Local governance problems:

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  Efforts to restrain corruption and the arbitrary exercise of power in local government, as well as problems with tax collection and the allocation of revenues between the various levels of government, have been persistent themes in modern Chinese history since the middle of the 19th century, and probably much longer. The Quing Dynasty, the Republic, the Nationalist regime and the Communists under Mao all tried without success to impose pertinent political reforms on local government.
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By curbing local leaders, the Communist Party-state hopes to strengthen its own grip on power at the national level.

  The problems of "abusive and rapacious" local power elites that undermine public support for the central regime continues to afflict modern China, which similarly struggles - with a similar lack of success - to deal with them. By curbing local leaders, the Communist Party-state hopes to strengthen its own grip on power at the national level. This has been so far a popular strategy, but similar efforts failed to save the Quing Dynasty or the Chinese Nationalists in the first half of the 20th century. Nevertheless, under the current system, there have been three decades of spectacularly successful market reforms and several successful leadership successions at the top with no sign yet of any stress on the Party-dominated political structure at the national level.
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  "Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China," edited by Elizabeth J. Perry and Merle Goldman, is primarily about this struggle. This examination of China's local political system is based on extensive field work, interviews, surveys and archival research conducted by the contributing scholars.
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  "Cadre responsibility systems, budget transparency programs, fiscal reforms, legal aid services, NGO pressures, popular protests, and the media" are utilized in the struggle with the complex governance problems in the thousands of counties and hundreds of thousands of villages. Local elections are generally deeply flawed and currently play just a small part in dealing with the traditional problems of local governance in China.
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Many civil NGOs arose to deal with local problems - education, rural reconstruction, public health, credit and marketing needs, agricultural modernization - but they did not have the capacity to restrain "rapacious tax collectors and abusive policemen."

Mao preferred the use of mass criticism for restraining local incumbent officials.

The Cultural Revolution is in part explained by the persistence of this problem. It was the most virulent of a series of mass criticism campaigns during the Mao regime.

  Local democratic semi-autonomous government has been a political feature in China running back into the 19th century, the editors note. The strengthening of these local systems has repeatedly been an objective of national reforms. The Shanghai city council founded in 1905 was an outstanding example of successful democratic good governance at the local level and was emulated in many other towns and villages.

  "In 1909 the emperor issued formal regulations for the establishment of elected local self-government organizations, which were made responsible for overseeing a wide range of critical functions that included education, public health, road repair, welfare, and tax collection. By the time of the 1911 Revolution, some five thousand elected local councils in market towns, townships, and county seats were in operation around the country."

  These local elections were frequently heavily influenced by locally powerful people. Nevertheless, this increasing sense of local autonomy coupled with resentment over higher taxes played a major role in the 1911 revolution that shattered over two thousand years of imperial rule. "Grassroots reforms thus hastened the downfall of the Quing dynasty."
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  In 1914, local self-government was abolished by the new Republic of China in order to direct more tax revenues to the central government. The resulting system of tax farming became a corrupt, oppressive morass.
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  The Nationalist regime tried to revive local self government after 1927, but the system was co-opted by local elites. The effort was soon abandoned because of security concerns as conflicts with Japan and the Communists arose. Another self government initiative in the 1940s covered over a thousand counties and cities but was again captured by local elites. Many civil NGOs arose to deal with local problems - education, rural reconstruction, public health, credit and marketing needs, agricultural modernization - but they did not have the capacity to restrain "rapacious tax collectors and abusive policemen."
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  In 1937, the Communist Party, too, initiated local democratic reforms to bolster popular support, but the Japanese offensive that summer brought that experiment to an untimely close. "Routine procedure and legal niceties" are readily sacrificed in China. Mao, in any event, preferred the use of mass criticism for restraining local incumbent officials.
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  Local elections continued fitfully into the 1980s, but similarly were dominated by local Party elites. Unrestrained local officials remained a serious nationwide concern. The Cultural Revolution is in part explained by the persistence of this problem. It was the most virulent of a series of mass criticism campaigns during the Mao regime.
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  Deng Xiaoping and his successors, mindful of the destructiveness of the Cultural Revolution, have concentrated their reform efforts highly successfully in the economic sphere. Political reforms were predominantly focused on term limits for the Communist Party Secretary who was limited to two five-year terms.

  "China's grassroots politics - in rural villages and urban residential districts - has experienced significant transformation in recent years. Although some of these changes are the product of conscious top-down state engineering and some a result of the unintended consequences of state policy, others have been generated by bottom-up societal initiatives as well as international influences. The variation both between and within urban and rural areas is enormous, but the general direction points toward a substantial renegotiation of state-society relations at the grassroots level."

Usually, Communist Party elites control and drastically limit the election process. They frequently amount to just votes of confidence for nominees approved by the Party.

Townships are often saddled with huge debts and bloated payrolls and unprofitable rural industries.

• Village assemblies and village representative assemblies: These gatherings encourage village participation in public deliberations.

• Elections for village committees and leaders: These have received considerable study, encouragement and logistical support from Western political NGOs. Although widespread, they generally fall far short of Western democratic standards. Usually, Communist Party elites control and drastically limit the process. The elections frequently amount to just votes of confidence for nominees approved by the Party.
• Systems to control local political elites and combat corruption: This continuing problem has given rise to a number of local reforms, including cadre responsibility and evaluation systems and budget transparency initiatives.
• Fiscal reforms: These reflect the continuing conflict over tax revenues between the national and intermediate levels of government and the localities that collect the taxes.
• Townships: The townships are required to fulfill a mass of unfunded mandates using revenues provided by local authorities. They are often saddled with huge debts and bloated payrolls and unprofitable rural industries. Township election experiments have foundered. The problems at this level of governance remain intractable. The elimination of township governance has been suggested, and would leave county governance the level next above the villages.

  "To date, the party-state has not managed to effect fundamental administrative restructuring, either by eliminating redundant bureaucratic levels and personnel or by separating party and state functions."

• Legal reforms: A variety of opportunities to seek legal redress of grievances have been created.. Methods of petitioning government have also been provided.
• Civil NGOs: A variety of civil associations have formed. Some are officially endorsed and some are not. Homeowners associations have been sanctioned, while village temple associations have not but continue to function. International NGOs have succeeded in exercising some influence in China.
• The press: Press freedom, though still carefully limited, has expanded substantially. The press has been especially useful in combating local corruption and abuses of authority and in highlighting civil problems.

As long as robust economic growth continues, Communist Party rule appears to be under no threat. However, the political reforms, although limited, "are reconfiguring local politics in surprising and significant ways."

    Central Party control of local government elites is far from effective. In the Soviet Union, reforms were accompanied by an economic collapse. The implosion of the Soviet Union thus deters the Chinese Party from attempting broader reforms. This leaves the Communist Party with the familiar problems of Chinese governance - pervasive corruption and predation.

  "On the one hand, the state has introduced reforms that it expects will improve the performance and accountability of local government officials, reduce corruption, channel public discontent, and maintain stability. On the other hand, mounting pressures on local officials both from the central state -- in the form of responsibility contracts, fiscal reforms, and the like -- and from their constituents -- expressed through grassroots elections, protests, media exposure, and NGOs -- place grassroots cadre, particularly in places plagued by a paucity of resources and revenues, in an extraordinarily difficult position."

  As long as robust economic growth continues, Communist Party rule appears to be under no threat. The political reforms, although limited, "are reconfiguring local politics in surprising and significant ways." The ultimate outcome, however, is simply unknowable.
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Village governance:

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  "Village Elections, Transparency, and Anticorruption in Henan and Guangdong Provinces" by Richard Levy, and "The Implementation of Village Elections and Tax-or-Fee Reform in Rural Northwest China," by John J. Kennedy, deal with village governance.
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Village elections of village leaders and village committees are a relatively ad hoc affair, with different procedures established by different superior jurisdictions and with various levels of procedural compliance at the village level.

Only a minority of elections offer a competitive choice.

  It is the village authorities that deal face-to-face with the people. They are subordinate to the townships, which are actually the lowest formal level of government in rural China. Each township controls many villages and is subordinate up the line to county, province and central government authority.
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  The village committee and village leader can be responsible for implementation of policies such as birth control, education, health care, village investments, land redistribution, road maintenance, and resolution of village disputes. Village elections of village leaders and village committees are a relatively ad hoc affair, with different procedures established by different superior jurisdictions and with various levels of procedural compliance at the village level.
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  The influence of the local Communist Party is widely but not universally maintained. Party cadre are frequently a majority of those elected to village committees or elected as village leaders, and some non-Party elected officials are brought into the Party. Only a minority of elections offer a competitive choice. Free meals and small gifts are often provided to encourage turnout.
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  The system is far from Western norms, but is sometimes sufficient to permit the village people to get rid of unsatisfactory leadership. Over 70% of village committees have women members but, despite affirmative action provisions, there are few of them and they generally lack influence.
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The process is shifting power from the more politically based elite to a new, more economically based elite.

  The villages are being squeezed to provide sufficient funds for the  increasingly bloated ranks of Party cadres. Many villages are deeply in debt. Efforts to increase resources by starting village enterprises frequently fail. The villages have thus been selling their assets to stay afloat - a form of privatization.

  "The virtual bankruptcy of local government combines with the increasing wealth and prestige of the entrepreneurial elite to create and reinforce in numerous ways the tendency for entrepreneurs increasingly to dominate rural economic and political structures."

  As the villages lose the ability to pay Party cadres, the local Party ranks are increasingly filled with people having outside income.

  "Moreover, as villages have fewer and fewer resources, the [village committees] -- and voters -- increasingly come to rely on the entrepreneurs' resources to meet their obligations, thus further strengthening the political position of the entrepreneurs."

In the more wealthy regions, electoral office may also provide control over major assets, making vote buying economically attractive.

Corruption is widespread and pervades all aspects of the government and the economy.

  The local business class presents itself as working for the development of the whole village, and this view is widely accepted. Involvement in local politics and in the Party provides entrepreneurs with valuable connections and influence. In the more wealthy regions, it may also provide control over major assets, making vote buying economically attractive. There is opportunity for nepotism not just for placing relatives in business positions, but also in government and in the Party or in township, county and municipal offices.
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  Corruption is widespread and pervades all aspects of the government and the economy. As a result, vote buying is evolving from providing small inducements to encourage turnout to large scale efforts that can only be explained by the opportunities for corruption and/or influence. There are a wide variety of laws, rules and regulations that pertain to vote buying, but enforcement is undermined by jurisdictional limits, unclear definitions, loopholes and influence. Privatization of collectively held village assets has been suggested as a means of reducing the temptation for vote buying.

  "Higher-level corruption often involves large amounts of money in unsecured loans; large-scale embezzlement; bribes for preferential access to materials, markets, and/or decisions about allocation of government resources; cadre participation in smuggling; and so forth. - - - [Village-level] corruption most often involves using public funds for private purposes, for instance, lavish meals, entertainment, and personal use of cell phones, cars, and motorcycles; preferential treatment for cadres, relatives, and bribe-payers in allocation of land and village contracts, loans from banking cooperatives, permits for housing, handling of family planning issues, and access to the military; as well as embezzlement and falsification of payments from higher-level authorities."

"Much of the data is late, vague, or inaccurate." Villagers seldom have the experience to interpret the data provided.

  Transparency regulations are widely used to control corruption. However, they vary widely in the extent of their coverage and implementation, The more prosperous villages generally have the most effective information programs.
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  Richard Levy outlines the impressive information transparency program in the prosperous village of Minle in Guangdong province. A vast array of tax, budget and programmatic data is published and made available online in a village with widespread computer access.

  "Numerous interviews with village and township cadres suggests, however, that this system is used more to publicize already-made decisions rather than to facilitate village input into decision making."

  Most villages post data on public bulletin boards, with the extent of such postings varying generally with the prosperity of the village. In some villages, transparency postings are sparse or largely neglected.
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  Generally, the degree of detail is far less than what is needed for deterrence or revelation of corruption. The preparation of data is in the hands of those in the positions that facilitate corrupt practices. "Much of the data is late, vague, or inaccurate." Villagers seldom have the experience to interpret the data provided, and Party cadres are unwilling to even admit that corruption in their village or township is a problem.
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  Record keeping and accounting systems are rudimentary and just beginning to be developed. Township auditing of village records also varies widely and is generally inadequate. One township has taken over the finances of its villages. It keeps records and makes payments based on village spending decisions. However, this just places more power for abuse in township hands and does not provide protection against such village abuses as tax evasion and linked payments.
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The higher levels of Party leadership used local elections as a means of boosting the influence of the entrepreneurial class and pushing aside the local Party leaders who stood in the way of private economic opportunity.

  Many problems afflict village elections and undermine their effectiveness. Party domination is frequently being transformed into bureaucratic crony capitalism. As influential entrepreneurs gain leadership positions in both Party and village, there are no institutional checks and balances to limit the use of public resources for private gain. The imposition of a bewildering array of regulatory requirements creates all the problems of any complex bureaucratic effort. 
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  Entrepreneurs have been given access to economic opportunities and local political and Party positions as a matter of policy to encourage China's economic development. They often struggle for influence with the old local Party elites, but the two increasingly integrate as the local governing elite. This excludes the mass of ordinary villagers.
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  The higher levels of Party leadership used local elections as a means of boosting the influence of the entrepreneurial class and pushing aside the local Party leaders who stood in the way of private economic opportunity. This having been achieved, there seems little interest in any further political reforms that might create real democratic self-governance and institutions that can be effective in limiting corruption. (Of course, there is always the chance that, with higher levels of education and the passing of a couple of generations, the current experiments could take on a life of their own.)
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Village governance reforms:

  The reduction of village tax and fee burdens has been another important reform. However, the improvements have been uneven.
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Leading cadre are rotated to new locations every three-to-six years to prevent them from becoming too entrenched in any locality.

  China's bureaucratic controls depend on the "one-level-down" management system by which appointments at each government level are controlled by the next higher level.

  "In the one-level-down management system, officials at each level have the authority to appoint their own subordinates. For example, a county official can appoint the township party secretary or the government head without seeking approval from higher authorities at the municipal or provincial levels. The implication is that promotion or reassignment depends on the ability of the subordinate to carry out the policies of his or her immediate superior."

  Leading cadre are rotated to new locations every three-to-six years to prevent them from becoming too entrenched in any locality. This reinforces their dependence on their immediate superiors in the next higher level of government.
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The dependence of village and township cadre on the central government is very remote. Village cadre are more focused on implementing the policies and pursuing the interests of their immediate superiors at the township level.

Village election policies are often fiercely resisted by township authorities.

"In order to reduce the level of uncertainty in the selection of village cadres, township officials, given the opportunity, will interfere in the elections by controlling the nomination process."

"Subordinates selectively implement the policies that can enhance their positions while ignoring policies that have little influence over promotion or transfer."

The central government lacks the tools to effectively influence and monitor local cadre from the top down.

  The implementation of national policy at the local level is very difficult. The dependence of village and township cadre on the central government is very remote. Village cadre are more focused on implementing the policies and pursuing the interests of their immediate superiors at the township level. The revenue concerns of the village and township are of more concern than national policies.
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  Moreover, quantifiable requirements like revenue collection and birth control are of more concern than unquantifiable policies like the general reduction of villager tax and fee burdens or the quality of elections. The central government policies of elections and general limitations on tax and fee burdens are popular with villagers but are frequently not enthusiastically implemented by local cadres. Indeed, village election policies are often fiercely resisted by township authorities.

  "The township leading cadres are responsible for the fulfillment of hard targets, especially tax collection and birth control, but the village cadres actually implement these policies by dealing with villagers on a face-to-face basis. The Organic Law of Village Committees reduces the authority of the township party secretary and government head to select compliant village cadres. If the Organic Law is fully implemented so that villagers nominate candidates and elect the committee members and the village leader, the township officials will have no idea who they will be dealing with until after the election. In order to reduce the level of uncertainty in the selection of village cadres, township officials, given the opportunity, will interfere in the elections by controlling the nomination process."

  Village elections were supported by the central government as a means of making village cadre as accountable to villagers as they are to their township superiors. This creates a clear conflict of interest as the policy is implemented down through the bureaucracy.

  "This combination of one-level-down management and cadre exchange system is characterized by tight control over immediate subordinates, which leads to selective policy implementation. Subordinates selectively implement the policies that can enhance their positions while ignoring policies that have little influence over promotion or transfer."

  It is "a daunting task" to monitor the vast multitude of village and township officials from the top. Central government authorities actually lack the capacity to control Party officials below the county level. However, to generate bottom-up influence, election policies must first be enforced from the top down.
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  In fact, where village elections are effectively promoted, tax systems become more transparent and village fees are lower. The only way to implement the reduction of these burdens is from the bottom up. The central government lacks the tools to effectively influence and monitor local cadre from the top down.
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Tax and fee reforms and election reforms can be effectively implemented when made a priority at the provincial and county levels. Villager capacity to nominate candidates and the competitiveness of village elections have improved dramatically in some villages in Shaanxi Province in recent years.

  Nation-wide political campaigns are sometimes used by the central government as a means of forcing implementation of its most important policies. This requires a great deal of time and effort. Birth control has been imposed by a series of such campaigns.
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  "Policy contracts" that impose quantifiable goals on lower level cadre are another policy implementation tool. Failure to meet specified targets can result in censure. Village election procedures and general tax and fee burden reductions can't be quantified.
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  Tax and fee reforms and election reforms can be effectively implemented when made a priority at the provincial and county levels. Villager capacity to nominate candidates and the competitiveness of village elections have improved dramatically in some villages in Shaanxi Province in recent years, John J. Kennedy notes, but not in others. Overall tax and fee burdens have declined in the Province.
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  Fees can be substantial for such things as roads, education and electricity. They can be a substantial burden on poor villagers even when agricultural taxes are low. In Shaanxi, many fees were eliminated and taxes were reduced uniformly among townships and counties, indicating that enforcement of these policies was considered a high priority of the provincial government.
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Often, nominations are dominated by the township or by the village Party branch in cooperation with the wealthiest families.

  Nominations may be controlled by the township, the village Party branch, or the villagers acting at a village assembly. Often, nominations are dominated by the village Party branch in cooperation with the wealthiest families.
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  Control over the nomination process is the most common method of manipulating village elections. There is considerable variation in the control of nominations processes and the quality of elections across counties, indicating a lack of interest at the provincial level. There has been improvement in recent years, but it has been slow.

  "In villages where the township government controls the nomination process, the village committees have relatively weak authority to govern, and villagers have few mechanisms to monitor or influence cadre behavior. By contrast, in villages with an open nomination process the committees are relatively strong, and the villagers have a number of legal methods to monitor cadres."

  Limits on the authority of village committees is another method that townships can use to exercise control. Kennedy mentions townships that do not permit village committees to settle villager disputes.
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Between elections, recall campaigns can be launched through village assemblies. "The open nomination process, competitive elections, campaigns, and formal public criticism of village cadres" become entrenched as they are permitted.

  The lack of property rights and the close-knit clan structure in the villages create additional governance problems. Clan voting allows majority clans to dominate village committees and leadership. They can use their positions to favor their clan members. Favoritism  may include the distribution of land in favor of clan members.
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  In some villages where there is no dominant clan, elective positions are divided on the basis of clan membership. Township officials complain that many of these elected officials are incompetent and make it difficult to meet township objectives. However, as long as there is no single clan that constitutes a majority, cooperation within the village is enhanced by the election process.
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  Election campaigns are getting increasingly sophisticated. Pamphlets and handbills have been used to criticize incumbent performance. Between elections, recall campaigns can be launched through village assemblies. "The open nomination process, competitive elections, campaigns, and formal public criticism of village cadres" become entrenched as they are permitted. Regression is rare. In the 1990s, implementation of election reforms was simply not a very high priority at higher levels of government. However, it has recently become more important in some provinces.
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  The same can be said for tax and fee reforms. They are another mechanism for reducing unrest and gaining public support for the central government. However, Kennedy notes that it may not be practical to continuously monitor tax and fee levels from the top, so political reform permitting monitoring from the bottom may be essential to restrain the imposition of financial burdens on villagers.
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Township finances:

  The "Financial Crisis in China's Townships" caused in part by those fiscal reforms is explained by Jean C. Oi and Zhao Shukai.
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Efforts to develop rural industry have been extensive, and the failure of such efforts has not been uncommon. Such failure has frequently been the cause of heavy indebtedness.

  The debts of agricultural townships and villages have been growing alarmingly. Costs for many have risen to unsustainable levels. Only the central government can increase taxes or issue bonds. Tax revenues from the villages have to be shared with higher levels of government. The income from rural industry does not.
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  Townships thus need rural industry and outside investment to balance their books. Efforts to develop rural industry have thus been extensive, and the failure of such efforts has not been uncommon. Such failure has frequently been the cause of heavy indebtedness.
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  Bloat has been running rampant through township bureaucracies since the 1980s. Each year, townships are required to take on new Party cadre. A lack of real autonomy has prevented even poor townships from effectively resisting rising payroll and administrative costs. These can amount to between 50% and 80% of total expenditures in the poorer townships.
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Due to the policy of rotating Party cadre, there is incentive to just muddle through and leave the mess for successors. Inevitably, a few townships borrow just to meet debt payments or even to meet their quotas for tax revenues to be sent to the counties.

  Meanwhile, tax and fee reforms have reduced their revenues. These reforms have successfully cut peasant financial burdens by between 25% and 40% in some areas. Villages and townships have no means of replacing these revenues. Many are having trouble paying wages. They fall deeper into arrears in wage payments and have little available for other programs. Only a few localities have been able to make up for the lost revenue through economic development.
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  The problem is being met by significant sums provided by the central government and, inevitably, by village and township measures to again increase revenues from the villagers. However, the sums from the central government become almost insignificant by the time they pass down to and are spread amongst the multitude of villages and townships. The peasants have been informed of the caps imposed on their tax and fee burdens.

  "Most if not all of this [local] debt can be traced to the pressures placed on cadres who still must operate in a mobilization bureaucratic system where meeting upper-level quotas and directives is the only route to job security and promotion. This includes debt derived from borrowing to establish township and village enterprises, to meet educational standards and quotas, to develop agriculture, and to invest in basic infrastructure. It also includes borrowing to make up for shortfalls in tax revenues, to undertake individual fundraising, to invest in projects to attract business, and to pay back wages to cadre."

  The biggest debts have been incurred in attempts to achieve centrally mandated education quotas and to pay off the debts of rural credit associations that have collapsed. These debts have accumulated at different times since 1980 and under different officials and Party cadres. Due to the policy of rotating Party cadre, there is incentive to just muddle through and leave the mess for successors. Inevitably, a few townships borrow just to meet debt payments or even to meet their quotas for tax revenues to be sent to the counties.
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  Even after the reforms, over 10% of peasant households have been unable or have refused to pay taxes and fees. The problem is concentrated in particular townships and villages. Fear of peasant unrest - which leaves a black mark on the records of the cadre involved - constrains collection efforts.
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  However, protests by laid-off cadre also leave a black mark. This constrains efforts to trim the bureaucracy. Severance incentives have been used to induce voluntary departures.

  "Debt has become such a problem that the credit of township or village government is no longer sufficient to secure a loan. [Individual local party leaders] are thus taking on debt for the government."

  Moreover, government agencies are not considered economic actors and cannot be held responsible for loans. But the Party leaders who take on the loans can protect themselves because they control the priority of repayments. They thus earn a fairly secure interest income from the loans.
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  Various stratagems have been used to meet this crisis. Townships vie to receive individual or business tax payments. They offer to accept less than full payment in return for credit for payment in full. More widespread and troubling is the use of land seizures - often with insufficient compensation for the affected peasants. Widespread disturbances have been attributed to this practice.

  "After more than two decades of reform and movement away from central planning, local officials in China's countryside maintain the façade of compliance with upper levels. They dutifully respond to orders to cut personnel from their payrolls, but this is done only on the books, by moving the personnel from one category to another. Local officials comply with upper level orders when they must, but they do what they need to do to survive the rest of the time. As local officials explained, there is no way to do everything that the upper levels demand. Over time, they figure out what the upper levels most want implemented and strive to meet those targets."

  Cadre will go to great lengths to retain the perquisites of office. Cadre owed significant amounts of back pay remain confident of ultimate payment. Thus, loyalty to the Party remains strong. However, outside the wealthier townships, local government services are being squeezed or eliminated and alternative methods of extracting revenues from the peasants are being used. The poorer townships are increasingly viewed by their peasants as useless. China's piecemeal reform process has generated these problems, and they remain to be addressed.
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Township elections:

  There were a few experimental efforts at holding township elections, but they have come to naught, Lianjiang Li explains in "Township Elections."
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As with village elections, township elections are viewed by supporters as a means of controlling corruption, gaining popular support for the Party and facilitating economic development.

  There is considerable township and county Party cadre resistance. However, dissatisfaction with corruption and conditions in various townships provide some impetus behind such experiments. Li goes at some length into these conflicting factors. After several years with no action, he notes that seven townships in Shiping county, Yunnan province, held elections for township heads in 2004.
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  There are about 38,000 townships. They average about 26,000 residents divided among 18 villages. Townships are the lowest formal level in the Chinese government hierarchy. They are governed by a township Party committee and township government. The county Party committee selects the township heads who then receive rubber stamp approval from township people's congress deputies.
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  Township officials have become very unpopular and are the target of numerous public protests. They are charged with collecting taxes and fees and enforcing the birth control and other mandates. The "buying and selling of offices" is a particularly widespread abuse.
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  Some township cadre favor elections as a method of strengthening township leaders so they can resist county government excesses and domination. As with village elections, township elections are viewed by supporters as a means of controlling corruption, gaining popular support for the Party and facilitating economic development.
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Private associations:

 Accountability and the delivery of public goods varies widely in China. Surprisingly, studies show that the political characteristics of the villages - the quality of elections - has little impact on this.
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Villages have to finance and construct almost all their roads, drainage systems, irrigation works, sanitation and trash disposal services, primary school facilities, and community recreation facilities.

It is the quality of civic associations - "informal institutions of accountability" - that most determine the quality of public goods provision.

  It is the strength of civil society organizations - such as village temple organizations or village-wide lineage groups - that determines the quality of public goods, Lily L. Tsai explains in "The Struggle for Village Public Goods Provision."
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  Villages have to finance and construct almost all their roads, drainage systems, irrigation works, sanitation and trash disposal services, primary school facilities, and community recreation facilities. Subsidies coming from higher levels of government are almost all drained away by the intermediate levels of government. Even the wealthiest villages frequently lack good public services. It is the quality of civic associations - "informal institutions of accountability" - that most determine the quality of public goods provision.
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  Party cadre are subject to various methods of Party control. Appointments and promotions are controlled by the next higher Party level. Organizational norms that emphasize Party loyalty are reinforced by heavy indoctrination methods and selective recruiting. Policy targets - including the provision of public goods - are the subject of performance contracts or "cadre responsibility commissions" between lower level cadre and their immediate superiors in the next higher level. Pay and bonuses depend on fulfilling these responsibilities. Frequently, however, performance contracts have a far greater impact on financial input than on actual financial output.

  "These findings suggest that just because formal institutions of accountability exist does not mean that they will be effective or that people will use them.  - - - Although in general, rural public goods provision leaves much to be desired, both case studies and survey data show that there are also many villages in which officials do the best they can with the resources they have to organize public projects for rebuilding schools, paving roads, and installing running water. These officials provide public services even though they have nothing to fear from village elections or sanctions applied by the township government. The question is: Why do these village officials bother?"

  The answer is a sense of obligation created by strong village civic associations, Lily L. Tsai concludes. Her  survey of 316 villages in 8 counties in 4 provinces indicates that the top-down Party mechanisms and the quality of bottom-up electoral mechanisms had only limited impact on the quality of public goods provision. Her study took place in 2001 using 1997 figures.
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There is low pay for officials, commercial investments are more important to the government than provision of public goods, township authorities lack interest in any individual village, village officials face conflicting personal demands on their time, legal redress against corrupt officials is generally lacking.

  Village temple organizations and village-wide lineage groups sometimes gain the moral authority "to define and enforce moral norms requiring citizens and officials to contribute to collective goods." These groups dominated village governance in imperial times, were destroyed by Mao, and have widely re-emerged since the beginning of the reform period three decades ago. Officials who are seen to fulfill their responsibilities in turn gain moral authority that helps them achieve their goals. This creates informal systems of mutual accountability and compliance.
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  Tsai's analysis "indicates that villages with strong temple institutions were substantially more likely to enjoy high levels of village government investment in public projects as well as better" infrastructure. The mean probability of finding rainproof classrooms increases from 88% to 100% when there is significant temple organization. Running water increases from 46% to 61%. Similarly, villages where there is at least one actively used ancestral hall building are more likely to have paved roads and paths, newer schools and running water. The likelihood of paved roads, for example, rises from 50% to 84%.

  Due to the short history of current economic and political reform efforts, it is likely that these figures have improved since 1997.

  Tsai provides many examples from villages both poor and wealthy, with and without democratically elected village councils and leaders. It is important, however, that these civil groups seek to benefit the whole village, and are not in conflict among themselves.
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  Tsai notes many reasons why institutional efforts - including elections - fail to assure good village governance. There is low pay for officials, commercial investments are more important to the government than provision of public goods, township authorities lack interest in any individual village, village officials face conflicting personal demands on their time, legal redress against corrupt officials is generally lacking.
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Homeowners groups in new neighborhoods:

  Private associations in China are as varied as in most other countries, but operate under the conditions peculiar to China, Benjamin L. Read points out in "Homeowners' Groups in New Neighborhoods."
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Homeowners associations become dominated by the more powerful commercial firms that the homeowners deal with or by a small clique of homeowners. They can be thwarted by local officials who can refuse to extend legal approval. However, "they can be highly autonomous bodies with which the state and other interlocutors have no choice but to deal and negotiate."

  Homeowners associations formed to manage housing developments, and were provided legal authorization in 1994. They handle such things as maintenance, security and utilities. Some have acted robustly to defend member interests against both state and private adversaries. However, most become dominated by the more powerful commercial firms that the homeowners deal with or by a small clique of homeowners. They can be thwarted by local officials who can refuse to extend legal approval.

  "In stark contrast to long standing patterns in which constituencies of many kinds of workers, entrepreneurs, and others are represented through government-run organizations, the [homeowners' associations] can be highly autonomous bodies with which the state and other interlocutors have no choice but to deal and negotiate. They constitute a new model for private associations in [Communist China] as well as an attractive laboratory for activists who have ambitions for far-reaching political change."

  There are autonomous grassroots groups beginning to form in China in such fields as environmental protection, women's and worker's rights, and combating the AIDS epidemic. These groups have varying degrees of autonomy, internal democracy and representational authority.
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  There already exist nearly eighty thousand official Residents Committees under tight urban authority control. They deal with residential management issues. Regulations promulgated in 1994 and 2003 attempt to restrict the new homeowners associations to hiring and dealing with a management company. However, the actual implementation of the regulations has been left up to city and provincial governments and varies widely. They are not only subject to local authority but also are accountable to the homeowners as a group.
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The development companies and property managers frequently oppose the homeowners associations, and threats and even violence are sometimes used against the associations.

  Opposition to the homeowners associations can come from authorities who view autonomous groups with suspicion or who have financial interests in the development companies or property managers with whom the homeowners must deal. The development companies and property managers frequently oppose the homeowners associations, and threats and even violence are sometimes used against the associations.
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  Regulations impose tight controls. Benjamin L. Read goes at some length into the constraints that they face and the weakness of the associations relative to local authorities as well as to development companies and property managers.
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  The regulations impose burdensome requirements that can block formation or burden operation. When local authorities refuse official recognition, this prevents informal associations from collecting dues and maintaining bank accounts. Sometimes, homeowners simply can't coalesce to form an association, or they leave their formation and operation in the hands of the development company or property manager. This remains the usual experience for homeowners.
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The owners of new housing are relatively prosperous people and may include some with considerable political influence sufficient to counter developer and property manager obstruction and even local authority opposition.

  However, autonomous dynamic factors are also at work. Some determined homeowners have succeeded in forming representative associations that have organized programs for neighborhood improvement and collective negotiations with developers and property managers. In some instances, internal disputes have prevented cooperative action. In others, however, the associations have proven fairly effective.
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  Some homeowners - still a small minority - have succeeded in forming powerful associations. In Shanghai and Beijing, the political environment has become more favorable to them. As of 2004, Read identifies several dozen "fully empowered homeowners associations" in those cities. They represented owners interests and were free from outside domination. The owners of new housing are relatively prosperous people and may include some with considerable political influence sufficient to counter developer and property manager obstruction and even local authority opposition.

  "Such groups agitate to be allowed formally to establish a [homeowners association] or to  democratize one that was created without owner participation. At times they challenge the developer or the [property manager] on specific substantive matters, for instance, fee scales, quality of service, or shuttle buses to and from the neighborhood. Some actively maintain lobbying efforts directed at government officials, media, and People's Congress deputies."

  In Shanghai, homeowners associations are encouraged, but their election process is subject to the vetting or limiting of nominees. Nevertheless, many have proved effective in advancing homeowner interests.

  "All that can be said with confidence is that so far, nonexistent or puppet groups constitute the majority, while fully empowered committees are modest in number. A substantial number of housing developments are engrossed in the external and internal struggles that characterize the riven and uncredentialed types, while the growing number of state-facilitated organizations represents one possible way of resolving otherwise intractable conflicts."

  Read points out that the trend towards urban private housing and market-based distribution inherently removes some important levers of power from local authorities. State authorities still influence property development and housing subsidies, among other things. However, homeowners are no longer dependent on work units or employer housing offices. Professional, market-based property managers still maintain close ties to government, but are primarily concerned with profits, not politics.
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The associations actively lobby for redress of construction defects, seek resolution of defects in property deeds, demand provision of utilities and oppose objectionable construction in their neighborhoods. They use channels open to all citizens, but their affluence, skills and influence make them far more formidable.

  When effective, homeowners associations can interfere with cozy relationships between local authorities and developers and property managers.

  "For example, state agencies commonly pressure developers to give or sell them the use of office space or empty land within housing developments. These are often areas that have been designated for other purposes such as parks, recreational facilities, day care centers, or the like. Thus empowering homeowners groups to defend claims to such neighborhood space places constraints both on the firms and on government.

  Even on matters outside the narrow remit of the homeowners groups, authorities often find they have to negotiate with effective homeowners associations. The associations actively lobby for redress of construction defects, seek resolution of defects in property deeds, demand provision of utilities and oppose objectionable construction in their neighborhoods. They use channels open to all citizens, but their affluence, skills and influence make them far more formidable.
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  Associations can also be nurseries for democratic impulses and civic leadership. They inspire concern with other civic issues and political reform. Association activists have become prominent among independent candidates for People's Congresses, but few have been actually elected. Their development continues, but their future remains uncertain.
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Rule of law:

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  Rule of law was recognized in the 1990s both in Chinese statutes and its constitution. While the Party still dominates the legal system, there have been "definite signs of progress," Yongshun Cai notes in "Civil Resistance and Rule of Law in China: The Defense of Homeowners' Rights."
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Conflicts over land use are now the leading cause of social unrest.

Urban renewal and city development are high priority objectives, and households in the many millions have been relocated to make way for such projects.

  The Party views submission to legal constraints as a prop for its legitimacy and public stability. A lack of recourse to legal redress is a major reason for citizen resistance that has at times gained widespread support.
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  About 70% of urban households now own their homes. However, state taking of private real estate often occurs without adequate compensation. Such takings have generated persistent resistance. Conflicts over land use are now the leading cause of social unrest. Of 130 mass confrontations between peasants and police in 2004, about 67% were over land use. State and business entities also frequently violate urban household property rights.
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  Urban renewal and city development are high priority objectives, and households in the many millions have been relocated to make way for such projects. Local officials with limited funds now frequently provide relocated households with inadequate cash payments rather than new outlying homes. Householders are thus forced to relocate to less desirable outlying locations. Since many households conduct some small scale retail business from their homes, relocation can leave them unemployed. There may also be a loss of city welfare benefits, access to the better schools in the city, and difficulties commuting substantial distances to jobs.
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  Yongshun Cai points out that about 80% of urban takings are for commercial development, but (just as in the U.S.) these commercial takings are interpreted broadly as being for a public purpose. All the legal cards are stacked against the households, including the setting of compensation rates for the takings. Cai provides details.
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  Nevertheless, householders have resisted through lawsuits, protests and demonstrations. Courts do not have the authority to delay demolition, and are not autonomous in any event. Violence is not uncommon. Perhaps surprisingly, lawsuits against state agencies under the 1990 Administrative Litigation Law have been successful about 40% of the time. In some provinces, as much as one quarter of these suits involve housing issues, but Cai does not provide a single example of success in a taking case.
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  Protests and petitions also face numerous difficulties. Here, too, Cai explains how the cards are stacked against the homeowners. Developers could forcefully evict recalcitrant homeowners, cut off utilities and otherwise harass them, and get support from local authorities.
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  In 2003, the State Council of the central government felt obliged by this growing often fierce resistance to modify the local government approach to housing demolitions. Local and central governments and the courts have since revised unreasonable rules, issued new rules and strengthened enforcement.

  "In addition, the housing demolition party is required to provide seven types of documents and to hold a public hearing before compulsory demolition can take place. The housing demolition party is prohibited from issuing threats, stopping the supply of water, electricity, gas, or heat, and carrying out compulsory demolition of its own accord. In China, the importance of promulgating these directives lies in the fact that they also serve as the legal basis for the courts to make judgments."

"The possibility of progress is reflected in the fact that the government will restrain itself when society generates sufficient pressure, which is likely to grow in China as an emerging market economy and privatization enhance the people's awareness of their rights."

  Cai explains the Beijing and Nanjing reforms. Dozens of construction projects have since been cancelled, and the licenses of many demolition companies have been revoked. Some local courts stopped issuing compulsory demolition verdicts. The Supreme Court has barred compulsory demolition approval prior to a judgment in the case unless state interests could be endangered. It set standards for compensation. Provincial and local courts have responded with additional rules for householder suits and assessment procedures.
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  Resistance to housing demolition remains very difficult, but there is some evidence that householder rights to more substantial compensation have indeed been strengthened.

  "The case of housing demolition reveals both the difficulty and the possibility of progress toward rule of law in China. The difficulty lies in the fact that rule of law may be in conflict with other vital interests of the government. When such conflicts arise, the credibility of the law is sacrificed, suggesting that progress toward rule of law in China is not a smooth process. Yet development toward the rule of law is also difficult to reverse. The possibility of progress is reflected in the fact that the government will restrain itself when society generates sufficient pressure, which is likely to grow in China as an emerging market economy and privatization enhance the people's awareness of their rights."

Village elections, media liberalization and the development of civic organizations as well as legal aid have been allowed in China as outlets for popular grievances and to facilitate bottom-up empowerment to help control lower echelon officials without the loss of political power by the Party.

The limitations of the legal system lead to frustration and to an "informed disenchantment" with the system. The system simply frequently promises what it can't deliver.

  The frustrations of seeking redress in a legal system that is not autonomous are set forth by Mary E. Gallagher in "Hope for Protection and Hopeless Choices" in the context of a labor law legal aid organization.
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  Of course, that there exists legal aid organizations in China is in itself a considerable improvement. There are now a wide variety of legal aid organizations. The state supports many of them in the hope of reducing public resentment and instability. Unfortunately, even when a favorable judgment is obtained, there is often no way to enforce court orders.

  "Rather than serving as safety valves or control channels for dealing with social contradictions and disputes, labor legal aid institutions promise more than they can achieve and raise expectations before smashing them. Consequently, they expose some of the systemic problems of capitalism within an authoritarian political system. - - - It is the difficulty of maintaining the long-term coexistence of democratic institutions, such as legal aid, within an authoritarian  context that leads to increased pressure for an expansion of civil and political rights in China."

  Village elections, media liberalization and the development of civic organizations as well as legal aid have been allowed in China as outlets for popular grievances and to facilitate bottom-up empowerment to help control lower echelon officials without the loss of political power by the Party. Websites with a legal orientation have proliferated and are extensively accessed. However, the limitations of the legal system lead to frustration and to an "informed disenchantment" with the system. The system simply frequently promises what it can't deliver.
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Labor unions are not independent. They are actually Party organizations, and are weak.

  Most aggrieved workers use the trade union or university legal aid agencies. The government sponsored legal aid system faces many barriers that discourage the taking of such suits. However, labor unions are not independent. They are actually Party organizations, and are weak.
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  Trade union agencies have provided almost 100,000 consultations a year, but have taken less than 10,000 cases a year. This is just a minute percentage of the actual number of labor disputes that are taken to out-of-court settlement, mediation or "arbitration" and litigation. Arbitration is expensive and is not like arbitration in the U.S. It is viewed as just a barrier to litigation as it is a prerequisite to litigation and heavily favors the employer.
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  Central government policy is to encourage mediation and settlement and discourage arbitration and litigation. However, union mediation efforts are widely suspect and are viewed as ineffective in protecting workers' rights. Even in Shanghai, Mary Gallagher could not find a single worker who was satisfied with the help received from a union. Indeed, the difference between union legal aid help and university or other independent legal aid has just increased worker resentment of the unions. Union legal aid routinely refuses to take disputes that are politically sensitive or against state operated enterprises or other influential companies
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Media coverage of labor law developments and disputes is encouragingly extensive. Only selective cases are publicized, but publicity can be effective in gaining favorable resolutions and even in altering employment policy.

Civic associations are still considered "suspect and potentially subversive."

  The formation and activities of a prominent university legal aid agency are highlighted by Gallagher. It works through the media as well as through mediation, arbitration and litigation. In 2003, it was fielding about thirty five visits or phone calls daily concerning labor law problems. Letters and website inquiries also flow in. The workload involved about 5,000 office consultations, but it handled only about 40 arbitration or litigation cases during the year.
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  The limits of its funding - which comes from abroad - constrain its caseload. "Reliance on foreign funding has meant a shoestring budget, which is often complicated by numerous approvals, reapplications, and delays."
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  Media coverage of labor law developments and disputes is, however, encouragingly extensive. Only selective cases are publicized, but publicity can be effective in gaining favorable resolutions and even in altering employment policy.
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  However, political activism is not an option. In China, civic associations are still considered "suspect and potentially subversive." The entire legal aid project is continuously put under political and financial pressure and remains fragile.
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Sympathetic staff at lower level Party and union offices often offer informal help to employees who have substantial grievances.

"'Informed disenchantment'" is a direct consequence of people's participation in the state-led project of rule of law."

  Retribution against employee plaintiffs, and even against their relatives, is not uncommon. On the other hand, employees gain legal and bureaucratic sophistication and connections to activists, volunteers and other workers. They often are grateful for help in expressing their complaint within the legal system even as they express frustration with the failures of the system. Sympathetic staff at lower level Party and union offices often offer informal help to employees who have substantial grievances. This is just one part of a slowly evolving civil society in China, the outcome of which remains uncertain.

  "'Informed disenchantment'" is a direct consequence of people's participation in the state-led project of rule of law. Those who use legal aid have taken the state seriously and responded to changes in the political and judicial arenas. The act of suing one's employers is still firmly within the realm of 'legal political behavior,' and it remains for the most part an individual act motivated by individual grievances. Suing with the help of legal aid, however, can be an empowering experience that educates and introduces isolated individuals to a community which offers support and strategy

Labor unrest:

  Labor rights and influence are evaluated by Ching Kwan Lee who addresses the question: "Is Labor a Political Force in China?"
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While the government controls the unions, independent organizations have sprung up to provide a variety of services including clinics, education centers and legal aid. These indicate that "the self-organizing capacity of Chinese society is growing." 

  The Party at all levels has responded to significant protests with redress of grievances, restored pensions and wages, labor law changes and even punishment for abusive cadre. However, labor problems have been kept local and separate by political decentralization and economic differentiation across and within localities. 
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  While the government controls the unions, independent organizations have sprung up to provide a variety of services including clinics, education centers and legal aid. These indicate that "the self-organizing capacity of Chinese society is growing."
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  Millions of citizen petitions are submitted to government offices each year, an increasing number of which are "collective" from five or more petitioners. There were about 87,000 protest incidents included in government statistics in 2005, many of which were labor protests. Bankruptcy and nonpayment create the most common grievances protested.
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Most notable is the care taken by the protesters to limit their protests to specific grievances. They must deflect Party suspicion of any activity that might appear political.

  "Petitioning to the letters and visits bureau is an institutionalized  and legitimate means" of seeking redress of grievances with a history running back to the 1930s. These protests are often referred to the labor arbitrators and the courts, which favor employer interests. Frustration has led to open protests that may involve the blocking of traffic and marches through town.
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  Ching Kwan Lee provides several examples of these protests. Most notable is the care taken by the protesters to limit their protests to specific grievances. They must deflect Party suspicion of any activity that might appear political. Aggrieved workers continue to protest because they can be successful in getting responses from local officials. However, protests remain local because those who work for more successful employers frequently receive better treatment and some workers receive better treatment even within firms.
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The local and particular nature of grievances thus focuses discontent on the lower Party and official hierarchy.

  To bolster public support, the central  government often promulgates legal and regulatory reforms - that the local officials and cadre frequently choose to ignore. The local and particular nature of grievances thus focuses discontent on the lower Party and official hierarchy.

  "[Decentralized] and market competition have created a kaleidoscope of fine-grained social and economic differentiations across factories in the same locality. And despite the overhaul of the work unit welfare system, Chinese workers' entitlements at work and after retirement continue to be closely tied to their work organizations. The availability of pensions, unemployment benefits, and industrial injury compensation still depends on the employing unit's ability and willingness to contribute to insurance funds pooled at the city or county levels. Migrant workers realize that legal wage levels are set by the local city governments, and the factory as a legal entity bears the responsibility to pay into the social security and injury insurance accounts. Therefore, the localized and workplace-oriented organization of workers' interests results in local and cellular activism."

The protests succeeded in getting some redress of grievances and punishment of corrupt cadre and business leaders, but protest leaders, too, were arrested and received long prison sentences.

  These are the results of conscious Party policy designed to keep grievances local and to deter - and even punish - lateral organizing efforts. Lee describes a mass protest that erupted in one industrial city after many years of unsatisfied grievances affecting workers at many declining enterprises. However, even then, workers took care that protest coordination was limited to notices of time and place with no formal effort to coordinate. The protests succeeded in getting some redress of grievances and punishment of corrupt cadre and business leaders, but protest leaders, too, were arrested and received long prison sentences.

  "[The] Liaoyang case highlights both the potential and the limits of cellular activism. Organizers consciously excluded outside workers from joining the leadership circle. Workers' demands, whether economic or political, were local and enterprise-based. In many of their open letters, the workers pledged support for socialism and the central leadership. While these acts can be interpreted as tactics of self-protection, the fact remains that they did not publicly challenge the regime's legitimacy; at most they challenged the legitimacy of the local government. Initially, the government's inaction fanned the flames of networking across work units. But once workers were arrested, support from other factories quickly collapsed. Moreover, when the government responded to some of [the] demands and cracked down on the leaders, the momentum for work unit-based action slowed and petered out."

There has been a substantial increase in social security funding, pension reform, bankruptcy severance pay reform, the provision of funds from all levels of government to respond to major protests, government efforts at job creation for laid off workers, and provision of back wages and pension payment arrears. Social stability has become a primary evaluation criterion for lower echelon cadre.

Labor unrest has had some periodic influence over local cadre practices but little influence over corruption, lack of accountability and the absence of rule of law.

  The Party has in fact felt impelled to respond to labor unrest. There has been a substantial increase in social security funding, pension reform, bankruptcy severance pay reform, the provision of funds from all levels of government to respond to major protests, government efforts at job creation for laid off workers, and provision of back wages and pension payment arrears. Social stability has become a primary evaluation criterion for lower echelon cadre. They thus feel squeezed by growing public demands for services and a lack of funds.

  "Despite official concessions to their economic demands, in the vast majority of incidents of worker unrest, enterprise and government officials are seldom reprimanded for financial irregularities and illicit privatization of state assets. The workers' seething discontent over the lack of rule of law, cadre accountability, and party discipline is palpable but remains an unaggregated impulse. Indeed, most workers, especially those who have participated in the protests, appear resigned to the realistic view that they are powerless to bring about fundamental political changes to the prevailing system."

  While there have been some efforts to increase worker influence over union locals, the party and national union have swiftly stamped out any signs of autonomous action or the formation of other local workers organizations. Labor unrest has had some periodic influence over local cadre practices but little influence over corruption, lack of accountability and the absence of rule of law.

  "Haunted by the specter of the Polish Solidarity movement and the networks of autonomous workers' unions that erupted during the 1989 Tiananmen rebellion, the Chinese government has effectively nipped such grassroots-organized dissent in the bud."

  The tactics generally employed by protesting workers in China are described by Xi Chen in "Between Defiance and Obedience: Protest Opportunism in China."
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The government meets protests with selective exemplary punishments, expedient concessions, and practical persuasion that all facilitate a strategy of interminable procrastination.

  Protesters basically avoid making political challenges or the use of force, remain submissive to Party domination, emphasize the official propaganda rhetoric and those legal commitments that are favorable to them, and exploit divisions and differing interests among Party cadre at various levels. While they maintain contacts and share information with similar groups and sympathetic groups, they keep their organization tightly focused so as not to appear politically threatening. Indeed, they usually strive to avoid any real disruptions.
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  The government has reduced its reliance on general punitive responses. It now meets protests with selective exemplary punishments, expedient concessions, and practical persuasion that all facilitate a strategy of interminable procrastination.

  "The relative decline in repression has emboldened protesters; expedient concessions have encouraged troublemaking; and procrastination has driven people toward disruptive troublemaking to counter government foot-dragging."

  Xi Chen describes how these factors played out in four protest incidents that lasted for periods ranging from one to eight years. The four interest groups were disabled people, retired Party cadres, retired state operated enterprise workers, and demobilized army officers.
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  These groups, Chen points out, "portrayed themselves as loyal members of the regime and explicitly rejected any activities directed against the party-state." They always tried to portray their actions as a natural outgrowth of legal claim-making, and downplayed any disruption and mobilization effort.
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"Big troublemaking leads to big solutions, small troublemaking to small solutions, and no troublemaking to no solution."

All are aware that there are limits beyond which it is not safe to go. The balance between defiant and obedient action is opportunistic, not political or ideological.

  Yet, they all found ways of being troublesome, of mobilizing at a local level, of networking broadly with similar groups, and publicizing their grievances.

  "For most of them, troublemaking constituted a necessary but not sufficient condition for success. Without any troublemaking activities, their demands were almost certain to be ignored. As the popular saying goes, 'Big troublemaking leads to big solutions, small troublemaking to small solutions, and no troublemaking to no solution.'"

  While they all stayed within the bounds they believed acceptable for protest, fear of retribution was always present since punishment is often inflicted in an arbitrary manner. This has the practical effect of limiting protest activity to serious grievances.
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   There were, of course, many tactical differences reflecting the individual characteristics of each group and situation. Some petition and visit higher echelon authorities - even going to Beijing - while others don't. The extent of collateral ties varies. The use of publicity varies. The amount of actual trouble caused varies.
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  However, all are aware that there are limits beyond which it is not safe to go. The balance between defiant and obedient action is opportunistic, not political or ideological.
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  Chen explains the bureaucratic imperatives that make such protests necessary. The weaknesses of other avenues for redress of grievances results in a flood of petitions and letters that swamp Party human and financial resources and threaten some of its ongoing activities. Thus, although as much as 80% of grievances are evaluated as legitimate, only a small proportion are even partially redressed - and those generally require significant protest actions.

  "[Protest] opportunism can give ordinary people a voice and can restrain government officials only on a limited range of issues and at certain levels of government. Protest opportunism works effectively mainly for issues for which ordinary people have both strong incentives and a relatively high capacity for resistance. Such protests, however, very rarely have a direct impact on the actions of provincial or high-level government."

Transnational civil society:

  The environmental opposition to the Nu River Dam project is described by Ralph Litzinger in "In Search of the Grassroots: Hydroelectric Politics in Northwest Yunnan." This opposition has been effective to the extent of gaining suspension of the project.
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  This was not a "grassroots" movement. There has been some participation by the local ethnic minority residents affected by the dam project, but it was initially mobilized by Southeast Asian environmental NGOs based on the downstream impacts of the many hydroelectric dams already built on the rivers dropping through China from the Tibetan plateau.
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  The movement was picked up by Chinese environmental NGOs that then spearheaded the effort independently to avoid the appearance of international conspiracy against the state. Ultimately, the Central government undertook a new study of the project, but excluded both the local residents and the environmental NGOs from the study group. Other state interests, such as hopes for establishing the deep river gorges as major tourist attractions, would be weighed against the dam project in addition to the environmental concerns.
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Opposition to government or government supported activities must be focused on those activities. It must clearly warrant a sympathetic public hearing, and it must avoid challenges to the Party or expansion into political, ideological or broader human rights advocacy.

  The peculiar characteristics of such opposition movements are noted by Ralph Litzinger. These characteristics are similar to the grassroots protests covered in this book. Opposition is carefully shaped to avoid any hint of disloyalty to the Party. Nevertheless, Chinese NGOs receive funding from international sources and considerable international publicity. Their efforts frequently generate international pressure on the Chinese government from international NGOs.
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  Thus, this is another example of the scope opened for civil society participation in governance in contemporary China, and the rigid remaining limits on that participation. Opposition to government or government supported activities must be focused on those activities. It must clearly warrant a sympathetic public hearing, and it must avoid challenges to the Party or expansion into political, ideological or broader human rights advocacy.
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  What is interesting in this case, however, is the nation-wide scope of the opposition movement. There was coordination between national and provincial environmental NGOs, extensive media coverage, and support from abroad. (As of October, 2006, the dam project was still on hold.)
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Media publicity:

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  The media, too, has been enlisted to facilitate bottom-up supervision of local cadres and officials. In "Public Opinion Supervision: Possibilities and Limits of the Media in Constraining Local Officials," Yuezhi Zhao and Sun Wusan describe how media publicity has been used to constrain local official corruption and abusive behavior.
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The authors argue that "the use of public opinion supervision in legitimating monopolistic party power through the public display of the central leadership's paternalistic commitment to the people is more significant than the actual ability of the media to restrain local officials in their everyday exercise of power."

The media is still a propaganda arm of the Party. Publication of Party leadership responses to lower echelon abuses and local problems serves important propaganda purposes.

  Media coverage, too, however, operates within rigid limits.

  "[The] rise of public opinion supervision signifies both the emergence of more assertive media outlets and the central leadership's more conscious use of the media to curb the systematic bureaucratic corruption and mounting crisis in local governance. Although the supposed power of the media to carry out political and moral persuasion and the government's power to dismiss officials are two different matters, media outlets are sometimes effective in disciplining local officials because they are part of the party-state structure. - - - [However], we argue that the use of public opinion supervision in legitimating monopolistic party power through the public display of the central leadership's paternalistic commitment to the people is more significant than the actual ability of the media to restrain local officials in their everyday exercise of power."

  The media has in fact been used since the beginning of Party rule in China to maintain Central Party control over lower echelon cadre and officials. In the beginning, this was limited to reports for internal Party consumption, but now includes open publicity of governance, coverage of mass protests, and debate about economic and social problems. Off limits to media scrutiny are basic Party policies like the economic reforms.
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  The media is still a propaganda arm of the Party. Publication of Party leadership responses to lower echelon abuses and local problems serves important propaganda purposes.

  "It projects a caring image and symbolically affirms the leadership's commitment to the people, enhancing its legitimacy and demonstrating its sincerity in dealing with China's problems."

The central Party has responded by portraying all governance evils as the fault of errant local cadres, and the central Party as active in the redress of grievances. Investigations and directives for remedial action flow from the top down to the lower echelons.

  The authors summarize the basic causes of instability in the relation between the central Party and its lower echelons. Unfunded mandates flow down while locally derived revenues are increasingly absorbed by the national government. An increasingly bloated and inadequately funded township bureaucracy has formed in the attempt to maintain control of the myriad activities at the local level. Where economic development is not successful, township officials have become harsh tax collectors.
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  The central Party has responded by portraying all governance evils as the fault of errant local cadres, and the central Party as active in the redress of grievances. Investigations and directives for remedial action flow from the top down to the lower echelons.

  "Though government officials may not be accountable to the public, they are ultimately accountable to the central leadership, whose awareness of inaction could spell the end of one's political career. In short, the media's public nature and their unique role as an integrated but relatively autonomous part of the party-state make them a powerful ideological tool for creating a closer identity between the party and the public at a time of increased political alienation. They also act as a cost-effective administrative instrument for the central leadership to reassert control over an unruly and dysfunctional bureaucracy that threatens the very existence of the party-state itself."

The national media aggressively pursue their assigned role - but always with care in picking their targets. They are mindful of their propaganda role and the topics and individuals that are off limits.

The general public contributes a vast flow of information about local problems, corruption, official abuse, consumer fraud, industrial accidents, and other problems.

  The media is now dependent for its funds on commercial success in attracting advertising in increasingly competitive markets. This makes them increasingly dependent on their credibility with the public. The national media aggressively pursue their assigned role - but always with care in picking their targets. They are mindful of their propaganda role and the topics and individuals that are off limits.
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  Despite these limits, efforts through TV programs, magazines, news articles and internet sites involved in supervision through public opinion are vastly popular in China. The general public contributes a vast flow of information about local problems, corruption, official abuse, consumer fraud, industrial accidents, and other problems. Investigative reports concentrate on local cadres, officials and businesses without implicating higher echelon activities. They can be highly effective within the limits of their sphere of operations.
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  The authors note the media impact in an industrial poisoning incident in Baigou township, Hebei province. Not only was the particular incident remedied with punishment for local business operators and local authorities, but a general inspection resulted in the closing of 1,100 substandard workshops. There was reform of pertinent national labor laws and widespread enforcement efforts.
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Urban audiences are not that interested in rural governance. Urban audiences are what advertisers want.

Local media - including right up to provincial levels - don't have the clout of the national media.

  However, the scope of media surveillance in China's vast hinterland is constrained by the limits of rural media outlets. Less than one third of the critical "focus interviews" news reports involved village or township matters. Urban audiences are not that interested in rural governance. Urban audiences are what advertisers want.
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  Local media - including right up to provincial levels - don't have the clout of the national media. The problems exposed get addressed in proportions that decline as the scope of the media involved becomes more rural. Local officials generally don't fear local media. County level media "operate strictly as party mouthpieces and as instruments of local boosterism." They are frequently run and always heavily influenced by local Party cadre.
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Threats and actual violence against journalists is not uncommon. Journalists have even been arrested and punished for criticizing local officials.

"The absence of opposition political parties and independent citizens' groups, together with the lack of an independent judicial system and the lack of transparency in the Chinese political process, deprive the media of important allies to carry out thorough investigations into official wrongdoing and to defend their right to conduct critical reporting."

  Even the national media is subject to influence by important Party and business interests. Many critical stories are killed as a result of such influence. High ranking national, provincial and city officials are immune from scrutiny. As a result, the emphasis in recent years has shifted from revelations of the malfeasance of local officials to revelations of general social problems that don't involve the targeting of easily identifiable officials. Local Party propaganda agencies have succeeded in gaining regulatory supervision when central media attempts to report critically about their jurisdictions.
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  Threats and actual violence against journalists is not uncommon. Journalists have even been arrested and punished for criticizing local officials. Central authorities have retaliated by firing investigative reporters for revealing especially embarrassing official transgressions. A weekly magazine noted for its investigative reporting was closed down. Whistle blowers within the Party have been expelled, prosecuted and heavily punished. Libel cases by officials and business leaders chill media scrutiny.

  "[Events] like these not only send chilling messages throughout the media system and demonstrate the limits of the central leadership's commitment to public opinion supervision, but also highlight the complicated power struggles over the party's anticorruption campaign in general and over media-based public opinion supervision in particular. The absence of opposition political parties and independent citizens' groups, together with the lack of an independent judicial system and the lack of transparency in the Chinese political process, deprive the media of important allies to carry out thorough investigations into official wrongdoing and to defend their right to conduct critical reporting. As a matter of fact, although the Chinese constitution formally endorses press freedom, journalists have no legally defined and enforceable rights to report. Although they are called upon to defend citizens' rights under the law, in practice their own constitutional rights are still denied. - - - When the central leadership itself censors the news and fires or even jails journalists at will to keep itself in power, it is not surprising that lower-level bureaucrats and unlawful elements are doing the same to protect their own interests."

Even when media exposure results in dismissals of abusive or corrupt officials, replacements acting within the same unreformed political and business power structures will be just as corrupt and abusive.

It is the system that is the problem, not just the individuals working within it. Indeed, focus on individual abuses and corruption  serves to deflect criticism of the system.

    The media thus cannot play a significant role in constraining local officials. Even when media exposure results in dismissals of abusive or corrupt officials, replacements acting within the same unreformed political and business power structures will be just as corrupt and abusive.

  "The current crisis in rural governance is rooted in China's political economy, particularly the persistent extractive policy of the central government toward the countryside during the processes of industrialization and modernization. Thus if the lack of economic opportunities in the rural areas and the temptations of power have drawn many into the ranks of local officialdom, - - - the discrepancy between extractive demands and service obligations in the Chinese political economy has also put local officials in an unenviable position."

  It is the system that is the problem, not just the individuals working within it. Indeed, focus on individual abuses and corruption  serves to deflect criticism of the system. Land seizures, environmental degradation, mining and other hazardous industrial practices are the results of the economic policies of the national government and are far more serious than local corruption and abuse.
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  There are now several web sites dedicated to airing complaints about official corruption and abuse. They have had some success, even leading to the downfall of a high level city official. One site has been co-opted by government agencies. However, several sites remained independent as this book went to press. The ultimate influence of this trend, and the Party reaction to it, remain to be seen.