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union. Sheer ignorance and the deployment by both regimes of skillful propaganda no doubt went a long way in shaping reactions among those who did not have to live under these regimes, but the willingness of foreign intellectuals and opinion-formers to be deceived remains almost incomprehensible."

  Against all evidence, ideological commitments led to widespread suspension of disbelief. Everywhere, failure to prevent or quickly deal with the Depression undermined the political center. For many intellectuals, WW I and the Great Depression caused all faith to be lost in liberal government. Lying - for the cause - became justifiable - and even virtuous.

  This intellectual tendency for self deception - for suspension of disbelief - remains clearly evident today in the astounding variety of authoritative myths that continue to attract substantial numbers of intellectual adherents. The debunking of such myths is essential for understanding the present and accurately evaluating future prospects - and is an essential feature of FUTURECASTS coverage.

    Again, Roberts adequately sketches the big picture of world war. (For those who want more, a host of good military histories are available. However, there is also some current politically correct revisionist history that is absurd. See Part 2 of the review of David M. Kennedy's sloppy effort in "Freedom from Fear.") By the end of 1941, it was clear that Europe's future was no longer in the hands of the traditional European powers, but would for the rest of the century be settled by the United States and Soviet Russia.

  Both world wars present far more subtleties concerning possible outcome determinative events than many modern historians care to reflect upon. When these great wars set all in flux, the outcome was far more uncertain than hindsight indicates. Small groups - and even single individuals - found themselves in positions from which they could change the course of history.

• If the Schlieffen Plan had been rigorously followed at the outset of WW I, and Germany had left its northern wing at full strength, it might have been able to envelop Paris as planned and bring the war to a quick end.
• If the Poles had not found ways of breaking Germany's unbreakable Enigma cipher machine, England might have lost air supremacy in the Battle of Britain, and might have been unable to keep the sea lanes open in the Battle of the Atlantic.
• If the little Greek army had been unable to defeat Italian aggression, Hitler would have invaded Russia a month earlier with about 15% more strength.
• If Spain had allowed German forces to pass through to take Gibraltar, England's Middle Eastern position might have become untenable.
• If the brilliant German professional generals had been permitted to fight a war of maneuver against Russia instead of being tied down by the position warfare concepts of a WW I corporal, the result on the Eastern Front in WW II might have been the same as during WW I.
• If FDR had rejected the atom bomb project, the war against Japan would have been much longer and bloodier, and Soviet Russia would have occupied half the Japanese islands and all of Korea.

  But of course, there is no room for such reflections in a single volume history covering an entire century.

  By the end of the war, France and Britain were exhausted financially, economically and spiritually. The New Deal's self defeating command economy efforts - especially its wage and price controls - had been abandoned. Monetary arrangements made the dollar the primary reserve currency - the World Bank and the IMF were created - and the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) changed the face of world trade.

  Thus, the pre-WW II trade war - that had played such a major role in the onset and duration of the Great Depression - was ended. Keynes and his followers were in no doubt about the importance of this effort, and they were very active in its achievement. It was their greatest contribution.

The Cold War:

  Left wing arguments about U.S. responsibility for the start of the Cold War are quickly and convincingly skewered by Roberts. Stalin's attitude was blunt. "Whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system."
  &

Russian destabilization efforts and military domination of Eastern Europe drove noncommunist governments together into the combined opposition that Soviet Russia feared.

  After WW II, Soviet Russia went right back to work trying to destabilize and promote the overthrow of noncommunist governments as well as - in Yugoslavia and periodically among its satellites - any communist governments that did not slavishly follow the Moscow line. This drove noncommunist governments together into the combined opposition that Soviet Russia feared.

  "From the start the United Nations was an arena in which the USSR contended with a still inchoate western bloc that its policies did much to solidify."
  &
  "For all the power of the United States in 1945, there was little political will to use it; the first concern of the American military after victory was to bring the boys home and achieve as rapid a demobilization as possible."

  By 1948, the U.S. Army's strategic reserve consisted of just 2 divisions. Soviet Russia had 185. Of course, the U.S. had a wide range of naval and air bases - and the atom bomb. It was also infinitely stronger economically and financially.
  &

The Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia was the unmistakable signal for the Western nations that a threat had to be actively opposed.

  The communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in 1948 played the same role for the Cold War as the German takeover in 1939. It was an action that was impossible to excuse - even for many of the most credulous - and an absolutely clear indication of aggressive intent. It was the unmistakable signal for the Western nations that a threat had to be actively opposed.
  &
  But in this conflict, the United States would have to lead from the beginning. By 1947, Britain was in retreat. Her finances were no longer able to support her broadening welfare state and her imperial and world power status. Harry S. Truman - without FDR's illusions about the friendship of Stalinist Russia - decided that the U.S. must step in to fill the void in Greece and Turkey.
  &

Unlike after WW I, both major WW II adversaries - Germany and Japan - were quickly transformed into major Cold War allies by benevolent occupation and magnanimous peace treaties.

  This quickly grew into a decision to "contain" Soviet power. "Behind it lay Soviet behavior and the growing fears Stalin's policy had aroused over the previous eighteen months." The Marshall Plan soon followed - to assure European recovery and resistance to communist expansion.
  &
  The West proceeded to rehabilitate West Germany as the front line state in the Cold War, and the Soviets responded by blockading Berlin and strengthening the hand of East Germany. With the Berlin airlift and the movement of heavy bombers back to bases in Europe, the U.S. indicated that a line had been reached that it was determined to defend with force if necessary. The Cold War had begun.

  "Inevitably, in so complicated a process on so wide a geographic scale much opportunism got mixed up with doctrinaire rigidity. So did much human inadequacy. The Cold War was a blight that left little of the world untouched, a seeping source of crime, corruption and suffering for more than thirty years."

  Then came the well known early mileposts of the conflict. In 1949, NATO was established. Then, the Federal Republic of (West) Germany - the (East) German Democratic Republic - widespread purges as Stalin tightened his grip on the satellite nations - North Korea, after obtaining permission from Stalin (and from Mao, too), invaded South Korea - and Stalin and his successors continued their all out war against their own people.
  &
  The Marshall Plan and the end of trade war protectionism that permitted a revival of West European trade soon revived prosperity and ended fears of a return of the Great Depression. Unlike after WW I, both major WW II adversaries - Germany and Japan - were quickly transformed into major Cold War allies by benevolent occupation and magnanimous peace treaties.
  &
  Post WW II developments in China, the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, and other "Third World" nations are covered. As the Cold War stalemated in Europe, both sides sought advantage elsewhere. China played an increasingly important role. New nations - many with old antagonisms - filled the world stage.
  &

Economics:

  Various aspects of the scientific revolution are also covered by Roberts. He acknowledges that ultimate impacts are currently impossible to evaluate. However, scientific advances clearly had an immense impact on the politics and military conflicts of 20th century history - and a great deal of impact on the economics.
  &

  Instant communications instantly reveal extreme events worldwide. Even the poorest nations have substantially increased life expectancies. Inequality grows exponentially. Capitalist nations develop and take advantage of the new technological capabilities. Their people consume - and produce - a vastly disproportionate percentage of the world's economic wealth. (2% of the world's farmers in developed nations produce 25% of its food and 75% of its food exports.)

  Without disputing the reality of the broad trends indicated by the gross economic statistics, it is well to keep in mind that they do not include the gray market activities that comprise a huge percentage of total economic activities in undeveloped regions, and sizeable percentages even in developed nations.

  Since the end of WW II, the U.S. has eschewed isolation and most - but certainly not all - protectionist impulses. It has financed and provided the driving force in free world economic development.

  "The explanation must include international circumstances (of which the Cold War was overwhelmingly the most important) which made it seem in America's interest to behave as she did, the imaginative grasp of opportunities shown by some of her statesmen and businessmen, the absence for a long time of any alternative source of capital on such a scale anywhere in the world, and the efforts of many men of different nations who, even before the end of the war, had tried to set in place institutions which could prevent any return to the economic anarchy of the 1930s." 

  The IMF, the World Bank, GATT - prevented a return to the political policies that had disrupted the international economic system before WW II - reducing average tariffs of the major economies from 40% to just 5%, and permitting a five fold increase in world trade. (Widespread predictions of a quick return of the Great Depression were thus proved false.)
  &

By the 1970s, the failures of the command economic systems of the Soviet bloc and many of the Third World nations had become increasingly evident. The failure of the Keynesian economic policies pursued in the West had also become evident.

Like so many professionals in fields like history, politics, and sociology - who have to take economics into account - Roberts is handicapped by the failure of the economics profession to convincingly explain major economic events.

  By the 1970s, the failures of the command economic systems of the Soviet bloc and many of the Third World nations had become increasingly evident. The failure of the Keynesian economic policies pursued in the West had also become evident. By the 1980s, the entire Soviet system - and much of the third world - were essentially bankrupt, and the West was desperately trying to recover from the great inflationary surges of the 1970s.

  Roberts is unable to overcome - to cut through - the ideological obfuscation - of modern economists. He thus fails to adequately cover the vital economic aspects of 20th century history.
  &
  Like so many professionals in fields like history, politics, and sociology - who have to take economics into account - Roberts is handicapped by the failure of the economics profession to convincingly explain major economic events. The Great Depression - the reasons why some economic systems have advanced faster than others and some have remained undeveloped - the devaluation of the dollar and related oil price shocks and the inflationary surge of the 1970s - the reasons for the gross failures of command economic systems both within and outside the communist bloc - these are all central questions relevant to any understanding of the 20th century.
  &
  Yet, repeatedly, Roberts just relates the economic facts as he might relate the occurrence and impacts of a drought or volcanic eruption.  Without facing up to these questions - without rigorous analyses of why these major economic events occurred - no 20th century history can be considered complete - or even adequate.

The spread of Western culture:

Western - and especially U.S. - influences have predominated in all these spheres, even as the rest of the world increasingly liberated itself from Western political control.

  Western - and especially American - influences have predominated around the world in all these spheres, even as the rest of the world increasingly liberated itself from Western political control. Sociological history at the end of the century has centered around the spread - and instances of resistance to that spread - of such Western and American influences.

  Roberts provides a full chapter on the impact of the "contraceptive pill" on the status of women, but the impacts on sexual morality of effective treatments for venereal diseases is omitted.

An age of miracles:

In just a few short years after 1980, western electorates managed to find and support strong leadership that would reverse apparently irreversible decline.

  Substantially omitted, however, was one of the most remarkable political turnarounds of history. As the 1970s ended, all the major Western powers suffered under weak leadership and acute demoralization. The intellectual community was full of voices counseling retreat. Yet, within a few years of the end of the 1970s, democratic electorates in all these nations had somehow found strong leadership - whether of the left as in France or of the right as in England - and it was Soviet Russia that labored under decrepit old leaders and a crumbling system. 

Contrary to the most strongly held Marxist expectations, it was not in the democracies, but in the communist states that workers began attempting mass uprisings against their political and economic masters.

  Then, impossible things began to happen - symbolized by the fall of the Berlin wall. (It was the age of Aquarius, after all - suitably signaled by an alignment of the planets.)
  &
  At the end of the century, the military and economic integration of Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Chinese turn toward capitalism, and the spreading if still fragile multiple triumphs of capitalism and democracy, improbably dominated world history.
  &
  Even at the height of the Soviet imperial advance and American weakness around 1980, Soviet Russia was stretched to the breaking point. Roberts estimates that one quarter of her economy was dedicated to maintaining her military and imperial status. The new weapons systems needed to keep pace with the Reagan buildup would be hugely expensive. (Indeed, without an opening of the entire social system, it would be impossible to develop the software and computer hardware engineers essential for modern weaponry.)
  &
  In 70 years, "neither material well-being nor freedom had been forthcoming." (Were they ever really an objective?) "And now the costs of modernization were becoming too heavy to bear."
  &
  Roberts sets forth the failures of the command economies.

  "By the 1980s, all the countries of the eastern bloc were in some degree in a state of economic crisis. An economic transformation was clearly necessary, but seemed impossible." (Communism was accomplishing what WW II had not been destructive enough to accomplish - the destruction of human know how - the massive decline of human capital.)

  After the Helsinki accords, dissident groups grew and even prospered in eastern bloc nations, despite repressive efforts. People in leadership positions increasingly came to question the viability of command economic systems. Contrary to the most strongly held Marxist expectations, it was not in the democracies, but in the communist states that workers began attempting mass uprisings against their political and economic masters.
  &

When Russian divisions did not move on Poland, that nonevent signaled a turning point in the Cold War.

  In Poland, the people increasingly turned to the Catholic Church as a counterweight to the authority of the Communist party. (Chinese reaction to the apparently harmless Falun Gong becomes more understandable with this history in mind.) The first real crack in the total control of East European Communism came with the recognition of the independent Solidarity trade union.
  &
  Obviously, where Russia was not going to step in and enforce total control, many East European satellite governments did not have the stomach for totalitarian repression. Indeed, they were undoubtedly themselves infected with nationalist aspirations. When Russian divisions did not move on Poland, that nonevent signaled a turning point in the Cold War.
  &
  Tied down in Afghanistan, drained financially by weak client states in Africa, Cuba and elsewhere, and encumbered by a crumbling command economy, Russia's aging leadership was losing its stomach for active totalitarian intervention in satellite nations.
  &
  Polish Communist repression during the 1980s was incomplete and increasingly ineffective. When the new young Russian premier, Mikhail Gorbachev, decided against further Russian military interventions, first Poland and then the other satellites spun away from the Soviet system. Like the rest of the old European imperial powers, Russia had finally realized that it must relieve itself of the economic burdens of empire if it was to progress economically. Gorbachev also realized that an open society was essential for technological progress and to overcome the stagnation of socialism.
  &

Russian exports of oil and gas at below market prices were especially important to the East European satellite nations. With this prop pulled from under the creaking satellite economic systems, economic and political collapse became general.

  In 1990, Russia decided it could no longer afford to receive anything but hard currencies for its exports. Russian exports of oil and gas at below market prices were especially important to the East European satellite nations. With this prop pulled from under the creaking satellite economic systems, economic and political collapse became general.
  &
  Reform in Russia - opposed by the command economy bureaucracy - was simply not delivered quickly enough or completely enough. (Indeed, it remains largely undelivered to this day.) Support for Gorbachev and the Russian Communist party fell precipitously. "Nationalist and regional sentiment excited by economic collapse" threatened to tear Russia itself apart.

  "After seventy years of efforts to make Soviet citizens, it looked as if the USSR had been, after all, just another multiethnic empire with unsolved ethnic problems."

  To this massive upheaval, "the West had contributed virtually nothing - to do so would have seemed too dangerous - but had  exercised positive effect indirectly, through economic burdens imposed on the USSR by armaments and the largely unanticipated effects of mass communications."

  By supporting rebellions in Soviet client states in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Africa, the Reagan administration substantially increased the rate at which Soviet Russia was bleeding financially. With strategic stalemate due to nuclear weapons, and stalemate in military tactical forces, it was ultimately the strength of the dollar - supported by the capitalist U.S. economic system - that proved to be the tactically and strategically decisive force in the Cold War.

A still dangerous world:

  The need to contain the destructive forces of nationalism - especially German nationalism - had been joined by fear of Soviet Russia and the benefits of economic integration - to drive the major components of Western Europe together - in a broadening military and economic union - designed nevertheless to achieve national interests.

  "It could by no means be said as the century drew to its end that liberal democracy was the unqualified beneficiary of the new prosperity of east Asia." 

  Roberts surveys developments in key nations and regions - China, Japan, India, Africa - from the height of the Cold War to almost the end of the century. Despite massive improvements in almost all aspects of life during this most bloody of centuries, at the end it is still a very troubled and dangerous world. Most nations still pursue economically unwise policies that must inevitably restrict growth and/or  lead to cyclical troubles.
  &

A weak European Community governance system that offers many benefits and few obligations is an irresistible attraction and a force for stability.

  The continued success and expansion of European integration - which has overcome  innumerable problems but is still facing many others - is perhaps the single most important stabilizing influence currently at work at the beginning of the 21st century. Roberts rightly devotes considerable coverage to this historic process.

  The further spread of European integration - so vital to the future of the world - is undermined by various narrow vested interests in the European Community's command economy and welfare systems. Hopefully, however, European integration will continue to flourish - ultimately convincing even Russia that its economic future must lie in close ties to Europe. Like the 19th century federal government in the U.S., a weak European Community governance system that offers many benefits and few obligations makes it an irresistible attraction and a force for stability.