Soft power

U.S. foreign policy

Modern international diplomacy

Globalization

Soft power sources

Defining the national interest

Order out of chaos:

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Nye provides a realistic method for analyzing the myriad forces at play.

  Nye deftly brings order out of the apparent chaos of the asymmetric post Cold War foreign policy environment. He crisply, logically and consistently demonstrates a profound understanding of factual context.
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  Perhaps most important, Nye provides a realistic method for analyzing the myriad forces at play - the forces with which actors in the foreign policy arena work in achieving and contesting foreign policy objectives. This permits all interested parties - whether they agree or disagree with particular policy recommendations - to at least speak the same language. Thus, even for those who might question some of his conclusions, Nye always clearly frames the issues for analysis and debate.
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Avoidance of fear and loathing:

U.S. ties to and interests in the rest of the world will also increase and will have to be addressed in its foreign policy.

  Unilateralism "on behalf of self-defined global ends" undermines U.S. influence and creates coalitions against its interests. The U.S. economy and culture have a global reach that will inevitably increase. The information age inevitably spreads and thickens international ties. Thus, U.S. ties to - and interests in - the rest of the world will also increase and will have to be addressed in its foreign policy. Most of these interests can be materially facilitated by taking advantage of international coalitions or international agencies, and some of these interests - including some of the most important - can only be addressed with broad international cooperation.
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  Among the latter are combating the illicit drugs trade and other international criminal activities, dealing with AIDS and other infectious diseases, many ecological problems, and now - especially - international terrorism. Among the former are the worldwide establishment of political stability and democratic values - and all the manifold aspects of globalization, which is hugely beneficial for all advanced nations - and absolutely essential for any hope of advancement for third world nations.

  "Openness of global markets is a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition for alleviating poverty in poor countries even as it benefits the United States." 

U.S. must prevent any widespread growth of the fear and loathing that would flow from arrogant and overbearing conduct.

  The current war on terrorism highlights these realities. Those who hate economic and political freedom - especially certain religious fundamentalists - know they must "break down what America stands for" if they are to prevent the widespread adoption of its attractive economic and cultural attributes.

  "American feminism, open sexuality, and individual choices are profoundly subversive to patriarchal societies. - - - Some tyrants and fundamentalists will always hate us because of our values and openness and opportunities, and we will have no choice but to deal with them through more effective counter terrorism policies."

  However, that hatred is unlikely to catalyze broader hatred "unless we abandon our values and pursue arrogant and overbearing policies that let the extremists appeal to the majority in the middle." It is vital that the U.S. prevent any widespread growth of the fear and loathing that would flow from arrogant and overbearing conduct. It is vital that the U.S. utilize all the tools available - including the resources available internationally - to combat such hatred and to further its other vital interests.

Principles and norms:

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The U.S. must set priorities to do the things it must do and the desirable things it can do without overreaching its substantial but not limitless resources.

Hard power - soft power:

  Of course, there are obvious overlaps in these categories. Military power can also be an attraction to those who wish to be on the winning side - or at least wish to avoid being on the losing side. Military units can be used for disaster relief. The attractive power of hard currency commerce inexorably draws nations into the European Union ("EU").

  Nye clearly recognizes the soft power attractions of international trade and the institutions that facilitate it. However, he actually does not give much attention to the soft power attributes of the hard power factors of military and economic strength. Most of his analysis of soft power concentrates on the inherently soft power factors of culture, ideology and institutions. This is probably because such inherently soft power factors have been so widely overlooked or so little valued in most of the literature.
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  However, it was the soft power attractions of hard currency commerce that played a dominant role in bringing down the Iron Curtain and shaping the post Cold War world. It is succeeding in pacifying and unifying Europe where millennia of efforts at military conquest have failed. Inherently soft power factors of culture, ideology and institutions also play a vital role in this process. The soft power carrot is indeed proving more powerful than the hard power stick.

There are many foreign policy objectives that cannot be achieved with only military and economic power - or that can be materially advanced by the attractive soft power aspects of a nation's culture, ideals and institutions.

  Hard power provides the essential physical security and economic wherewithal for everything else. These power factors must always be the predominant concern of foreign policy.
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  However, there are many foreign policy objectives that cannot be achieved with only military and economic power - or that can be materially advanced by the attractive soft power aspects of a nation's culture, ideals and institutions. Thus, the development and maintenance of soft power can be as important for a nation's foreign policy as the development and maintenance of hard power.
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  Nye seeks to answer the question: How can the U.S. most effectively use and maintain its soft power attributes in its foreign policy efforts to "protect our people, promote our values, and lead toward a better world over the next few decades?"
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  "Unilateralism, arrogance, and parochialism" tend to undermine a nation's soft power - and this matters for a wide variety of foreign policy objectives. This is a central thesis of Nye's book. He finds such arrogance, unilateralism, and parochialism in Congressional policies that have resulted in sanctions against Iran and Cuba, rejection of more than a dozen treaties and conventions in the last decade, reductions in foreign aid, the withholding of dues for the United Nations and other international agencies, reduction of funds for the State Department, and the abolition of the U.S. Information Agency.
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  Nye recognizes the reasons for U.S. rejection of many of the rejected treaties and conventions. However, he insists that a better response would have been to continue negotiations to achieve better results, while voluntarily taking acceptable actions that would further the objectives of these international initiatives. Of course, there have been some international initiatives that have been contrary to the nation's core values -- UN agency efforts to restrict free trade and freedom of the press -- which were properly rejected.

  This book, in its 171 pages, does not go into the particulars of these recent individual instances of unilateralist and parochial U.S. actions sufficiently to judge the propriety of any of the particular actions. FUTURECASTS does differ with Nye in a few cases. (See, "Defining the Foreign Policy National Interest," below.) However, these are issues on which reasonable men can differ, and this is no reflection on Nye's accurate scholarship and perceptive analytical approach to the general principles and norms needed to guide modern foreign policy - which is the principle concern of the book.

  There are fears that such conduct could lay the groundwork for adverse coalitions that would recreate a bipolar world of adversarial powers. Coalitions built around China and/or Russia could eventually establish a military challenge for the United States. A united Europe could challenge for international primacy. (See, "U.S. leadership," below.)
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  Prospects that a united Europe will mount a broad challenge for primacy are not feasible under present conditions. As Nye points out, Europe simply isn't that united and - for the foreseeable future - is unlikely to attain such levels of unity. Of course, frustration - or worse - with U.S. foreign policy could become a driving force for such unity.
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  Adverse coalitions built around China and/or Russia are unlikely unless U.S. actions are also overbearing enough to create fear and loathing sufficient to counterbalance the attractiveness of its hard currency commerce. Moreover, the fear these two nations still engender in their neighbors and between themselves - and a multiplicity of other divisive forces - remain in play. Nevertheless, as Nye points out, the most likely hard power challenges could come from a growing China or a revived Russia - both of which are currently predominant regional powers.
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  Coalitions against particular U.S. international interests have occurred and are made more likely by unilateralist, arrogant, and parochial U.S. conduct. Protectionism is undoubtedly the most dangerous and divisive form of such conduct. "The United States must resist protectionism at home and support international economic institutions" that facilitate international commerce. Trade disputes must not be permitted to explode into disastrous trade wars (such as the trade war during the 1920s and 1930s that played a major role in the Great Depression).
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  U.S. economic and cultural supremacy may indeed erode as Asian and European markets prosper and grow. They may ultimately "loom larger than the American market." In several particular areas - such as international trade, antitrust regulation, the establishment of technical standards, and protection of intellectual property - Europe already shares predominance with the U.S.
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Defining our national interest broadly to include global interests will be crucial to the longevity of our power and whether others see hegemony as benign or not.

The various aspects of soft power must be a part of any effective foreign policy - and multilateralism is essential for the development and maintenance of the attributes of soft power.

  Transnational organizations - from multinational corporations to non governmental organizations ("NGOs") to various associations - including criminal and terrorist groups - increasingly cut across national borders. Some have soft power of their own - attracting coalitions that ignore national boundaries. NGOs in particular have used soft power attributes to become a driving force on subjects like human rights and the environment.
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  Nye persuasively explains why - although the U.S. military role remains essential to global stability - "military power alone cannot produce the outcomes we want on many of the issues that matter to Americans." The various aspects of soft power must be a part of any effective foreign policy - and multilateralism is essential for the development and maintenance of the attributes of soft power. Learning "to define our national interest to include global interests will be crucial to the longevity of our power and whether others see hegemony as benign or not."

  As Nye points out, although the U.S. is predominant in military and economic power, it is clearly not omnipotent. At any particular moment, the world is full of problems of concern to the U.S. that have no immediate solution - some that may never have a solution. The task in these instances is to devise the best practical approaches to these continuing problems. These best approaches will inevitably involve multilateral cooperation.

  The need for such multilateral cooperation is actually not widely in question. Even the "unilateralist" members of the Bush administration referred to by Nye support such features of multilateralism as NATO, the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), and continued efforts to liberalize international trade. The real questions arise in judging the wisdom and scope of particular multilateral or unilateral actions. It is a question of degree.

  The real policy battles are being fought over where the lines should be drawn in particular situations. Which treaties should be ratified and which are too flawed to be ratified? Which conventions should be adopted? Which international initiatives should the U.S. contribute to? Should agreements be informal and voluntary, or set forth in binding treaties? Arguably the most important battles are with protectionist forces - each of which wants to draw defensive lines around its own vested interests at the expense of the economic welfare of the nation and of the world.

  Clearly, the soft powers of culture and ideology have a huge role to play. Equally clearly, as Nye emphasizes, the effectiveness of soft power can be substantially undermined or enhanced by the way a nation conducts itself.
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The American Colossus:

  In foreign affairs, power is the ability to affect desired outcomes and - if necessary - "change the behavior of others to make this happen."

Hard power:

Modern terrorist groups are like pirates - which were often used as proxies against adversaries for hundreds of years until successfully suppressed by the British Navy during the 19th century.

  Military force is still a major factor - that can quickly become a predominant concern - as recent events have demonstrated. Even when the direct use of force is rejected by nations, they can still employ private proxies to wage terrorist campaigns against adversaries. And, increasingly, private groups without visible connections to national governments have undertaken their own terrorist campaigns. Nye compares modern terrorist groups with pirates - which were often used as proxies against adversaries for hundreds of years until successfully suppressed by the British Navy during the 19th century.
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  Military force can also play a stabilizing role for unstable relationships. U.S. military forces are welcomed in many Asian states - and in Europe too - as insurance against uncertain neighbors and to "shape the environment" in favorable ways.
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  Economic force has been increasing in influence as economic objectives increase in importance for modern states. A hard currency can frequently be used to project power far more efficiently than actually transporting men and materials. However, to maximize economic power, a nation must submit to market disciplines.
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  Thus, in a sense, modern nations must relinquish sovereign economic powers to the markets unless they want to relinquish a considerable degree of their economic strength and prosperity. (This is because governments are so inherently inept at economic management that markets - even when imperfect - always do a much better job.) Despots that care not about the prosperity of their people can refuse market disciplines and scoff at international sanctions. However, the attractiveness of hard currency commerce is a powerful influence even within despotic regimes.
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  The familiar ground of the hard power attributes of military and economic power are briefly but competently analyzed by Nye.
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Soft power:

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  However, there are more subtle forces also at work in international affairs - cultural, ideological and institutional forces that the author categorizes as soft power.

  "A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness."

More than just influence or persuasion, soft power is the ability to entice and attract, which may lead to acquiescence or imitation, and may facilitate efforts at leadership.

"The values of democracy, personal freedom, upward mobility, and openness" expressed in its culture, higher education and foreign policy materially contribute to U.S. foreign policy.

  Getting people to want what you want - to co-opt people rather than coerce them - is "soft power." Soft power can establish institutions, beliefs and values that "set the agenda and determine the framework of debate." More than just influence or persuasion, soft power is the ability to entice and attract, which may lead to acquiescence or imitation, and may facilitate efforts at leadership.
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  Most important are the values expressed in a nation's culture, domestic policies, and international conduct. Because it can "inspire the dreams and desires of others," the U.S. wields significant soft power in international relations. (That it is easier to co-opt people than to co-opt governments does not undermine such soft power as "an important reality.")
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  All forms of power are, of course, interrelated in complex ways. The way one type of power is wielded can enhance or detract from other types of power. Military strength and resolve may attract favorable alliances - or create widespread fear and loathing that cements adverse alliances. (Success in the war on terrorism will depend in large part on how well the Bush administration treads the fine line between these two extremes in the volatile Middle East.)
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  Several small states with little hard power nevertheless wield considerable political clout because of their soft power activities. The author cites Canada, the Scandinavian states and the Netherlands that use such causes as economic aid and peacekeeping to broaden their influence. (Of course, this is only possible in an environment made secure by NATO military power or the absence of immediate military challenges.)
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  Large nation examples are also prominent. Britain during the 19th century enhanced its position by broadly establishing free trade and the gold standard - a soft power use of economic power. The U.S. after WW II established various international organizations to facilitate world trade and international diplomacy. "If a country can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes."
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  An attractive culture, accepted international rules consistent with its objectives, and institutions that favorably encourage or limit the activities of other countries, can materially reduce the amount of "costly carrots and sticks" needed to influence outcomes. "The values of democracy, personal freedom, upward mobility, and openness" expressed in its culture, higher education and foreign policy contribute to U.S. foreign policy.

  Soft power emanates from the people as well as from government. Popular and governmental soft power may reinforce each other, work separately, or even at cross purposes - as during the Vietnam War. Arrogance, indifference to the opinion of others, and a narrow approach to national interests "are a sure way to undermine" soft power.
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  Nye analyzes the various aspects of soft power. The importance of the different types of power varies in different types of nations. Soft power factors operate differently in modern states than in the pre industrial agricultural despotisms and dysfunctional states of much of Africa and the Middle East. There are also differences in recently industrializing nations like China and India. However, current economic and social trends tend toward increased influence for soft power factors. In the modern world, "military power alone" cannot ensure success.
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U.S. leadership:

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There is always a need for some predominant power that is broadly accepted as a leader to restrain and mediate conflicts, stabilize world finance, and encourage the establishment of the arrangements and institutions needed for international governance.

Soft power that offers many benefits and few burdens, and is widely nonthreatening to peaceful states, can achieve much that brute application of hard power cannot.

  Free nations chose to ally themselves with the U.S. against the Soviet Union in the period just after WW-II, for example, even though the U.S. was far stronger at that time. It was the Soviet Union that created widespread fear and loathing. Until recently, Iraq and Iran worried more about each other than about the U.S., even though both hated the U.S.
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  Nye points out that predominant power can bring periods of relative peace and open trade routes among the world's major nations. He cites the Pax Romana in ancient times, and the Pax Britannica after the Napoleonic Wars, and the Pax Americana after WW-II. (Of course, this is only true in a relative sense. There were military conflicts - some fairly serious - during all three periods.)
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  Nye correctly recognizes the need for some predominant power that is broadly accepted as a leader to restrain and mediate conflicts, stabilize world finance, and encourage the establishment of the arrangements and institutions needed for international governance. Such necessary objectives are unlikely to be achieved by committees of weak powers. (Europe's inability to act decisively in Yugoslavia without U.S. leadership provides a prime example.)

  "Global governance requires a large state to take the lead. But how much and what kind of inequality of power is necessary -- or tolerable -- and for how long?"

  Here, soft power that offers many benefits and few burdens, and is widely nonthreatening to peaceful states, can achieve much that brute application of hard power cannot. (Examples include the current rush to join the EU, and the 19th century desire of  remote western territories to join or remain a part of the U.S.)
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The EU is far more likely to be "confederal" than federal - with nationalist interests confining EU influence to particular purposes.

  Possible challenges for U.S. predominance are realistically outlined and analyzed. China is appropriately listed foremost as a possible source for such challenges. However, China's economic and military outlook includes many substantial obstacles and limitations - not only in achieving world power status, but even in displacing the U.S. as the predominant power in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asian regions.
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  Prospects for Japan, Russia, India, and/or Europe rising to challenge U.S. predominance are also realistically evaluated. In spite of the usual differences between nations, it would require some very clumsy U.S. behavior to drive these nations individually or in coalitions to broadly oppose the U.S.
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  Only a united EU is likely to equal U.S. power in the near future. But the EU is far more likely to be "confederal" than federal - with nationalist interests confining EU influence to particular purposes. Some view the EU is a "postmodern polity," ruling "alongside, rather than in place of," the national governments of member nations. Actually, even this view overstates the current and likely influence of Brussels.
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  In any event, the influences that tie the member EU nations to the U.S. far exceed the divisive influences, and its more vigorous economic system should keep the U.S. well ahead of Europe for the foreseeable future. However, as stated, perceptions of U.S. unilateralism - especially when it obstructs widely sought European objectives - could cause a weakening in the relationship, an increased tendency for European states to combine to frustrate some particular U.S. objectives, and increased difficulty in gaining European cooperation in dealing with the world's problems and promoting core values of democracy and human rights.
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  Current U.S. predominance does not make this a "unipolar" world, Nye points out. The U.S. remains limited in the degree to which it "is able to get the results it wants in some dimensions of world politics." However, this does not make it a "multipolar" world, either, since there is no even remotely equivalent world power.
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  A more complex analysis dealing with the many particular kinds of power is used by Nye to present a coherent understanding of the current foreign policy environment. In the hard power world of military and economic power, the U.S. is the only nation able to project military power globally, but is only a near equal in economic power with Europe and only marginally ahead of Japan.

  That the dollar is by a considerable margin the world's primary reserve currency - giving the U.S. a limited but still substantial ability to "print gold" - makes the U.S. the world's predominant economic power as well, even if it is far from being unchallengeable.

In the soft power world, power is widely dispersed - and can not be rationally analyzed in simplistic terms of hegemony or unipolarity or multipolarity.

  However, there is also a soft power world. Here, governments are not the only players. Many transnational players - from multinational corporations to NGOs to terrorists and criminals and individual hackers - play a role over which no national government exercises much control. Here, power is widely dispersed - and can not be rationally analyzed in simplistic terms of hegemony or unipolarity or multipolarity.
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  Because foreign policy now involves all three of these dimensions - like a three dimensional chess game - it is "woefully inadequate" to concentrate on just the military and economic dimensions. "Cultural attraction and ideology and agenda setting and holding out big prizes for cooperation, like the vastness and sophistication of the American market," also determine success and failure in foreign policy. (Indeed, as stated, the EU has been built on just such forces, and the vastly important peaceful incorporation of Russia and China into the modern world may also depend on them.)
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In pursuing its foreign policy objectives, the U.S. needs cooperation and coalitions that require a complex array of compromises and accommodations.

Information technology:

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There is a "diffusion of governance" along pragmatic lines.

Authoritarian and despotic regimes wrestle with the conundrum of gaining the economic benefits of the internet and mobile phones without losing control over the flow of political and social information.

  The world is being tied together by information technology in ways that change the nature of governments and sovereignty, and enhance the role of soft power in foreign policy. Modern information technology thus destroys the government monopoly over foreign policy. It is transforming economies, society, government, and world politics. Nye reviews the ways in which soft power factors of ideology, culture, and institutions play increasingly important roles in this new world.
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  Under current conditions, the nation state has "become too small for the big problems of life and too big for the small problems." This is leading to a "diffusion of governance" along pragmatic lines. Some tasks are being ceded to multinational organizations, and others are being devolved to subnational governments, and others to markets or private nonmarket agencies. Nonprofits now employ more people in the U.S. than the number of federal and state employees. NGOs and local associations play increasing roles in governance at all levels.
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  However, most nations and peoples have yet to feel the full impact of the revolution in information technology. They have yet to come to terms with the need to adjust governance arrangements in response to that revolution. Authoritarian and despotic regimes wrestle with the conundrum of gaining the economic benefits of the internet and mobile phones without losing control over the flow of political and social information. Market forces are driving government and economic entities to provide sufficient transparency to attract needed capital. Middle class populations are more resentful and impatient with repressive measures.
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  Governments that seek to control information flows on the internet face high costs and ultimate frustration. The new information technologies tend to foster network organizations, new types of community, and new demands on government.
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Governments are losing some of their power to set the agendas, are increasingly pressed for rapid response to events, and must share the stage with more actors from the private sector.

  Thus, both individuals and private organizations are increasingly empowered to play direct roles in world politics. NGOs and private networks strive incessantly to increase the influence of  soft power factors, because soft power is their primary resource. The treaty banning use of land mines is an example of the possibilities. Governments are losing some of their power to set the agendas - are increasingly pressed for rapid response to events - and must share the stage with more actors from the private sector.
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  This new complexity makes the various aspects of soft power increasingly important. A partial list of problems that are difficult to control within sovereign boundaries includes: Financial flows, drug trade, customs enforcement, many ecological problems, AIDS and other infectious diseases, refugees, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, cultural intrusions. All require international cooperation if any effective policy response is to be attempted. Adapting to these needs, governments are changing the meaning of sovereign jurisdiction, control, and the roles of private actors.
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  Even the approach to national defense requires increasing multination cooperation as private terrorists and hackers attain the ability to do significant damage, and people and commerce in vast quantities flow across international borders. The hard power stage, too,  is cluttered with new private actors, and borders have become increasingly porous. (Efforts to close borders for protectionist or security reasons come at a great price - both in economic terms and in terms of individual choice and mobility - as the U.S. is learning as it strives to combat terrorism.)

  "Geographic communities and sovereign states will continue to play the major role in world politics for a long time to come, but they will be less self-contained and more porous. They will have to share the stage with actors who can use information to enhance their soft power and press governments directly, or indirectly by mobilizing their publics."

  Of course, despotic systems can still ignore such influences - but, like Myanmar and North Korea, at a heavy economic cost.

Soft power implications of information technology:

"Well developed communications infrastructure, secure property rights, sound government policies, an environment that encourages new business formation, deep capital markets, and a skilled workforce, many of whom understand English (the language of 80 percent of all Web pages)," are all essential for progress but are slow in being developed by poor nations.

  Progress is now impossible in the absence of certain fundamental characteristics. "Well developed communications infrastructure, secure property rights, sound government policies, an environment that encourages new business formation, deep capital markets, and a skilled workforce, many of whom understand English (the language of 80 percent of all Web pages)," are all essential for progress but are slow in being developed by poor nations. (The importance of most of these factors is precisely what FUTURECASTS has been emphasizing since its beginning 3-1/2 years ago.)
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  "Size still matters," even though information technology offers many opportunities to small nations. Barriers to entry and economies of scale persist even with respect to information. The cultural output of large nations like the U.S. and India allow them to have their own mature cultural industries. Large networks are more valuable than small networks. Proximity to competitors, suppliers and customers, and the existence of substantial markets and clusters of related expertise, all still matter. 
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  Nye emphasizes the continuing advantages of size and power with respect to "three dimensions of information."

• Flows of data - news and statistics - increase in volume and become increasingly accessible - helping smaller actors. However, large and powerful actors retain the advantage in their editorial and systems integration capacity for analysis.
• Competitive information - both commercial and military - often is only advantageous if and when acquired first and for as long as it is closely held. This favors the already powerful.
• Strategic information - about competitors - still is more accessible to the powerful.

Attention to what the information is telling may actually decrease for any particular aspect of the information as the total flow increases. Inertia remains a powerful factor.

  First mover status also has benefits. First movers create technological standards and architecture. Frequently - but not always - "path-dependent development of information systems reflects the advantage of the first mover." The use of the English language and the pattern of top-level internet domain names are examples (although English was already the language of international commerce). Silicon valley and similar information technology clusters around the U.S. retain their early mover advantages.
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  Financial strength still matters, even though technology constantly decreases in cost and becomes more widely accessible even in matters of national security. High resolution satellite photos are now available to all - global positioning is now available to all - and information technology networks offer a rich target environment for adversary nations, groups and even individuals.
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  Nevertheless, the U.S. continues to expand its lead in military technology. Only the U.S. currently has the resources to integrate the most advanced systems into a coherent "system of systems" for predominant impact.
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  The "paradox of plenty" is that gathering information is just part of the problem. Attention to what the information is telling may actually decrease for any particular aspect of the information as the total flow increases. Inertia remains a powerful factor. Attention and analytical capabilities become increasingly important with the increase in quantity of information. "Editors, filters, and cue givers become more in demand." This generally favors the U.S. with its free and vibrant press and intellectual community. (FUTURECASTS will help you stay abreast of the best in current analytical books on consequential subjects.)
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All actors, big and small, government and non government, "compete for credibility."

  Credibility becomes a characteristic to be fought over, established, strengthened, weakened, or destroyed. "Internet users tend to frequent web sites that provide information they find both interesting and credible." All actors, big and small, government and non government, "compete for credibility." (This is a battle FUTURECASTS wages incessantly against the mythmakers in the ideological and political arena.)
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  Tactical victories won with false information frequently become strategic disasters as the truth catches up to the lies. With a deluge of information and viewpoints, people increasingly tune out those that lack credibility. England has invested decades of effort in establishing the credibility of the BBC. However, since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has reduced its emphasis on such cultural exchange and information systems.
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  Domestic policies that are inconsistent with international positions undermine credibility, as do unilateralist tendencies that demonstrate a disregard for foreign nation beliefs and interests. Domestic policies that are consistent with international positions can enhance credibility.
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  Japan is offered as an example of a nation with a vibrant pop culture that still lacks the credibility to widely influence those beyond its borders.
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The portrayal of a people enjoying freedoms and individual liberty and great prosperity are inevitably broadly attractive.

  Thus, soft power advantages go to those nations whose dominant culture and ideas are most widely attractive. Liberalism, pluralism and autonomy are increasingly the global norm. Advantages also go to those with the most channels of communication, the most ability to frame the issues, and the most credibility.
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  By any measure, the U.S. has strong advantages in the arena of soft power. Its culture has many weaknesses and detractors. It is also a threat to conservative fundamentalists - to ruling elites - both religious and secular. Nye asserts that domestic policies such as capital punishment and weak gun control rules provide grounds for criticism. Foreign policy that appears arrogant and unilateral similarly undermines U.S. soft power.
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  However, the portrayal of a people enjoying freedoms and individual liberty and great prosperity are inevitably broadly attractive.

  "To the extent that official policies at home and abroad are consistent with democracy, human rights, openness, and respect for the opinions of others, the United States will benefit from the trends of this global information age, even though pockets of reaction and fundamentalism will persist and resist in some countries."

  What all this means is that important issues will less frequently be resolvable through military and economic power alone - credibility has become a vital resource - the attractiveness of culture and institutions matters more - nongovernmental actors play an increasing role - and globalization has decreased the protection of distance enjoyed by the Western Hemisphere.

Threats and opportunities:

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  Globalization refers to worldwide networks of interdependence. National boundaries have become more porous, but are still far from irrelevant.
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  Nye discusses economic, environmental, military, social, intellectual, political, ideological, and religious aspects of globalization. All of these factors are influenced by technological progress and government policies that have an impact on barriers to international exchange. The U.S. has been a major instigator and beneficiary of globalization, but can't control it.
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  The U.S. drives and gains huge advantages from globalizing tendencies in commerce, culture, travel, norms of conduct, and law. However, some ruling elites and conservative fundamentalists - both secular and religious - are threatened by the rapid changes loosed by globalization. They invoke nationalism and religion to generate opposition to globalizing influences - especially those influences emanating from the U.S.
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  However, all nations and all cultures can spread through globalization - and the U.S. and other globalizing nations are heavily influenced by trends coming from many outside sources. The U.S. constantly absorbs attractive elements from other cultures and foreign intellectual concepts. "Globalization is not intrinsically American, even if much of its current content is heavily influenced by what happens in the United States."

  Indeed, the primary beneficiaries are those third world nations that have been making an effort to facilitate their international commerce. Such nations have been growing at twice the rate of developed nations.

  As a free and open and entrepreneurial society, the U.S. is a natural dynamo of cultural influences. The U.S. accepts and recycles culture from all its many population elements and from all over the world. However, it is not the only generator of soft power influences, and some of what it generates has been widely ignored or deplored. Measurements in pounds and feet rather than metrics, capital punishment, and widespread gun possession are cultural aspects that have little soft power attractiveness and have sometimes undermined its overall soft power influence.
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  Globalizing influences keep developing faster and with increasingly pervasive impacts. The spread of knowledge makes knowledge more valuable and triggers further knowledge and information. Networks become increasingly more elaborate, spreading both beneficial and threatening impacts. Interdependence becomes increasingly pervasive and extensive.
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  Nye points out that globalization is a cause of increasing uncertainty. Conditions become increasingly subject to influences from an increasing array of factors and geographic areas. If uncertainty becomes "chaotic" - causing financial crisis and unemployment - that may be "too high a price for most people to pay for somewhat higher average levels of prosperity," and people may turn against globalization. He cites the 1997-1998 "Asian Contagion" financial crisis as an example.

  Nye, here, falls for a propaganda myth. Of course, the ordinary business cycle remains a natural and unavoidable feature of capitalism. However, catastrophic or intractable financial crises and chronic unemployment are not inherent features of capitalism and are never caused by "globalization." They are always caused by errors in public and private management. It is easier to blame impersonal globalization than for leaders - especially political leaders - to take the blame themselves.
 &
  This is not a benign propaganda myth, either. Protectionism itself can be a powerful cause of financial and economic collapse. Two decades of trade war protectionism after WW-I was one of the more important causes of the Great Depression. It is no accident that those nations with the most unemployment and poverty are the ones that most cut themselves off from world trade and other global influences.
 &
  Nye correctly makes the point that free trade is an answer - a necessary answer - to economic problems. It is thus inconsistent when he lends credence to the dangerous propaganda myths which aid protectionist causes.
 &
  Every nation that was caught in the Asian Contagion was undermined by clearly dysfunctional financial and economic policies. Each was already clearly heading for trouble - even if most commentators weren't paying attention. Stronger systems - even little Singapore existing in the eye of the storm - came through quite well.
 &
  Accelerating technological developments cause rapidly changing conditions that inevitably generate a wide array of uncertainties. This is primarily beneficial, because it also provides an unending array of opportunities. Those that try to protect the status quo will not escape the threats of technological change, but will miss most of the opportunities.

"The world is more upon us, but in terms of our policy responses, one size will not fit all."

Globalization spreads technology and economic capabilities, enabling others to ultimately catch up with U.S. levels of prosperity.

  "As we shape our foreign policy for this new century, we will have to respond to issues that involve greater complexity, more uncertainty, shorter response times, broader participation by groups and individuals, and an uneven shrinkage of distance. The world is more upon us, but in terms of our policy responses, one size will not fit all."

  The nature of complex globalization interrelationships and networks in the general realms of military, economic, environmental and social activities are analyzed by Nye. "Falling costs are increasing the thickness and complexity of global networks." The U.S. is today the primary promoter and beneficiary of economic globalization. However, globalization spreads technology and economic capabilities, enabling others to ultimately catch up with the U.S. (Only those that open themselves to economic globalization and that facilitate profit driven, market directed commerce will catch up to and reach U.S. levels of prosperity.)
 &

While U.S. influence is and will remain strong, nations will develop in their own unique ways, and they in turn will influence developments in the U.S.

  But convergence in response to modern conditions that are similar for all globalizing nations is far from total. While the industrial revolution had similar affects on all industrializing nations, Nye perceptively notes that Japan, Germany, the U.S., Great Britain, France, and smaller industrial states all retained vast cultural and political differences.
 &
  The same is occurring with respect to post industrial modernization. There is much evidence of convergence, but still no homogeneity. While U.S. influence is and will remain strong, nations will develop in their own unique ways, and they in turn will influence developments in the U.S. Even as the U.S. attempts to influence political and economic institutions worldwide, many worldwide influences strive to change U.S. foreign policy and attitudes towards such domestic matters as capital punishment and environmental policy.
 &
  No modern culture is stagnant. All now develop within a complex mesh of crosscurrents from other nations. Most new democracies have NOT followed the U.S. model, but have borrowed more from other nations, such as Canada. (It might just be that more of them would be successful if they DID borrow more from the U.S. model.)
 &
  Increasingly, political and social power is devolving down to subnational units. Information technology is increasingly enhancing the survivability of niche markets and local cultural attributes. While localized languages and dialects continue to disappear elsewhere, in locations that have embraced information technology - such as in Wales and Ireland - local languages are reviving. Indeed, modern technology empowers smaller private and governmental actors.
 &

The fact that the U.S. is open to outside cultural influence - to immigration from various places - and to foreign economic competition - serves to strengthen U.S. culture, its soft power influence abroad, and its economic system.

  Openness is a huge U.S. advantage. The fact that the U.S. is open to outside cultural influence - to immigration from various places - and to foreign economic competition - serves to strengthen U.S. culture, its soft power influence abroad, and its economic system. This aids U.S. efforts to encourage liberalizing political and economic trends around the world. "We may have less control in the future, but we may find ourselves living in a world somewhat more congenial to our basic values of democracy, free markets, and human rights."
 &
  Political reactions to globalization are perceptively analyzed, with proper attention to nuance and the wide spectrum of factors involved. "Capitalism is far from monolithic, with significant differences between Europe, Japan, and the United States. There is more than one way to respond to global markets and to run a capitalist economy." (But some are clearly more effective than others.)
 &
  Nye emphasizes the elites that are threatened by change and that thus resist globalization and modernity. This opposition takes a variety of secular and religious forms, and has proven to be a divisive factor between nations and between population segments within nations.
 &

If combined with poor economic management that results in chronic financial crisis and recession, inequality can provide a reactionary driving force that can be tapped by protectionist interests.

  Inequality has been blamed for the breakdown in the globalization of the 19th century, and Nye accepts it as a primary factor in generating opposition both then and now. Yet he notes that a century ago, inequality between the richest and poorest nations increased just from a 7-to-1 ratio to an 11-to-1 ratio, while today it has increased from a 30-to-1 ratio to 74-to-1 as of 1997.

  Obviously, inequality is a makeweight. It is used by vested interests threatened by import competition to generate opposition to free trade, and by egalitarian ideologues to push their agenda.

  Nye notes that there is no automatic relationship between inequality and political reaction, as long as general prosperity permits all to achieve some gains in their material conditions. However, if combined with poor economic management that results in chronic financial crisis and recession, it can provide a reactionary driving force that can be tapped by protectionist interests. This combination succeeded in ending the 19th century period of globalization.
 &
  Nye provides a fine summary of the various causes of inequality - many of which have nothing to do with globalization. "It is difficult to find any countries that have prospered while closing themselves from globalization, but openness alone is not sufficient to overcome [backwardness]." "Equally striking is the uneven distribution of the benefits of globalization among individuals within and across countries." 

  To attain economic prosperity, there are many factors that are each necessary but not sufficient. Governance that is effective in facilitating commerce is a complex activity.

  Brazil, for example, has far more inequality than the U.S. Many of the least developed nations are not even in the global ball game. In China, dramatic gains have occurred during the two decades of its far from complete efforts to strip away the economic restraints of its communist and feudal past. Now, it is increasingly - but still tentatively - opening its economy to foreign competition. Revealingly, those economic sectors most exposed to globalization have surged ahead, while others have lagged behind, and vast state owned enterprises have become increasingly hopeless economic burdens. This has greatly increased inequality in China. 
 &

Anti globalization groups are largely elitist groups that pretend to speak for the poor, but actually speak for a variety of interests most of which are inimical to efforts at poverty reduction

  Politicians hate rapid change, because change always undermines some powerful vested interests as well as many of the established relationships of the people as a whole. Thus, politicians prefer "useful inefficiencies" with which they can shelter important constituencies from competitive forces. "As globalization removes such inefficiencies, it removes the buffers and becomes the political victim of its economic success."
 &
  Social globalization has facilitated international alliances of groups opposed to globalization. These are largely elitist groups that pretend to speak for the poor, but actually speak for a variety of interests most of which are inimical to efforts at poverty reduction. Among these groups are "old leftist opponents of capitalism, trade unionists trying to protect well-paid jobs against competition from poor countries, environmentalists wishing for stronger international regulation, young idealists wishing to show solidarity with the poor, and young anarchists rioting for fun and profit."
 &
  Some still grieve over the triumph of capitalism. They hate economic freedom and use complaints about globalization in their effort to give some life to lost radical causes such as socialism and anarchism. "To the extent that the United States wants to see economic globalization continue, it will have to think more clearly about the responses [to complaints from these factions] and about the governance of globalism."
 &

International governance:

While the nation state remains the key institution for global governance, it will be supplemented by an increasing array of international agencies created for particular purposes.

  "Rather than thinking of a hierarchical world government, we should think of networks of governance crisscrossing and coexisting with a world divided formally into sovereign states." While the nation state remains the key institution for global governance, it will be supplemented by an increasing array of international agencies created for particular purposes. There are already hundreds of such agencies managing the global dimensions of trade, telecommunications, civil aviation, health, environment, meteorology, etc.
 &
  Responses to globalization have been a mixed bag. Protectionist impulses remain strong. They are held in check among wealthy nations by threats of retaliation, but are loosed with devastating impact against the agricultural and textile exports of poor nations that cannot retaliate.

  The Africa Growth Opportunity Act of 2000 permits duty free imports of many specific textiles from sub-Saharan African nations. This has already had an observable beneficial impact within many of those poverty stricken nations.

  On the other hand, there has been an observable "race to the top." Best manufacturing and business practices are adopted to meet competition - transparent  accounting practices are adopted to gain access to U.S. capital markets - agricultural pesticide standards acceptable in European and U.S. markets are promoted - as are other quality standards demanded in major markets.
 &
  Nevertheless, governance of globalization is a complex affair that requires more than voluntary acquiescence. In many instances it requires enforceable rules of the game. Nations are "increasingly willing to sacrifice some of their own legal freedom of action in order to constrain, and make more predictable, others' actions toward themselves."
 &

Regulation of global flows increases by layers of accretion as problems arise. It is far too complex to be encompassed in a single treaty or constitutional document, and will always remain imperfect.

  Bilateral and multilateral treaties, informal agreements, and delegation of authority to formal intergovernmental institutions build a governance network. Regulation of global flows increases by layers of accretion as problems arise. It is far too complex to be encompassed in a single treaty or constitutional document, and will always remain imperfect.

  This is true of ALL regulation - which inherently involves constant efforts to control segments of reality that constantly change in response to changing conditions and to the regulations themselves - and thus NEVER achieve the effectiveness thought possible by those of little understanding.

  Systems of cooperation among similar national agencies also increase steadily, and NGOs play an expanding international role. Today, "the majority of officers in American embassies come from agencies such as agriculture, transportation, commerce, energy, NASA, defense, intelligence, and the FBI."
 &

• NGOs can marshal considerable soft power, using shame to attack vital corporate reputations. They have successfully influenced employment practices, environmental practices, and discount sales of AIDS drugs in poor world nations.
• Private global policy networks attack such issues as corruption, erection of large dams, debt relief for poor nations, polio eradication, etc.
• Contractual agreements contain arbitration and choice of legal system provisions.
• Credit rating agencies influence access to capital markets.

  These influences have sometimes contradicted the policies of governments - both authoritarian and elected - and represent a part of an evolving tapestry of international civil governance.
 &

Legitimacy:

Global institutions are actually quite weak - and are all beholden to the wishes of the national governments that formed them - the most influential of which are all democracies.

  Anti globalization forces have had the most success in challenging the "legitimacy" of global institutions - none of which are democratically elected. But global institutions are actually quite weak - and are all beholden to the wishes of the national governments that formed them - the most influential of which are all democracies. They are thus similar to such professional and more powerful domestic agencies as central banks and most high appellate courts. They are far more responsive to democratic influences than the NGOs that attack them.
 &
  Nevertheless, their actions can have powerful impacts, and even when broadly beneficial, will always impact some people and institutions negatively.
 &

There is as yet no widespread sense of identity as a worldwide "citizenry as a whole."

  Nye counters arguments in favor of internationally elected government. There is as yet no widespread sense of identity as a worldwide "citizenry as a whole." The interests of China and India would dominate a world parliament - and would NOT be kind to NGO interests that favor higher labor and environmental standards.

  "Adding legislative assemblies to global institutions - - - might well produce an undemocratic body that would interfere with the delegated accountability that now links institutions to democracy."

  Nevertheless, to establish legitimacy, high visibility global institutions will have to accept greater transparency and accountability, and responsiveness to societal concerns. They must display "a willingness to experiment."
 &
  Globalization remains vulnerable to protectionist backlash, especially during extended periods of instability and economic downturn. The U.S. has a huge interest in multinational efforts to support and further globalization, and must remain internationally engaged to further those interests. Of course, it has its own domestic protectionist tendencies, too.

Domestic factors:

&

  A mélange of strengths and weaknesses are recognized. However, no weaknesses seem likely to achieve sufficient influence to justify analogies with the fall of the Roman Empire. These analogies are much favored in certain intellectual circles that tend to pessimism about the future of the U.S. (Yes, these intellectual circles still - stupidly - persist.)
 &
  Nye points an accusing finger at the mass media - which concentrates on bad news and thus feeds undue pessimism. Tendencies towards undue nostalgia for the past are also cited.
 &

Multiculturalism:

&

  Cultural divisions are no longer so deep that they prevent effective implementation of foreign policy - as they did in the 1970s. Most perceived moral and cultural problems are shared by other Western nations, and thus provide little ammunition for critics seeking to undermine U.S. influence. Nye correctly emphasizes the many foreign policy advantages and strengths enjoyed by the U.S. because of its substantial flows of immigrants, and notes no substantial diminution in traditional "American melting pot" assimilation rates.

  Even when all other forms of propaganda are made suspect, the fact that uncle Ivan or cousin Abdullah have been received well in the U.S. - are successful - and can send small sums to help those left in the old country - powerfully shapes popular views of the U.S. in foreign nations.

Civic engagement:

The economy:

Money invested in the U.S. produces 50% more output than in Germany or Japan. Real rates of return are about 9%, compared to about 7% in Germany and Japan.

&

  Diminishing public esteem for government has not led to diminished voluntary compliance with the laws or payment of taxes. Nor has it restricted the flow of talented young people into government. Levels of civic engagement may vary from period to period, but remain within historic norms, and are significantly higher than in all but a few small nations in Northern Europe.
 &
  Periodic recessions of a year or two - such as the current one - are not a significant factor. "What matters - - - is not short-run corrections in the business cycle but whether the American economy can sustain the new level of higher productivity that developed in the second half of the 1990s."
 &
  Leadership in information technology, globalization, deregulation, and competition continue to spur business process improvements, with important positive implications for U.S. power - both hard and soft. Money invested in the U.S. produces 50% more output than in Germany or Japan. Real rates of return are about 9%, compared to about 7% in Germany and Japan. In the "open economy" of the U.S., such factors naturally draw in massive and productive investment flows from abroad, justifying the nation's persistent payments deficit.

  Again, it is the shear attractiveness of hard currency commerce that is perhaps the most powerful incentive for nations and leaders and private economic interests to "get along with" the U.S. and imitate the governance structures of the U.S. and other hard currency nations.

Education:

The slow growth of working class living standards after 1972 has more to do with the stupidity of Keynesian policies in the two decades from the Kennedy to the Carter administrations - and the higher than normal real interest rates needed after 1980 to get the resulting inflation under control - than with any inherent weaknesses in the economic system.

&

  The U.S. education system is strong at the top, but weak at lower levels. "Americans win more Nobel prizes than do citizens of any other country." However, primary and secondary systems that serve the poor lag badly. These schools may not be turning out graduates capable of making their way in the modern information-based economy.

  Nye notes the high levels of income inequality in the U.S. and the apparent increase in poverty rates in the quarter century after 1972. This provides ammunition for critics of its economic system. His brief analysis is necessarily incomplete.
 &
  Like the critics, he omits such factors as the statistical impacts of the nation's substantial immigration flows and changing workforce, its growing number of single mothers, and the noxious impacts of the entitlement welfare programs of that period - none of which are attributable to its economic system. There are important problems with the statistical measurements as well - as the observable living conditions of all classes that took part in economic activity so evidently improved during that period.
 &
  Nevertheless, the U.S. economy did perform poorly in the quarter century after the devaluation of the dollar. Currency devaluation may  be made necessary by policy failures - but is always part of an economic disaster.

  Indeed, unless accompanied by appropriate reform of pertinent economic policy, NEVER provides the economic stimulation expected by economists of little understanding.
 &
  Indeed, the slow growth of working class living standards during that period has more to do with the stupidity of Keynesian policies in the two decades from the Kennedy to the Carter administrations - and the higher than normal real interest rates needed after 1980 to get the resulting inflation under control - than with any inherent weaknesses in the economic system. It would be useful if some economist provided an analysis of the impact of such factors.

Public involvement:

&

  Indifference and preoccupation with domestic concerns leaves foreign policy vulnerable to those groups with special economic or ideological or ethnic interests. Nye especially deplores the way small groups blocked payment of UN dues - conditioning payment on extraneous issues like abortion policy.
 &
  In fact, except during times of war - including the Cold War - the U.S. has always been widely divided on just what its "national interest" in foreign policy happened to be. However, this has become especially serious now that the U.S. is the world's predominant power and its decisions on how and when to use that power - and how to sustain it - have become of worldwide significance. Nye quotes Henry Kissinger:

  "What is presented by foreign critics as America's quest for domination is very frequently a response to domestic pressure groups. [The cumulative effect] drives American foreign policy toward unilateral and bullying conduct. For unlike diplomatic communications, which are generally an invitation to dialogue, legislation translates into a take-it-or-leave-it prescription, the operational equivalent of an ultimatum."

  If enough foreign nations feel the sting of such unilateral and uncompromising conduct, it could induce the formation of  coalitions against the U.S. - the avoidance of which is undoubtedly one of the predominant foreign policy objectives of the nation.

Multilateralism:

&

  The U.S. must define its "national interest" broadly for foreign policy purposes. It must seek broad international cooperation to achieve those interests.

  "The ties that bind the international community may be weak, but they matter. Failure to pay proper respect to the opinion of others and to incorporate a broad conception of justice into our national interest will eventually come to hurt us."

Core Values:

Values are a part of the nation's soft power armory, and encouraging their spread should be pursued predominantly with its subtle but considerable soft power influence.

 The public must be brought on board by means of public discussion and debate, Nye states, so that the nation's commitment to certain values - such as democracy and human rights - can be defined, and so that support can be generated for a foreign policy that includes those values.

  This has, in fact, occurred - with such values as the prevention of abortion and opposition to the despotisms in Cuba and Iran generating foreign policy initiatives that Nye deplores. All segments of the domestic ideological spectrum can play this game. Intensive public engagement causes contentious aspects of foreign policy to swing with swings in the domestic political pendulum.
 &
  Actually, there is no dispute about the short list of real core values of the United States -- peaceful relations among nations, political and economic freedom, civil rights, and rule of law are broadly beneficial  for the U.S. and for the world. Foreign policy initiatives favoring the spread of these core values has broad domestic support. It's when ideologically charged items - like abortion or "economic rights" - are considered for addition to this short list that problems arise. Disputes also arise over the costs and risks that policies based on such  interests justify.

  Nye quite realistically notes the limits to U.S. power and foreign policy influence. Values are a part of the nation's soft power armory - and encouraging their spread should be pursued predominantly with its subtle but considerable soft power influence.
 &

Public Goods:

&

The existence of foreign critics justifies the incurrence of substantial economic burdens and the disregarding of domestic support for domestic policies such as capital punishment and gun ownership rights.

  Nye asserts that domestic policy in economics, environmental regulation and criminal justice should be altered to satisfy the foreign critics of those policies and enhance the related soft power influence of the U.S. The existence of these foreign critics justifies the incurrence of substantial economic burdens and the disregarding of domestic support for domestic policies such as capital punishment and gun ownership rights.

  How far do we go with this? Will those who want the U.S. to dispose of its land mines volunteer to stand guard at the Korean border? Without a missile shield, who will stand with the U.S. if and when it has to face down an aggressor armed with nuclear missiles? Should the U.S. withdraw support for Israel to appease its critics and facilitate its other vital foreign policy interests in the Middle East?
 &
  Or, is Nye here merely using foreign policy arguments as a makeweight to advance portions of a liberal agenda? When the political pendulum in Europe next swings to the conservative side, should pertinent aspects of U.S. domestic policy swing with it?
 &
  Can the U.S. ever get enough support from its foreign critics to make up for the intense domestic opposition that would be generated by such policies? Nye never addresses this question.

International aid:

  Wouldst that it were that simple - and that development was just a matter of delivering sufficient aid in a manner beyond the reach of corrupt elites.
 &
  Of course, disaster relief is always proper and enhances the nation's soft power influence. However, development aid is doomed to failure whenever there is a lack of human capital - a lack of economic and political know how and commitment - in recipient nations. Poor nations are poor because of their governance problems - and nothing can help them until those governance problems are addressed.
 &
  Aid programs can be successful if used as an inducement for appropriate governance reform and to assist earnest efforts. Elsewhere, aid programs may actually be counterproductive - helping to prop up noxious despots (as in North Korea) or initiating inappropriate activities - and will quickly lose popular support if some visible results cannot be  demonstrated. Spreading aid around broadly regardless of recipient efforts to help themselves will just disburse the available resources too thinly to be of much use anywhere.
 &
  At any rate, opening hard currency markets to poor nation exports is a far more effective policy than aid - and avoids the defects of dependency.

Mediation:

Priorities:

The U.S. has to be judicious and opportunistic in its implementation of values policies.

Values initiatives must be prudently calibrated to take into account such factors as the needs and chances of success - and the costs and risks - of each effort.

 Values policies must not undermine the nation's more essential interests in its physical security, alliances and economic interests, Nye notes. That they are a third priority item does not make them unimportant. It just means that the U.S. has to be judicious and opportunistic in its implementation of values policies.
 &
  Despite frequent tactical retreats on such policies during times of crisis and conflict during the course of the 20th century, democracy and capitalism have spread widely, and even concepts of civil rights and rule of law have become widely familiar. The U.S. has achieved vast success with its values policies, and now has many allies in their spread.
 &
  There is, in fact, great domestic support for values and humanitarian aspects of U.S. foreign policy, but that support is realistically conditioned. Popular support is quickly withdrawn if the costs - as in Somalia - become too high.
 &
  Thus, values initiatives must be prudently calibrated to take into account such factors as the needs and chances of success - and the costs and risks - of each effort. This is especially true whenever the hard power of military force is engaged. In places like Congo and Chechnya, "the difficulties and costs of achieving our ends would exceed our means." Indeed, intervention in civil wars is an especially dubious practice that should be avoided unless significant security or economic interests are involved. (The difficulty of distinguishing friend from foe in civil conflicts will now become troublesome in Afghanistan and on other battlefronts of the War on Terrorism.)
 &

International law:

Rejection of international initiatives provides ammunition to foreign critics and undermines the soft power of the U.S.

  Nye castigates the U.S. for failure to ratify a variety of treaties and conventions. Agreement has been refused for treaties and conventions concerning economic, social, cultural and women's rights, and global warming, land mines, the International Criminal Court, the Law of the Seas, the Comprehensive Test Ban, and control of weapons of mass destruction. This type of unilateralist conduct provides ammunition to foreign critics and undermines the soft power of the U.S.

  "International rules bind the United States and limit our freedom of action in the short term, but they also serve our interests by binding others as well."
 &
  "We must develop multilateral laws and institutions that constrain others and provide a framework for cooperation."
 &
  "[The U.S. should also establish] a loose constitutional framework between the United States and the societies with which we share the most values."

Voluntary compliance means that the U.S. is voluntarily constrained without achieving similar constraints on the actions of others.

  The reasons for U.S. rejection of many of these treaties are recognized by Nye. However, he insists that a better response would have been  to continue negotiations to achieve better results, while voluntarily taking acceptable actions that would further the objectives of the treaties.
 &
  In fact, the U.S. has frequently adopted a policy of voluntary compliance. However, in the absence of efforts to eventually develop an acceptable treaty, he views this  approach as "schizophrenic." The U.S. is voluntarily constrained without achieving similar constraints on the actions of others.

  There are real enforcement problems here - that Nye does not address. These treaties do not have limited and effective self enforcement mechanisms such as those for the WTO.
 &
  In the U.S., treaties are the law of the land, enforceable - often by private parties - in the nation's independent courts. In many cases, sovereign immunity will not be a bar. In others, important private interests are impacted. 
 &
  Few nations are as litigious as the U.S. Many do not have independent courts, or a willingness to find renunciation of sovereign immunity. Indeed, even in many European nations, enforcement of laws of these types is far more flexible than in the U.S.
 &
  And some nations - especially the ones that most need to be constrained - cheat. Others may abuse the enforcement mechanisms.
 &
  Some of these treaties would throw into the courts some very contentious political issues. As has been seen with abortion, a lot of resentment can be raised when contentious issues are removed from the political arena and resolved by the courts. The only recourse would be to win a change of government and withdrawal from the offending treaty. If failure to ratify a treaty provides ammunition to foreign critics, how much worse is it when the U.S. withdraws from a treaty of this type - as recently occurred with respect to the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty?
 &
  As Nye points out, the U.S. has responded to this asymmetry of enforcement burdens by voluntarily complying with many treaty provisions without ratification. This is not at all "schizophrenic." This is a very practical response to profound problems of enforcement. Relying on voluntary compliance at least levels the playing field.
 &
  Of course, there is also involved the Constitutional duty of the U.S. Senate to ratify or reject treaties. The Senate cannot be expected to be a rubber stamp. If a presidential administration negotiates treaties that it knows cannot gain Senate ratification - as the Clinton administration did - that is a grievous fault of the administration - not of the Senate.

Congressional intervention in foreign policy:

Congressional foreign policy initiatives generally ignore foreign interests, are seldom suitably modulated to be effective, and usually cause more harm than good.

&

   By such actions as the imposition of sanctions on noxious regimes and foreign corporations that do business with them - and the withholding of dues for international organizations - Congress has intervened affirmatively in the nation's foreign policy. Such Congressional decisions generally ignore foreign interests - are seldom suitably modulated to be effective - and generally cause more harm than good.

  Nye is undoubtedly correct about the frequent ham handed Congressional intervention in foreign affairs. During the last decade of the Cold War, for example, Congressional efforts to constrain administration Cold War efforts caused much harm to the Reagan administration's ultimately successful efforts to bleed the Soviet Union financially on several distant battlefronts and bring the Cold War rapidly to a favorable and peaceful conclusion
 &
  However, as Nye notes, international agencies such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the UN, are properly accountable to the governments of the member nations. Congress is an important part of the U.S. Government. It is very unlikely to surrender its power of the purse. It would be much worse if the only appropriate response to bloated bureaucracies and intolerable conduct were U.S. withdrawal from these essential international organizations.

Unilateralism - multilateralism:

Multilateral action is desirable as a practical matter, and should always be presumed as appropriate.

  There are times when unilateral action will not draw any serious criticism that might undermine soft power ability to achieve foreign policy initiatives. Nye notes that unilateral actions taken for national security reasons are a recognized right - although even here, efforts to engage coalition partners and make appropriate use of international institutions can be a big help. However, when the U.S. sends its military men and women in harms way to deal with some volatile situation, U.S. control and firepower are essential - (and anything less - after Somalia - will not be politically tolerated).
 &
  Unilateral action in pursuit of "public goods" bestows benefits broadly on foreign as well as domestic interests and is unlikely to be seriously criticized. However, multilateralism is still favored in these cases as a way to share the burdens and facilitate such efforts.
 &

  However, multilateralism is essential "on intrinsically cooperative issues" that cannot be managed without widespread international cooperation. Such issues include climate change, infectious diseases, stability of global financial markets, the international trade system, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international crime, and terrorism. Indeed, there is no choice but to engage in multilateral governance of international commerce, since jurisdiction is inevitably shared with the EU and all sovereign nations.
 &
  It is also vastly important that U.S. support be extended to other nations for their international interests. A willingness to do this when those interests appear legitimate will encourage support for U.S. initiatives. However, multilateral initiatives that are contrary to core values - or that are "recipes for inaction" - or that promote narrow self interests - should be rejected.
 &
  Soft power considerations matter, and must be part of the calculation of foreign policy decisions.

The predictable unpredictable:

&

  Reasonable men can differ on specifics and tactics - and FUTURECASTS has noted a few such disagreements, above. However, Nye is clearly correct in his analytical approach and broad strategic vision. In the nature of the beast, this review gives disproportionate attention to those few items that it disagrees with. The great majority of Nye's specific recommendations seem clearly advisable.

  As with hard power, soft power can be dissipated not just by neglect, but by over commitment as well. A visible reluctance to use its influence outside its core interests is actually broadly reassuring around the world - and the strongest argument against charges of overbearing hegemony. When the U.S. is forced to intervene in one way or another, it helps that the situation clearly calls for such intervention. Frequently - by that time - local interests are delighted and relieved to have such intervention - although the mass media generally remains blind to this phenomenon. Of course, delay in taking action often has its own costs.
 &
  Tactics and strategy still involve choices - of what not to do as well as of what to do and how to do it. Nye provides some practical guidance on the subject of priorities. The U.S. must still react to immediate challenges and pick its best opportunities to influence desirable but nonessential  trends. Even in Africa, democracy and economic markets edge forwards in various nations and may be helped along by a little encouragement.
 &
  However, not even the U.S. has the resources "to mount its horse and ride off - like rumor - in all four directions at once." No general fritters away his reserves. How much more difficult it would have been if the U.S. budget had  already been in substantial deficit when the War on Terrorism began. The U.S. cannot so commit itself - domestically or internationally - that it retains little strength in reserve for predictable unpredictable contingencies.
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  The beauty of the inherently attractive soft power influences of the U.S., however, is that many require modest resources - involve subtle impacts - and yet can over time be broadly influential in often unpredictable ways. This is a ball game that has indeed received far too little emphasis since the end of the Cold War.