Military_futurecast, strategy, tactics, international terrorism

The conflict against international terrorism:

No one strategy or tactical methodology will succeed in the conflict against international terrorism. However, there are some things that absolutely have to be accomplished for any chance of success, and there are other realities that must be faced.

Every regime inclined to favor or harbor terrorist organizations MUST be made to fear for its own existence. Political borders must not offer terrorist organizations any sanctuary, and financial or other support must be made extremely risky.
Neither containment nor deterrence are feasible strategies against the terrorists themselves. They will neither compromise nor accept any reasonable accommodation. They must be chased and harried without letup wherever found.
The conflict against terrorism MUST be won. There is no alternative. While gratuitous violence will as always be self defeating - and good judgment in choice of tactics remains essential - this "absolute need to win" does justify any tactics that may be appropriate and within the broad limits of the Geneva Convention. It may, indeed, at times become a dark and dirty conflict - and there may be times when substantial civilian casualties may be unavoidable. Nations may even have to shoot down their own hijacked airliners. However, these are the terms of engagement chosen by the terrorists, and the conflict will have to be fought out on that basis.
Evil groups like the Taliban and the terrorists inevitably make many enemies. We must strengthen and assist their enemies against them - even many of those that we might otherwise prefer not to have any dealings with. On occasion, that may be enough. However, inevitably, there will be times when the U.S. will have to commit forces - sometimes substantial forces - on the field of battle.
Only with the assistance of the vast majority of the Moslem peoples can this conflict be won. Fortunately, they are like everyone else - anxious to get on with their lives - with a clear preference for life in the 21st century rather than in the 14th century.
Getting rid of the Taliban would certainly not end the conflict. However, it would certainly be a first - and probably an essential - step. Afghanistan is still a tactically difficult area, with no direct access from the sea. However, the Taliban have their own weaknesses that may come into play if effective force can be applied.
Fear of adverse reaction from other Middle Eastern states must not be a deterrent to effective action. To accept such deterrence is to admit defeat. If such reactions are likely now, they are certain later - and it would be best to get rid of one problem before others have to be faced.
A convincing show of force on such an apparently out-of-reach battlefield may reap unexpected dividends. The Taliban have made enemies with most of the nations on its borders, and Iran and Pakistan are burdened with about 4 million troublesome Afghan refugees. A display of futility such as those typical of the Clinton administration would just invite contempt and encourage the terrorists.
The terrorists are, in fact, effectively attacking strategically significant targets - with substantial impacts on the economic strength of the United States and the rest of the developed world - and on the Third World and Arab nations, too. Like most of the 20th century adversaries faced by the U.S. and its allies, they admit to no moral limitations on their actions. Although they remain tactically pitifully weak, this gives them tremendous strategic advantages that must be recognized.
As a result of their recent success, the basic risk/reward ratio of Western economies has shifted adversely. The "risk premium" between Treasury Notes and other investments has widened. The capital markets will reflect this by fluctuating around lower price/earnings multiples than before. The sharply lower levels of stock market prices reflect this fact. This increases the cost of capital. The cost of insurance is also increased. With a long conflict, a substantial growth in government spending will inevitably squeeze the private sector. The productivity of the entire Western world has thus been adversely impacted. There are also, of course, the immediate costs of the attack and the significantly higher costs of heightened security to take into account, but the greatest damage is from the system wide impacts.
Nevertheless, the ability of the terrorists to mount a sustained campaign has yet to be demonstrated. It took them a long time to launch the recent attack, and they may in the future have trouble coming close to their recent spectacular success. The world has been shrugging off lesser acts of terrorism for some time, and at least now is mounting an active defense.
If the terrorists fail to maintain a sustained campaign, the adverse economic impacts of the recent attack will slowly lessen - with sufficient time, to near the vanishing point.
Meanwhile, the nations hurt the most by this attack will be the commodity manufacturing and raw materials exporting nations (Asian Tiger and Third World nations), the Middle Eastern oil exporters, and Russia. The sums lost by OPEC will quickly mount into the tens of billions of dollars. In the absence of a sustained terrorist campaign, the lower raw materials and supplier prices will help the developed nations recover from the blow.
The economic prospects of the whole world have been adversely affected by the attack - something that will tend to support allied efforts to gain widespread cooperation and alliance against the terrorists.
The West has been made infinitely stronger by the attack. The normal hesitancy and divisiveness of peacetime are over. The U.S. is now actively engaged in marshaling worldwide opposition to the terrorists.
Globalization has received a boost as a result of the conflict. Trade liberalization is being granted to Pakistan, Jordan and other Middle Eastern states as a reward for cooperation, and Pres. Bush may now be able to get "fast track" trade negotiating authority through Congress.
The period of unilateral disarmament of the intelligence and security forces charged with combating espionage and sabotage is now over. This disarmament policy was enacted by a liberal U.S. Congress during the Carter administration in the 1970s. Once again, weakness and a determined denial of reality has invited attack. Inevitably, there will in the future be abuses of the powers restored to the security agencies just as there were such abuses in the past, but these problems will have to be dealt with without unilateral disarmament of such forces. As FUTURECASTS has repeatedly pointed out, the world remains a dangerous place. An effective defense is essential.

Military strategy	Grand strategy
Tactical considerations	International terrorism

Wars of attrition dictated by restrictive terms of engagement: Attrition warfare is, in essence, the total lack of strategy.	Since WW II, the United States and its friends and allies have frequently been involved in frustrating, costly, and sometimes losing, wars of attrition. [ This has never been the choice of the military. Since the WW I Battle of Verdun - which was a battle of attrition and, by common acknowledgement, the most stupidly fought battle of the most stupidly fought war in history - attrition warfare has been universally considered discredited by military strategists. [ Nevertheless, Washington has repeatedly imposed political constraints on military strategy - frequently resulting in Washington dictating even the choice of individual bombing targets. The nation and friendly governments have repeatedly been enmeshed in conflicts under politically imposed terms of engagement that made victory impossible and even avoidance of defeat very difficult. [ Attrition warfare is, in essence, the total lack of strategy. [
North Vietnam won by attacking economic facilities and noncombatant civilians as well as military forces and facilities.	During the Vietnam conflict, North Vietnam could send invading forces across political boundaries with impunity, attacking not only the military forces and installations of the Allies, but also all manner of economic facilities and noncombatant civilians. They aimed directly at the destruction of the political and economic systems of South Vietnam. [ Vast segments of the North's economic system, however, were off limits to Allied attack, and the North was repeatedly assured that its political structure wouldn't be attacked. It was like playing a game of chess while restricting your pieces to your half of the board and denying any intention of attacking your adversary's king. [ The United States thus restricted itself and its allies to a strategy of attrition against a war hardened nation with one of the highest birthrates in the world and a demonstrated callousness towards casualties. Fifty years after the Battle of Verdun, Defense Secretary McNamara and his whiz kids - with their supreme contempt for the lessons of history - led the United States into a war of attrition in Asia. [ There were many good reasons to avoid that conflict, not the least of which was the tactical stupidity of choosing to fight on an Asian battlefield bordering a then antagonistic China that the United States did not want to confront militarily. [
The United States sought to prevent its allies from launching counterattacks across political borders or against the economic facilities and civilian personnel supporting their adversaries.	During the 1970s, the United States uniformly tried to limit the strategic options of all friendly governments that relied on the United States for support. There were widespread attacks or threatened attacks by Soviet clients - often across political borders - that targeted not only military facilities and personnel but economic facilities and civilian personnel as well. The usual response of the United States was to attempt to prohibit counterattacks across those same borders or against the economic facilities and civilian personnel supporting those adversaries. [ The result was that South Vietnam and several other friendly governments were toppled. These governments certainly had many faults, but the alternative governments - whether or not Soviet clients - invariably proved much worse - not only for American interests but for the interests of the local peoples as well. All around the world, friendly governments began to suspect that it was fatal to be an ally of the United States. [
Today, the United States generally offers little more than muted objections to the way internal conflicts are managed.	This changed dramatically in the 1980s, as the U.S. turned a blind eye to the harsh measures adopted by friendly governments in dealing with internal conflicts and external threats from neighboring Soviet clients. Today, the U.S. offers nothing more than muted objections to the ways in which internal conflicts are managed in such nations as Egypt, Turkey and Algeria, and continues normal relations with the determinedly repressive regime in China. Russia's brutal suppression of Chechnya also draws little more than muted objections, and not the slightest disruption in normal relations.

As soon as the thirst for aggressive adventure wanes, the attractiveness of ties to a Soviet Union or Nazi Germany wanes with it.	World War II saw similar strategic phenomena. [ England not only ultimately obtained powerful alliances with the Soviet Union and the United States, it also obtained vital assistance from a handful of Polish code breakers and some excellent Polish pilots, some Yugoslav partisans, a valiant little Greek army, and partisan groups throughout Europe. Hitler's allies were uniformly inept and irresolute on the battlefield, and their failures were a constant source of trouble. The need to control subjugated peoples diverted vast German forces. [ The Japanese always fought alone, while the United States fought against them with allies such as England, China, Australia, and New Zealand, and obtained vital assistance from Philippine partisans and Solomon Island natives. [ In both theaters, until final victory, the Allies never had to divert substantial forces for occupation duties. [ There is no natural cohesion in alliances with evil empires like the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Only fear of military retribution keeps subject peoples in line. Only a desire for arms and diplomatic support makes such alliances attractive to those few nations contemplating aggressive military or diplomatic initiatives against their neighbors. As soon as the thirst for aggressive adventure wanes, the attractiveness of ties to a Soviet Union or Nazi Germany wanes with it. [
Magnanimity towards old adversaries and good will towards peaceful nations has proven to be the most powerful concept of grand strategy in the 20th century, and will remain such in the 21st century.	The grand strategy of the United States since WW II has been outstanding even if its military strategy has often left much to be desired. No powerful nation in the history of the world has been more successful in developing and maintaining friends and allies, and in turning old adversaries into friends and allies. [ Even where friendship has not been possible - and even among those who resent its success - its essentially non threatening posture has enabled it to maintain cordial commercial relationships. Only those nations that entertain aggressive ambitions need fear the United States. [ Magnanimity towards old adversaries and good will towards peaceful nations has proven to be the most powerful concept of grand strategy in the 20th century, and will remain such in the 21st century.
Victory in the great conflicts of the 20th century has been as much because of the virtues of the Allies and the evil of their opponents as because of Allied economic power and the skills and valor of their fighting men.	The weaknesses within Western alliances and within Western relationships with Third World nations were and remain many and profound. However, the ties between them were and remain based on military, commercial, and /or ideological interests that were and are both mutual and fundamental - and thus were and remain capable of surmounting most difficulties. [ Victory in the great conflicts of the 20th century has been as much because of the virtues of the Allies and the evil of their opponents as because of Allied economic power and the skills and valor of their fighting men. However imperfect those virtues inevitably were, there can be no doubt that the lines between good and evil were never more clearly drawn than in the 20th century. The rewards of virtue and the weaknesses of evil were never more clearly demonstrated. [ The stupidity of moral relativism was never more obvious. [

The mighty dollar:	And then, there is the dollar. [ The turning point in the Cold War came in 1982. It was a dark time - a terrible night - for the United States and its allies - with evil portents abounding at every point of the compass. [
In spite of all the troubles of 1982, the position of the United States was stronger by the end of that year than at any time since the start of the Vietnam War, and its ideological opponents were everywhere in evident retreat. A stable dollar prevented oil embargoes, assured reliable flows of supplies from friends and foes alike, shielded the Western allies from the shockwaves of Third World conflicts, assured respect for the United States and its interests, and improved economic efficiency and stability.	Two major wars in the Middle East - a potentially disruptive conflict between a primary European ally and a primary Latin American friend - the deepest worldwide depression since the 1930s - and the most serious policy split in the history of the vital NATO alliance - all howled and whistled in the winds that year - without laying a glove on the strategic position of the United States. [ Indeed, despite those problems and many other dire events during the course of that year, the United States found itself with a far stronger position throughout the world at the end of 1982 than at any time since the beginning of the Vietnam War. [ One would have expected that the troubles of 1982 would have aroused all manner of barking dogs. One would have expected them to be not just howling in the winds, but to be actively nipping at the heels of exposed worldwide commercial and strategic interests as well. This is what invariably happened during such moments in the 1970s. [ Nevertheless, no dogs barked in the troubled night of 1982. [ OPEC made no move to cut off or restrict oil flows when Israel invaded Lebanon. The quarrel over the Falkland Islands was successfully contained. NATO differences were successfully resolved. The Soviet Union found herself hopelessly enmeshed in costly conflicts all around the world and in a state of serious economic decline. [ Indeed, the ideological foes of the United States hadn't been so quiescent since the start of the Cold War. Socialist nations not only refrained from nationalizing western business interests, they began actively courting investments from the much-maligned multinational corporations. [ This remarkable state of affairs was obviously neither good luck nor outstanding coincidence. There was a single overwhelming reason for this mysterious state of affairs - a reason we forget at our peril. That reason was simply the reestablishment of the stability of the dollar. A stable dollar meant that suppliers needed dollars more than we needed their supplies. A stable dollar meant positive interest rates -- the interest that could be earned and the debts that could be paid rendered income from sales far more valuable than supplies left in the ground or hoarded by suppliers. A stable dollar protected the economies of the United States and its primary allies from the shockwaves of Third World conflicts. A stable dollar assured respect for the United States even from those nations from which it would have been naive to expect friendship. A stable and strengthening dollar meant favorable shifts in the nation's terms of trade. It took less of our coal to buy more of their oil - less of our grain to buy more of their bananas. A stable and strengthening dollar meant - and itself was possible only because of - a steady reduction in the rate of inflation.
The reestablishment of the stability of the dollar was one of the Reagan Administration's greatest Cold War and domestic victories.	Whatever the failures of the Reagan administration - and there were many - Reagan succeeded in reestablishing the stability of the dollar. Unaffordable levels of defense expenditures, insufficient cuts in government domestic spending, and the frequent resort to self-defeating trade embargoes as Cold War weapons, were hardly minor matters. However, as long as real interest rates remained above normal, inflation rates would continue to decline and the dollar would remain stable. [ The stability of the dollar easily made up for a host of other weaknesses and mistakes. The end of inflation and elimination of energy price controls ushered in 15 years of low energy prices that provided a substantial basis for renewed prosperity. [
All political leaders, both friend and foe alike, had to eventually establish sufficient ties to the Western World to engage in commerce with the Western World.	The dollar easily regained its status as the predominant strategic weapon of the Cold War and the most potent force behind American diplomacy. A strong military defense was obviously still required to deter overt aggression from the Soviet Union and its clients. [ However, oil kept coming to the West from OPEC suppliers - even from such ideological adversaries as Libya, Algeria, Iraq, Iran, and Angola - not because of strategic missiles, but because of the dollar. East European satellites strained at the ties that bound them to the Soviet Union not because of the military might of NATO, but because of the irresistible attractions of the hard-currency commerce of the Western World. The attraction of the dollar, not fear of the United States Navy, kept supplies flowing from Latin American nations, and from Argentina as well, during the Falkland Islands conflict. [ Even the Soviet Union remained the very model of a reliable supplier of such vital resources as titanium and oil, not because of any fear of the United States Army, but because of its hunger for the dollar. [ Repeatedly, it was proven that failure of any particular Western diplomatic or military effort didn't necessarily translate into increased Soviet strength or a weakened Western World. Whether in regional powers like China, Indonesia, Egypt, or Iran - or in smaller states like Chile or Angola - if new leaders were to cap military and political success with economic success - whoever grabbed power had to eventually establish sufficient ties to the Western World to engage in commerce with the Western World. [
Liberal economic policies ignited inflation, pushed interest rates up, and made all problems worse.	Liberal Keynesian economic policy in the 1970s resulted in monetary expansion sufficient to artificially force interest rates down. This inevitably ignited inflation, resulted in higher interest rates, undermined the dollar, made all existing problems worse, and left the Western World's commerce naked in the face of the world's continuous flow of political and economic storms. [
The major difference between the commercial and ideological vulnerability of the Western World during the 1970s and the seeming invulnerability and ultimate triumph of the 1980s, was the renewed stability and slow strengthening of the dollar.	Those who doubt the overwhelming importance of a sound dollar should ponder all those barking dogs that so mysteriously remained silent during the long troubled night that covered the international wasteland during 1982. The major difference between the commercial and ideological vulnerability of the Western World during the 1970s and the seeming invulnerability and ultimate triumph of the 1980s, was the renewed stability and slow strengthening of the dollar. [ The answer to the mystery is elementary, my dear Dr. Watson. [ Today, there is justifiable fear that a troubled Russia or expansionist China might someday initiate a serious military confrontation with the United States. However, this is not inevitable or even as likely as many believe. As long as the dollar is something the United States has - and Russia and China want and desperately and increasingly need - there will remain powerful reasons for those nations - and all other nations - to get along with the United States. [

War fever:	It appears that each generation has to learn for itself just what the horrors of war actually are. [
No government that can count on the support of an armed citizenry need fear the outbreak of revolution or guerrilla conflicts. All of the many internal conflicts of the Cold War world came about because governments could not arm their ordinary citizenry and count on their support.	Major military conflagrations relieve the world's periodic war fevers, but apparently only for about the time needed for a new generation to reach its twenties. Within each generation, there will be those who view war as just a lot of adventure stories - an acceptable means of settling old scores and current frustrations - and even as an apparent means for escape from humdrum lives. [ Such young people readily flock to the banners of those who promise action. Suddenly, petty, rabble rousing demagogues find themselves with the kind of youthful martial following that gives them real power. How easy it seems to push aside the more centrist political leaders and dominate any nation whose citizenry won't or aren't permitted to take up arms to defend political institutions. [ No government that can count on the support of an armed citizenry need fear the outbreak of revolution or guerrilla conflicts. All of the many internal conflicts of the Cold War world came about because governments could not arm their ordinary citizenry and count on their support. [ When demagogues succeed in taking control of nations, they frequently find themselves riding the whirlwind. Their rhetoric creates expectations of forceful action and dramatic achievement. Their following will inevitably include some young leaders who lie in wait to take advantage of any sign of weakness - any disappointment at the pace of events. It is an environment ripe for the success of the paranoid thugs who grab and sustain power by ruthlessly eliminating all current and potential opposition. The Taliban in Afghanistan have remarkably succeeded in earning the dislike or enmity of all of the many nations on its borders - and of China, Russia and the U.S. as well..
With the demise of the willingness to reach compromises and accommodations in international disputes, the war fever mounts.	Truth and reason are invariably the first casualties of this phenomenon. Intellectuals and media elements that refuse to slavishly follow the party line are quickly targeted for silencing or elimination. Ultimately, the willingness to compromise and accommodate differing interests within and across national boundaries also falls by the wayside. [ Compromise and accommodation are the key elements in any effort to peacefully resolve differences among sovereign nations. Without a cop on the beat or a court with the authority to order compliance with its decisions, there is no disinterested force behind international law or diplomacy. With the demise of the willingness to reach compromises and accommodations in international disputes, the war fever mounts. [
Western military might must be substantial enough, and the willingness to use it must be visible enough, to convince even the most rabid and heavily propagandized rabble that compromise and accommodation is the only prudent course for their leaders to follow.	For a diminishing but still significant number of aggressive despotisms around the world, only Western military force provides an inducement towards compromise and accommodation and continued acceptance of established principles of international law. It is no accident that the vast majority of the world's conflicts rage in areas of Africa where Western interests are not involved, or in Central and South Asia where Western power cannot reach. [ At least where Western interests are involved, this Western military might must be substantial enough - and the willingness to use it must be visible enough - to convince even the most rabid and heavily propagandized rabble that compromise and accommodation is the only prudent course for their leaders to follow. [ The credibility of Western military capability and will to act is what, above all, became at risk once it was decided to intervene in the Balkans. (This vital credibility is once again at risk - this time in Central Asia.) [ Where Western interests do not extend or where Western protection cannot be relied upon, war fevers can be expected to grow. Each nation in such regions must find the means for shouldering an increasing responsibility for its own defense. [
In the near future, the development of war fever may increasingly lead to, and take place in, a world afflicted by nuclear proliferation.	Since the "nuclear umbrella" offered by the United States cannot be relied upon in such regions, this has forced the pace of nuclear proliferation. This is happening particularly with nations that may face military threats from Communist China. First India felt impelled to develop nuclear weapons, and then its rival Pakistan felt impelled to respond. If the United States fails to provide them with an effective nuclear shield, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and the nations bordering the contested South China Sea may all be forced to consider nuclear arms. North Korea and Iran may open up new fronts in the nuclear proliferation struggle. [ In the near future, the development of war fever may increasingly lead to - and take place in - a world afflicted by nuclear proliferation. (The near future may well be now.) [