Paris Peace Conference

League of Nations

Yugoslavia

Rumania & Bulgaria

Germany

Reparations

Poland

Czechoslovakia, Austria & Hungary

Italy

The birth of nations:

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Mapmaking that reflected European interests and rivalries rather than indigenous interests and rivalries has been behind much subsequent misery.

They sensed their limitations and the possibly disastrous consequences of their decisions but had not the leadership capacity to grapple with the problems they were leaving for the future.

  Several once-great European empires were shattered and others were fatally weakened. The fall of empires opened opportunities for previously subject peoples and small nations throughout Europe and the Middle East. The conflict was ended at a Peace Conference in Paris that, like the conflict itself, was fatally flawed and sowed the seeds of much subsequent misery.
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  In his Forward, Richard Holbrooke mentions some of the resulting problems that remain intractable into the 21st century. Mapmaking that reflected European interests and rivalries rather than indigenous interests and rivalries has been behind four Balkan wars in the 1990s, the rule by terror that characterizes the governance by dominant groups over subject groups throughout much of the Middle East and Africa, "and the endless struggle between Arabs and Jews over land that each thought had been promised to them." The world leaders at the Peace Conference proved as equally incompetent in peacemaking as they had been in war-making.

  "But facing domestic pressures, events they could not control, and conflicting claims they could not reconcile," Holbrooke explains, "the negotiators were, in the end, simply overwhelmed -- and made deals and compromises that would echo down through history."

  In fact, the Big Three - Woodrow Wilson, Lloyd George, and Georges Clemenceau - all failed even to achieve their own top priorities at the Peace Conference.

• Wilson staked all on the establishment of a League of Nations that could resolve international problems and preserve the peace. This was and remains an impossible dream.

•  Lloyd George sought to preserve and strengthen the British Empire and Britain's naval predominance. However, WW-I had undermined British financial strength and welfare state economics rendered both goals impossible.

•  Clemenceau sought to permanently weaken Germany, surround it with French allies, and above all cement the French alliance with Britain and the United States that was France's primary defense against its far larger neighbor. Germany would revive, the new nations of Central Europe would prove to be weak reeds, the U.S. would fail to come to France's aid, and British support would be weak.

  These men - undoubtedly the world's most powerful leaders - became personally absorbed at the Peace Conference in long hours of earnest even passionate endeavor. With respect to Europe, there was nothing casual about it. Nevertheless, so extensive and complex was the task that numerous decisions were delayed until finally hastily resolved with little regard for future implications. They indeed sensed their limitations and the possibly disastrous consequences of their decisions but had not the leadership capacity to grapple with the problems they were leaving for the future.
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These men of narrow 19th century backgrounds were literally dividing up the 20th century world.

  Where do you begin to explain such a failure of diplomatic leadership and its vast disastrous consequences? Margaret MacMillan, in "Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World," begins sensibly with a series of illustrative maps showing the geographic results. Next, she introduces the primary participants - the Big Three and their few closest advisors. These men of narrow 19th century backgrounds were literally dividing up the 20th century world.
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  MacMillan then covers Bolshevism and Bolshevik Russia which was a ghostly presence at the Peace Conference. Next she covers deliberations over the League of Nations Covenant. She then proceeds through each of the nations subject to the deliberations of the peacemakers, weaving a rich tapestry of personalities and events. She portrays their prior history and contemporary claims, explaining what each nation received from the Peace Conference, and briefly sets forth the subsequent results. At various times she explains the evolving procedures at the Peace Conference and the overall environment in Paris. Only the outlines are presented in this review. See, MacMillan, "Paris 1919," Part II covering Greece, Turkey, the Arab Middle East, Palestine, Japan, China, and the Treaty of Versailles."

The Big Three:

"The 'submerged nations' are coming to the surface and as soon as they appear, they fly at somebody's throat. They are like mosquitoes -- vicious from birth."

  Military and economic power had been drained by The Great War, their armies were rapidly demobilizing, and they no longer had public support to meet any further major challenges. In shaping their post-war world, they  were to a large extent reduced to merely responding to a bewildering array of rapidly shifting facts and influences on the ground.

  "By the time the Supreme Council [of the Peace Conference] met on January 12, Poland had been re-created, Finland and the Baltic states were well on their way to independence and Czechoslovakia had been pieced together. In the Balkans, Serbia had joined with Austria-Hungary's South Slav territories of Croatia and Slovenia. The new entity did not yet have a name but some people were talking of a Yugoslav state."

  The new states - and some of those like Greece and Italy that had come into existence just in the 19th century - were nothing if not ambitious. Poland reappeared on the map as if by magic, almost as large as Germany. Nationalists did not want just a Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Greece or Italy. They wanted a Greater Poland, a Greater Czechoslovakia, a Greater Yugoslavia, a Greater Rumania, a Greater Greece, a Greater Italy. There were similar nationalist dreams in Hungary and Bulgaria but they had chosen the losing side in the war and their dreams were forever dashed.
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  Having just escaped submergence and domination, these new nations were all anxious to try their own hands at dominating neighboring peoples within the broadest borders they could obtain. Suddenly, they were all historians. Each of them within the last 2500 years had at some time controlled a much broader stretch of territory, and believed it only just that they be restored to their former glory. As an American military advisor wrote:

  "The 'submerged nations' are coming to the surface and as soon as they appear, they fly at somebody's throat. They are like mosquitoes -- vicious from birth."

  The new nations actually achieved many of their territorial goals only to be staggered by their lack of economic viability when the world went from military conflict to trade war autarky. They were ultimately smashed by the Great Depression and engulfed by WW-II and the Cold War. Today, nationalist ambitions for a Greater Serbia clash with those for a Greater Albania as conflicts among pygmies in the Balkans again threaten the peace of Europe.
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  What small nations - indeed all nations - need most is not territory but friendly neighbors and a world of borders open to international commerce. Many of these small Central European nations - although shorn of much of their WW-I territorial gains - now thrive in a peaceful region that enjoys the massive benefits of economic globalization.

Wislon was rigid, certain of the moral superiority of his views, and thus suspicious of opponents and reluctant to compromise.

Clemenceau was grudgingly aware that France was permanently dependent on her Anglo Saxon alliances for its safety.

Good relations with the U.S. was essential to make up for British financial weakness and military decline.

   It was primarily the Big Three who had to try to sort all of this out.  Unfortunately, the map of Europe cannot be made to stretch like a balloon.

• Pres. Woodrow Wilson had the widest scope of vision of the leaders. However, the U.S. - still sheltered behind its ocean borders - had the fewest strategic interests at stake. Wilson's vision was idealistic and poorly thought out. He shifted inconsistently. He generally conveniently interpreted his vision to further U.S. interests. He was rigid, certain of the moral superiority of his views, and thus suspicious of opponents and reluctant to compromise.

  Nevertheless, Wilson was soon compromising even his deepest principles in the quixotic pursuit of a League of Nations. He earnestly believed that the League would assure peace and security and over time resolve international problems - including those that would arise from the acknowledged flaws at the Peace Conference. The League was the final item in his 14 points. The realities that faced Wilson at the Peace Conference were not only outside his dreams, they were beyond his worst imaginings. But the League of Nations was not half as unrealistic as the aims of most of the other nations at this Peace Conference.

• Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau was intensely nationalistic. His political life had been dominated by his concern over the growing power of Germany just across France's eastern border. With Bolshevik Russia temporarily out of the strategic picture and Germany's economic infrastructure unscathed by the war, he was grudgingly aware that France was permanently dependent on her Anglo Saxon alliances for its safety.

    The reality was that, in the west, the war had been fought primarily on French soil, leaving it devastated. France had lost 1.3 million men out of a population of about 40 million, with twice that many wounded. Germany had suffered immense casualties, too, and at least temporarily, its finances and international commerce had been shattered. However, its homeland and economic facilities were largely intact. There were 75 million Germans and only 40 million French.
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  These realities powerfully influenced both the Paris Peace Conference and its aftermath. "Where Wilson believed that the use of force ultimately failed, Clemenceau had seen it succeed too often." Clemenceau thus eschewed reliance on the vague promise of a new and untried international organization - the League of Nations - and concentrated instead on leaving a balance of power that favored France over Germany. In the event, both the League and the balance of power failed France.

• Prime Minister Lloyd George was a pragmatic manipulator with a vast array of imperial interests to protect all around a disorderly and rapidly changing world. Germany must be preserved strong enough to be a barrier against a rising Bolshevik Russia, British trade and imperial interests must be protected, naval dominance must be preserved, and a balance of power restored in Europe to prevent any European power challenging British interests. Good relations with the U.S. was essential to make up for British financial weakness and military decline.

  The dominions - and India - that had loyally sacrificed much in the war and had come of age - had to be mollified with separate representation at the Peace Conference. They generally supported Britain, but they had interests of their own.

• Japan and Italy were initially also primary participants in the deliberations of the "Supreme Council" of the Peace Conference, but the Japanese were left out at the end of March as the other four national leaders - including Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando - met as "the Council of Four" to hammer out the final arrangements. Japan and Italy were preoccupied predominantly with there own claims and interests.

  The Supreme Council met in secret, quickly abandoning the first of Wilson's 14 points, which favored "open covenants of peace, openly arrived at." It included the leaders and foreign ministers - the "Council of Ten." When the Supreme Council fell into disuse in March, it was replaced by the "Council of Four." The Big Four met in private and initially kept no records, but by the middle of April, the need for records of what had been decided was recognized. Secretaries, a historian and an interpreter were included. A council of five of foreign ministers - including Japan - dealt with lesser issues.
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  An open plenary session was scheduled at the end of each week attended by all the lesser allied nations. Special commissions and committees were formed to study and make recommendations on various subjects. The full Peace Conference - comprised of 32 nations - met just 8 times.
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Clemenceau, staring down the barrel of the German gun, struggled with his unsympathetic Anglo Saxon allies to get every balance of power advantage over Germany that he could arrange, but he needed his allies most of all.

  Domestic issues inevitably intervened due to the length of the Peace Conference. Both Wilson and Lloyd George had to leave the Peace Conference for awhile in the middle of its deliberations to attend to domestic political matters. Their close aides - Edward House and Arthur Balfour - were left in charge of their delegations. An anarchist shot and wounded Clemenceau. Although the bullet could not be removed, he was back at work within a week. Observers felt, however, that he was never quite the same.
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  For six months, these men worked hard and seriously, bickered and joked. They came to know each other and even to like each other. Paris, although short of coal during a cold winter, nevertheless entertained the thousands of staff members, diplomats and their ladies as only Paris can.
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  Lloyd George, secure in Britain's naval superiority and imperial interests, thrived. Wilson watched his illusions crumble. He was assailed by declining physical health and mental stability and aged visibly while grimly pushing his League of Nations as the last best hope for avoiding future catastrophic conflicts. A serious illness that sidelined him for awhile during the Conference may have been a stroke. Clemenceau, staring down the barrel of the German gun, struggled with his unsympathetic Anglo Saxon allies to get every balance of power advantage over Germany that he could arrange, but he needed his allies most of all.
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"If the United States joined any association at all, [Lodge believed] it should be one with other democracies, where there was a community of interests, not a league which threatened to draw the country into vague and open-ended commitments."

Wilson made no attempt at conciliation.

  Domestic political problems were dealt with quite successfully by Lloyd George and Clemenceau, but not by Wilson. The Republican Congress was attacking the League and obstructing administration efforts. MacMillan explains the differing viewpoints of Wilson and his primary Republican adversary, Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge.

  "Wilson put his trust in the League and collective security as a way to end war. Lodge, a pessimist with little faith in the perfectibility of human nature, preferred to trust power. He wanted to hem Germany in with strong states, a renewed Poland, a solid Czechoslovakia and a France beefed up with Alsace and Lorraine and perhaps even the Rhineland. If the United States joined any association at all, it should be one with other democracies, where there was a community of interests, not a league which threatened to draw the country into vague and open-ended commitments."

  However, Lodge was the leader of the moderate Republicans whom Wilson now needed. It was essential for Wilson to work with the moderate Republicans, but he excluded them from his Peace Conference delegation and refused all compromise.

  Beyond the moderates were the isolationists and protectionists that would dominate national policy during the next two decades under first the Republicans and then the New Deal Democrats. They would drive the U.S. and the world towards the disasters of the Great Depression and WW-II. See, "Summaries of Great Depression Controversies and Facts," and the seven Great Depression Chronology series articles beginning with "The Crash of '29."

  Although public support for the League remained strong, thirty nine Republican Senators - more than enough to block the League Covenant - publicly expressed opposition pending completion of the German peace treaty. Wilson made no attempt at conciliation. Instead, he responded with public blasts at the obstructionist Senate. Wilson was equally ham handed with doubters in his own party. When he first arrived in Paris in December 1918, he was received by huge enthusiastically cheering crowds of people attracted to his ideals. When he returned to Paris in March, there were no enthusiastic crowds waiting to cheer him on. His show had become tiresome.
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The Big Three undertook the most important and complex aspects of the Peace Conference essentially on their own - frequently disdaining advice from their huge delegations - often ignoring the conclusions of the various commissions established to examine and analyze difficult questions.

  Numerous intellectual and diplomatic studies had poured forth to aid the deliberations. The leaders were supported by sizable delegations of men with a wide array of experience and expertise who offered sometimes perceptive advice. However, the Big Three undertook the most important and complex aspects of the Peace Conference essentially on their own - frequently disdaining advice from their huge delegations - often ignoring the conclusions of the various commissions established to examine and analyze difficult questions. Driven by the interplay primarily between the Big Three, the peacemaking process often lacked depth of perception and understanding. (Indeed, the hubris of power might well have been the primary weakness of the peacemakers.)
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  Together, they still had real power. Most - but not all - of their decisions about borders were at least grudgingly accepted and remain in effect to this day. Borders, at least, can be self enforcing. But subsidiary treaty provisions for the protection of minority rights and mandate provisions for the benefit of indigenous peoples and demilitarization of territories proved widely unenforceable.

  "The ability of the international government in Paris to control events was limited by such factors as distance, usable transportation and available forces -- and by the unwillingness of the Great Powers to expend their resources." (These factors remain applicable to this day.)

A world government:

More than 30 countries from around the world sent delegates to Paris.

As their armed forces demobilized, the Big Three were aware that their power was shrinking.

  The problems faced by these men were vast beyond precedent. The issues dealt with at the Congress of Vienna that had wound by the Napoleonic Wars were "large but straight forward in comparison with those in Paris." Aside from condemnation of the slave trade, the Congress of Vienna was concerned only with Europe. Now, more than 30 countries from around the world sent delegates to Paris. Thus, their concerns spread around the globe.
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  As their armed forces demobilized, the Big Three were aware that their power was shrinking. All U.S. troops would be home before the end of August. Their deliberations were thus driven by a sense of urgency. They had to impose peace terms while they could. Already, their writ did not run to an increasingly large segment of the world that nevertheless awaited their deliberations.
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Wilson was astounded at what his principle of "self determination" had stirred up, and his staff was dismayed at the multitude of often conflicting hopes that could not be reconciled and fulfilled.

Previously submerged nations were surfacing everywhere, fighting from birth for the widest possible borders.

  Wilson "Fourteen Points" setting forth idealistic principles for the Peace Conference had received widespread publicity and raised hopes worldwide. Wilson was astounded at what his principle of "self determination" had stirred up, and his staff was dismayed at the multitude of often conflicting hopes that could not be reconciled and fulfilled. The principle proved impossible to consistently define or implement. The generalization was grand and stirred latent passions all around the world, but the devil truly lurked in the indefinable details.
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  Where national ambitions clashed, self determination was sometimes the basis for plebiscites that resolved contentious issues. However, self determination rights often meant bloody conflict and ethnic cleansing as various groups vied for dominance and dominant groups suddenly began to fear that large subject groups might someday deprive them of territory or even of their political power.
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  Nobody wanted to be in a subject - much less in a subject minority - group. Poland, for example, was fighting for its borders with its neighbors when the Conference began and was still at it when the Conference officially ended a year later. Similar small wars were being fought throughout Central Europe. Previously submerged nations were surfacing everywhere, fighting from birth for the widest possible borders.

  The domination of subject groups within national borders where national borders had previously been unknown has frequently involved ruthless suppression and on occasion hideous slaughter.

Credit was blocked by unsettled borders and unsettled laws.

Millions were unemployed, hunger and disease were widespread - especially the dreaded influenza - and revolution was in the air.

  New borders blocked established lines of commerce on rivers and railroads. The credit needed by the Allies to reestablish peacetime commerce was unavailable because everyone was so deeply in debt already - primarily to the U.S. For the new nations and the defeated Central Powers, credit was blocked by unsettled borders and unsettled laws. Millions were unemployed, hunger and disease were widespread - especially the dreaded influenza - and revolution was in the air. Deprivation was particularly acute within the old boundaries of Germany and Austria-Hungary.
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  Supplies were available from the U.S. and the British dominions, but only the U.S. could finance the distribution. With this leverage, an American, Herbert Hoover, was put in charge of Allied relief operations. He was a marvel of organization and effectiveness, but by the summer of 1919, he decided that the U.S. had done enough and Europe should make out on its own. However, European economic production did not recover prewar levels until 1925, and many states remained fragile and financially strained. They responded with mercantilist practices and budget deficits, and suffered accordingly.
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  "The expectations of the Peace Conference were enormous; the risks of disappointment correspondingly great." Clemenceau complained that it was much easier to make war than peace.
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Wilson naïvely expected all nations to accept dependence on the League of Nations for their security.

  Since Britain's vital interests were in its Empire and naval predominance, it had few axes to grind in Europe. Thus, the U.S. and British positions on most European issues were easily brought into conformance. Within a week, to the surprise of Wilson and the delight of Lloyd George, skepticism about Britain dissolved within the U.S. delegation and the two delegations began an open and frank collaboration.
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  It was with France that the two had increasing difficulties. France, perforce, was intimately involved in every aspect of the balance of powers intrigue in Europe. This infuriated Wilson, who naïvely expected all nations to accept dependence on the League of Nations for their security.
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Treaties had to be drawn up not just for Germany, but also for Bulgaria, the tottering Ottoman Empire, and the new nations spinning out of Austria-Hungary.

Hundreds of journalists watched, wrote and speculated - often with dubious accuracy.

  The German treaty was the first, the most important and the most far ranging piece of business. It included recognition of new nations and their borders, the League of Nations Covenant and the establishment if the International Labor Organization, in addition to a host of normal details. Reparations, ports, finance and economic considerations were grist for a central drafting committee. Luxembourg, opium traffic and poison gas provisions were hastily added near the end. Numerous changes had to be accommodated during the Conference.
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  Belgian claims to reparations and some German territory were granted. Not all the atrocity stories were true, but some were, and the Germans had stripped Belgium clean of movable assets. Belgium did not get its initial $500 million priority reparations payment in full until 1925.
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  Treaties had to be drawn up not just for Germany, but also for Bulgaria, the tottering Ottoman Empire, and the new nations spinning out of Austria-Hungary. Meanwhile, allied occupation forces were busy filling power vacuums. The Allies were taking on administrative tasks where nations small and large had collapsed in Europe and the Middle East.
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  By March, it was clear that the Peace Conference would be the real thing instead of just a preliminary meeting establishing the groundwork for future negotiations. There was a growing sense that the mass of detail had to be dealt with quickly and the contentious issues resolved lest the world spin irrevocably into inherently unstable pieces.
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  In the background were strikes, revolutionary unrest, numerous small wars, hunger and disease and the ordinary demands of domestic politics. Hundreds of journalists watched, wrote and speculated - often with dubious accuracy.
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  Wilson's League of Nations was pushed to the front and was quickly falling into shape, but support back in the U.S. was already dissolving. The ultimate treaties with the defeated Central Powers - Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire - had to be taken in hand as soon as possible. The Ottoman Empire had to be divided up. Bolshevik Russia was a ghostly presence yet to be dealt with.

The Bolsheviks:

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 There was no way of ascertaining what was going on in Russia. There were wild rumors - many of which turned out to be true.

  "Finland, the emerging Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Turkey and Persia all came to the Peace Conference, but their borders could not be finally set until the future shape and status of Russia was clear."

Lloyd George airily dismissed news of the "Red Terror" as exaggerations - even when related by the French and Danish ambassadors who had just returned from Russia.

Left wing intellectuals had already fallen in love with the bloody Bolsheviks.

  There was fear of civil unrest and there were actual communist uprisings in Bavaria, Hungary and Berlin. The fear of Bolshevism was thus available for "the diplomacy of vapors." ("Support me or I will disappear leaving something much worse in my place.")
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  Of course, there were many even then who were willing to look sympathetically on the Bolshevik communists. Wilson wanted to invite them to the Peace Conference. It was one of his 14 Points that foreign armies evacuate Russia and that the Bolsheviks be welcomed into "the Society of Free Nations." Lloyd George airily dismissed news of the "Red Terror" as exaggerations - even when related by the French and Danish ambassadors who had just returned from Russia. However, Clemenceau understood the bloody intentions of the Bolsheviks perfectly and vetoed any inclination to invite their participation in the Conference.
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  The Conference remained indecisive with respect to Russia. The Allies limited their actions to ineffective interventions that in the event were just sufficient to anger the Bolsheviks. Their interventions in European Russia had been initiated during the war to deny Russian resources to the victorious Germans.  After the Armistice, they were continued from sheer inertia supported by a variety of vaguely perceived opportunities amidst the revolutionary chaos in Russia. However, there was no public support for any robust intervention by Allied forces, and a winter in Russia was understandably unpopular among the troops. Left wing intellectuals had already fallen in love with the bloody Bolsheviks.
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  The Bolshevik leadership had as little understanding of what was going on in the West and was just as muddled about what to do. The Peace Treaty ultimately had almost nothing of relevance concerning Russia. The peacemakers in Paris had no ability to influence Russian events. But Bolshevik Russia was a ghost that had a definite influence on the Peace Conference. Relations with Russia was a problem to be left for the future.
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The League of Nations:

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The League itself would have no power. The U.S. Congress resented the ceding of power to the president, much less to an international body.

Britain put its faith as always in the Royal Navy and France put its faith in its system of alliances.

  The author explains how public pressure pushed skeptical leaders like Lloyd George and Clemenceau to actively participate in the establishment of the League. Many of the problems that arose were interestingly similar to those at the U.S. Constitutional Convention more than a century and a quarter earlier. See, Bowen,  "Miracle at Philadelphia, Part I, "Divisive Issues that Threatened the Union," and Part II, "Compromises and Accommodations that Made the Union." The interests of small states clashed with those of the large states. There were problems concerning representation and control of institutional power and the rights of subject peoples. There were differences over the degree of empowerment of the League. There were differing interests that had to be papered over because they could not be resolved.
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  There was even a need to avoid confronting racial issues. WW-II and Cold War alliances would ultimately do for international racial relations what the Civil War and the long civil rights struggle achieved in the U.S. The League Covenant included many other compromises and accommodations. There was, however, one key difference.
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  Union was not an issue. The small states thus had little real leverage. Any that chose not to take part would not be missed. While some minor concessions were offered to the small nations, the major powers - in particular France, Great Britain and the U.S. - were definitely in charge. But the League itself would have no power. The U.S. Congress resented the ceding of power to the president, much less to an international body. In the event, the failure of the U.S. to take part reduced the League to impotence. In essence, the anti-federalists won the day.
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  British leaders like Winston Churchill and Henry Wilson were scornful. Britain put its faith as always in the Royal Navy and France put its faith in its system of alliances, although France more than Britain and the U.S. supported a military component for the League. Germany, after all, still lay seething with resentment across its eastern border.
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  MacMillan summarizes the first draft of the League Covenant.

  "[There was] a general assembly for all members, a secretariat and an executive council where the Big Five would have a bare majority - the failure of the United States to become a member in the League vitiated that clause -.  There would be no League army and no compulsory arbitration or disarmament. On the other hand, all League members pledged themselves to respect one another's independence and territorial boundaries. Because the Great Powers worried that the smaller powers might get together and outvote them, there was also a provision that most League decisions had to be unanimous. This was later blamed for the League's ineffectiveness."

  Germany, in particular, was to be kept disarmed and at least at first kept out. Other provisions included an international court, an international labor organization, support for the International Red Cross, and provisions against arms trafficking and slavery. Unlike the League, the International Labor Organization included German representatives from its beginning, and it survived. In spite of the League's evident limitations, Wilson was pleased.
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Ultimately, the mandates were divided up according to deals between the various imperial powers.

  There were many compromises. The Japanese wanted a racial equality provision, mandates had to be settled for German colonies and Ottoman Empire territory, and the U.S. Congress adamantly insisted on acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine. Wilson was thus forced into the kind of bargaining mode that he hated. He got what he wanted for the League, but had to refrain from making adversaries during the other deliberations of the Peace Conference. This imposed a tactical weakness that Clemenceau and Lloyd George recognized and took advantage of. As one result, self determination would on several occasions be denied Germans and Austrians. The Tyrol would go to Italy and some German areas would go to Poland - leading ultimately to much trouble and grief.
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  Wilson believed that evolutionary forces within the League would over time iron out its defects. This, after all, is what was happening under the U.S. Constitution. However, the League was not a union, and it required unanimity for major decisions - and the U.S. had had to fight a bloody Civil War to straighten out its own worst difficulties.
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  Territorial dispositions outside Europe were organized as League mandates rather than as annexations or colonial possessions. This was a concession to Wilson pursuant to one of his 14 points. The colonial powers cynically accepted it without the slightest intention of allowing the change in terminology to change their colonial policies. (However, this change of terminology probably facilitated somewhat the ultimate dissolution of the European empires.) Wilson insisted that there be no mandates governing European peoples, and in this he had his way.
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  Ultimately, the mandates were divided up according to deals between the various imperial powers. The League confirmed the arrangements and received annual reports from the mandate powers, but it did not interfere. After WW-II, mandates were dissolved with the dissolution of the European empires. The last Pacific Island mandate ended in 1994.
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Yugoslavia:

During WW-I, Croats, Slovenes and Bosnians and even some Serbs had fought for the Empire as it crushed Serbia and ravaged the countryside.

  Under Serbian initiative it included Serbia and the South Slavs set loose by the collapse of the Austria-Hungarian Empire. They all spoke the same language but were otherwise sharply divided in their alphabet, culture, religions and history. They had fought viciously against one another. During WW-I, Croats, Slovenes and Bosnians and even some Serbs had fought for the Empire as it crushed Serbia and ravaged the countryside - payback for the assassination of the Austrian Archduke.
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  Now they joined forces to create a nation with enough heft to survive in their dangerous neighborhood. They feared Italian domination from one side and Austrian and Hungarian domination from another and so were thrown into each others arms. Nevertheless, they intrigued continuously against one another. The exact borders of Yugoslavia had yet to be settled, so these intrigues inevitably involved neighboring powers. Within the Yugoslav borders there were also Albanians, Bulgarians, and Macedonians. Other minorities included Greeks and Rumanians, Germans, Jews, Turks, and the Italian coastal colonies.
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  For a century, Serbian intellectuals and teachers had been building a history to support a Serbian national myth. However, this myth competed with Bulgarian and Greek national myths for a claim on territory in the south, and with Hungarian and Rumanian national aspirations in the north. One at a time, those peoples under Ottoman rule had successfully broken free, before being engulfed in The Great War.
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Recognizing Wilson's great influence, they all based their claims on high moral principles as they grabbed for as much as they could get.

  The Serbs had already grabbed much of southern Hungary and Austria, and wanted more. Greece and Bulgaria wanted more of European Turkey, Bulgaria and Rumania contested a stretch of the Black Sea coast. Everyone wanted self-determination for themselves but not for contested neighboring territories. Recognizing Wilson's great influence, they all sanctimoniously based their claims on high moral principles as they grabbed for as much as they could get. Wilson's naïve notion in his 14 points that all this could be sorted out so that the Balkan states could establish friendly relations constituted a breathtaking denial of history and facts on the ground.

  However, it was nowhere near as stupid as the usual levels of belligerence among the Balkan states. None of these states was large enough to be economically or militarily viable in the absence of friendly relations with neighbors and borders open to commerce.

The South Slavs wanted just a federation, but the Serbs were determined to dominate the new state. The Serbs had an army and the others didn't. The Serbs were willing to act with all the ruthlessness needed to force union on their terms.

  Yugoslavia was adamantly opposed by Italy, which coveted much of its Adriatic shoreline. It was initially recognized by only the U.S. Wilson did not care for Italy and its Adriatic ambitions. Britain and France recognized Yugoslavia in June, after Italy had threatened to torpedo the Peace Conference.
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  The South Slavs wanted just a federation, but the Serbs were determined to dominate the new state. The Serbs had an army and the others didn't. The Serbs were willing to act with all the ruthlessness needed to force union on their terms. The others were left with pathetic hopes for redemption from Pres. Wilson and his promise of self-determination.
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  Both France and Great Britain favored large states capable of taking care of themselves and remaining independent of revived German or Russian ambitions. Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey had been on the losing side in the war and had few friends in Paris. Bulgaria had already lost much territory in 1913. Great Britain hoped Serbia could contain Italian ambitions across the Adriatic. Italy feared a strong Serbia, and thus favored Rumania, Austria and Bulgaria. A variety of wartime territorial promises had been made by France and Great Britain that further confused matters. And, how could self-determination be implemented among people who had as yet no idea of nationhood?

  "How could you draw neat boundaries where there was such a mixture of peoples? How could you leave people together who had come to fear each other? On the population maps of the Balkans the patterns were rather pretty, a pointillist scattering of colors and an occasional bold blob. On the ground it was less pretty, a stew of suspicions and hatreds bubbling away."

Its neighbors would be quick to join Germany in dismembering Yugoslavia during WW-II and its resentful minorities would aid the Axis occupation. It would crack into its myriad pieces in the 1990s.

Rumania:

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  Rumania moved quickly to grab vast swaths of territory in Hungary and Russia, creating facts on the ground. Some of its claims in southern Hungary - in the Bonat - conflicted with Serbian claims. Major territorial promises had been made to induce Rumania to join the Allies during the darkest days in the war in 1916, but by 1918 Rumania had been driven out of the war after disastrous military defeats.
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  This entire region was well beyond the reach of the western Allies. Centuries of Ottoman rule had left it corrupt to the core with infrastructure that remained backwards despite the natural wealth of the land. (Almost a century later, pervasive corruption is still the predominant fact of political life.)
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  A territorial commission was established by the Supreme Council to make recommendations, with jurisdiction that extended to the borders of Yugoslavia, Rumania, Greece and Bulgaria. That meant that Hungarian and Soviet Russian borders were also at issue. The commission was given no guidance from a distracted Supreme Council as to what the basis of decision should be. Substantial areas were too rich a mixture of peoples for dominant nationality to be pinned down.
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  The commission eventually favored Yugoslav claims, but Rumania was nevertheless hugely expanded elsewhere. The recommendations were accepted by the Supreme Council and after a few years of tensions, the borders were accepted in a 1923 treaty between Yugoslavia and Rumania. There were tens of thousands of Serbs in Rumania, tens of thousands of Rumanians in Serbia, hundreds of thousand of Hungarians in Yugoslavia and Rumania and lesser numbers of other minorities - all coming under intense pressure to assimilate with the dominant nationality.
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Bulgaria:

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  Serbia, Greece and Rumania were all ready to move troops in to take additional pieces of Bulgarian territory. Italy was a natural ally due to its adamant opposition to all Serb interests, and France, too, was sympathetic.
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  The Peace Conference preserved most of Bulgaria on principles of self determination and self interest in a Balkans balance of power. Prewar borders in the Balkans had caused much trouble, and the peacemakers opted not to tamper with them, leaving many Bulgarians in Greek and Turkish Thrace, Yugoslav Macedonia, and Rumanian Dobrudja running north along the Black Sea coast. Bulgaria's southern border with Thrace would not be settled until 1923 when there was a peace treaty with Turkey. Over Italy's bitter opposition, some border areas were handed over to Yugoslavia. Many of these decisions simply ratified facts on the ground established by foreign armies.
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  Bulgaria ultimately defaulted on all its foreign debts, including the 90£ million in reparations imposed by the treaty. The new shaky Bulgarian republic was scarred by its losses and quickly fell to a coup in 1923, becoming a destabilizing influence to its neighbors. It was thus naturally attracted to the Axis powers during WW-II and thereafter slipped into communist domination.
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Germany:

Except for the Rhineland and a few small enclaves, no Germans saw occupying armies on their soil. 

  When the German treaty was taken in hand in March, 1919, it was already four months since the end of the fighting. By June 1919, 198 Allied divisions had shrunk to 39, and all public support for further conflict had ended.
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  Alsace and Lorraine must be returned to France - regardless of what the locals might want. Damage to Belgium and Northern France had to be paid for. These were two of Wilson's 14 points. Furthermore, Germany must be punished for the horrors of the war and prevented from again dragging Europe into war. All agreed on these terms, but as MacMillan explains, there were devils in the details - and there were no adequate precedents for guidance.
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  There had been some high-minded talk in the British government about eschewing vengeance and greed and negotiating a just peace with the new German Weimar Republic. However, the electorate wanted blood for the loss of millions of husbands and sons and the immense financial cost. They were in a hanging mood towards the Kaiser and his top generals. They earnestly believed it was these men who had caused the terrible conflict.

  This is a bit simplistic but not that far from the truth. Germany had spent two decades building a great North Sea fleet. What could it have possibly been for but to challenge the Royal Navy? They had also been preparing to conquer France by means of a sweep through Belgium and had made it impossible to avoid the conflict as it arose. They clearly intended to become the dominant power in Europe.

The Germans had ruthlessly stripped the occupied areas of Belgium and Northern France of productive assets and had destroyed vital French coal mines before retreating.

  The Germans, after all, had imposed harsh terms when they conquered Rumania - which had thus been briefly reduced to a German dependency. They had imposed harsh terms on Bolshevik Russia - from which they  took a huge swath of territory and on whom they imposed reparations of a million gold rubles. German troops were still occupying some parts of this territory. They had ruthlessly stripped the occupied areas of Belgium and Northern France of productive assets and had destroyed vital French coal mines before retreating. In France, the sentiment was even more vengeful.
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  MacMillan portrays the Kaiser Wilhelm as erratic, boastful, bullying, and perhaps mad. Both Clemenceau and Lloyd George were willing to defer to Wilson on the question of how Wilhelm should be dealt with. Wilson acted with commendable caution. Who in Germany were in fact the driving forces for war?
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  The U.S. delegation rejected subjecting the German leaders to charges of crimes against humanity. They feared turning Wilhelm into a martyr. The Netherlands refused to give Wilhelm up for trial in any event, and tempers cooled over time. A handful of German generals were tried by Weimar Germany. Most were absolved and two submarine commanders escaped from jail after a few weeks.
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The other Central European states - both old and new - were all weak reeds that eyed each other viciously over common contested borders.

France wanted the Rhine River as a defensible border against Germany.

  The disarming of Germany, however, was a task that could not be ducked. Clemenceau wanted the German army limited to 100,000 men. There were doubts, however, whether this would be enough to maintain internal order in Germany. What other nation could provide a bulwark against the Bolsheviks in Russia? The other Central European states - both old and new - were all weak reeds that eyed each other viciously over common contested borders.
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  That Germany would shrink was obvious, but the question of how much and precisely where was more complex. Here, the principle of self determination offered some help. Schleswig-Holstein was divided between Germany and Denmark - a wartime neutral - on the basis of a plebiscite. That border remains today.
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  However, France wanted the Rhine River as a defensible border against Germany. French public opinion strongly favored French control of the Rhineland. France also wanted the tiny Saar with its rich coal fields that could replace those the Germans had destroyed in France. There was considerable support in France for the breakup of Germany into the constituent parts cobbled together by Bismarck little more than a half century before.
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Germany was already doing a good job of permanently embittering itself with "stab in the back" myths and other rumors.

  Wilson insisted that France did not need the Rhine River as a defensible barrier. After all, the League of Nations would assure its future security. Edward House commented that if the Allies ever permitted Germany to again mobilize, "we would deserve the fate which such folly would bring upon us." Britain was still wary of an enlarged and more powerful France, which had been Britain's chief adversary in Europe and indeed around the world until only a quarter century ago.
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  Towards the end of February, France moved to mark the Rhine as Germany's western border. It occupied the Rhineland and the bridgeheads on the eastern shore. Both Britain and the U.S. rejected this obvious breach of the self determination principle and feared it would just permanently embitter Germany. However, Germany was already doing a good job of permanently embittering itself with "stab in the back" myths and other rumors.
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Enforcement was left to the Germans themselves, supervised by an Allied commission.

  Wilson again elevated the League to his primary concern upon his return from the U.S. in March. For him, the League Covenant was the essential part of every peace treaty. It would be the League that would deal with all the myriad unresolved issues. When Wilson indicated opposition to the provisions in the German treaty that restricted Germany to a volunteer army, Lloyd George forced him to back down by threatening opposition to the League.
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  Germany was to have an all-volunteer army of no more than 100,000, 15,000 in the navy, no air force, tanks, armored cars, heavy guns, dirigibles or submarines. Its western fortifications and existing armaments were destroyed. Clubs for private military activities were forbidden. However, enforcement was left to the Germans themselves, supervised by an Allied commission. It was "like the ropes of Lilliputians over Gulliver," MacMillan concludes.
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  Enforcement was already a weak link. The U.S. had no intention of becoming embroiled in endless efforts to enforce harsh terms on Germany. Germany kept the strategic Kiel Canal and the little islands of Heligoland and Dune in the North Sea. They were neutralized and their fortifications were destroyed - but the Nazis refortified them and they proved to be of considerable strategic importance in WW-II.
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  The U.S. and British delegations split badly on naval matters. Division of the German fleet brought up the issue of the relative size of their own fleets. However, neither side wanted a split and there was no political support at home for an expensive naval race. Differences were compromised.
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Reparations:

Germany had routinely imposed reparations on the adversaries it had vanquished and had expected to impose them on Britain and France, too.

  Somebody had to pay, Lloyd George pointed out. If the vanquished didn't pay, the costs would fall on the taxpayers of the Allies. Of course, the vanquished had their own costs to cover, also. However, Germany had routinely imposed reparations on the adversaries it had vanquished and had expected to impose them on Britain and France, too.
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  Britain owed the U.S. $4.7 billion. France owed the U.S. $4 billion and owed $3 billion to Britain. Britain had extended substantial loans to Russia and smaller allies that probably could no longer be collected. Any compromise of war debt and reparations problems thus depended on the U.S.
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  While the U.S. didn't want reparations for itself, it expected its Allies to repay what they had borrowed. Congress was determined that the U.S. would not be left holding the financial bag for the war. Congress, in any event, was not in a charitable mood towards Europe. There was still a widespread belief in the U.S. that Europe had to meet its obligations and sort out its own problems.
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  The Allied nations in Europe, struggling under the accumulated costs of the conflict, wanted those reparations to at least cover their debts and reconstruction costs. The question of how much Germany should pay inevitably included how much it could pay - two hugely complex questions. The Peace Conference handed this hot potato to a special commission.
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Establishment of a European free trade area would have been far more appropriate than establishment of small nationalist states that lacked economic viability.

The German government would not impose taxes just to pay reparations. It undertook substantial social obligations and met those expenses by borrowing.

  However, Germany was financially crushed, her economy in shambles, her foreign trade from which the revenues would have to come had been destroyed by the British blockade. Her new government was shaky, there was public unrest, and the specter of Bolshevism was all too present. The German government would not impose taxes just to pay reparations. It undertook substantial social obligations and met those expenses by borrowing.

  "It is easy with hindsight to say that the victors should have been less concerned with making Germany pay and should have concentrated more on getting Europe going again. But after a war that had brought destruction on such a scale and shaken European society so deeply, how could political leaders speak of forgetting?  In any case, public opinion would simply not allow them to do so. 'Make the Hun pay,' said the British. 'Let Germany Pay First,' said the posters covering the walls of Paris."

  Keynes' ideas concerning wartime financial obligations were simply one world war too soon. They would have their day - and be proved successful - during the half century after WW-II. When the U.S. dominated peace terms, it proved far more magnanimous and farsighted than had its more experienced and sophisticated Allies after WW-I.

  The maneuvering within the delegations as the ultimate sum was thrashed out and apportioned is covered at some length by MacMillan. A primary problem was that Lloyd George could not make up his mind - a common problem for him on many issues. He was not sure what the British public would accept. His vacillation poisoned the Peace Conference and undermined the relationship with Wilson that was so important to British interests. He, too, wanted to punish Germany, but he knew Britain needed its German markets.
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  Clemenceau, too, was subject to intense public pressure to punish Germany. After all, France had paid reparations after both the Napoleonic Wars and the Franco-Prussian War. He had to play to his electorate even as he in private admitted that Germany must not be financially crushed. And Germany had intentionally stripped Belgium and Northern France of everything it thought valuable and destroyed much of the rest - even blowing up the vital French coal mines.
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The German peace treaty:

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Germany must not be driven into a corner, for otherwise she would certainly ultimately fight her way out of it.

Germany would not be "appeased" by these moderate terms, Clemenceau correctly predicted.

Both Britain and the U.S. were determined to disengage their military from the continent.

  Britain feared that unpopular borders would embroil it in expensive occupation and enforcement actions that would stretch its limited military capacity. Lloyd George had made up his mind - in favor of a moderate peace that might last, leaving a sturdy German state in the middle of a chaotic Central Europe. Germany must not be driven into a corner, for otherwise she would certainly ultimately fight her way out of it. The defeated Central Powers must not be made fertile ground for revolution. Germany must not be driven into alliance with Bolshevik Russia.
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  Thus, Poland would get her corridor to the sea, but would control as few Germans as possible. The Rhineland must remain German but would be suitably demilitarized. Germany must trust the League and the Allies to take care of her defense needs. Somehow, the coal fields of the Saar must go to France without French control of the territory. Wilson was pleased with these terms - Clemenceau was furious. Germany would not be "appeased" by these moderate terms, he correctly predicted.
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  However, both Britain and the U.S. were determined to disengage their military from the continent. Both had reason to prefer a stable Germany with whom they could trade and deal. Wilson had little sympathy for French fears. The Council of Four was putting in long hard hours, striving to reach agreements that protected their many interests. Tempers were fraying and Wilson and Clemenceau were in private contemptuous of each other. Rumors that the Peace Conference was failing and that Europe would descend into anarchy began circulating.
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  Wilson was visibly wearing down. For awhile he was unable to attend. He ordered the cruiser George Washington to Brest to prepare to take him home. News that he might leave without agreeing to a European peace treaty began to circulate and had the desired effect on Clemenceau. France still needed its allies.
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  Clemenceau's retreat on the Rhineland and Saar was met with serious domestic opposition.

• France got ownership of the Saar mines, but its occupation of the Saar would last for just 15 years and would be followed by a plebiscite. In 1935, 90% voted to join Hitler's Germany. 

• France would have temporary occupation rights in the Rhineland region ranging from 5 to 15 years. In 1936, the German army marched back into the Rhineland unopposed.

• France did not have to end the occupation of the Rhineland if Germany failed to fulfill its treaty obligations. Britain and the U.S. refused to help with enforcement and Clemenceau's successors failed to enforce these rights.

• Britain and the U.S. would come to France's aid if Germany attacked. Britain tried, but the U.S. - having refused to ratify the treaty - reneged.

  Clemenceau - correctly - claimed he had gotten all he could for France. It would be up to his successors to enforce French rights. Despite harsh criticism from those in France who wanted much more, Clemenceau quickly succeeded in getting ratification of the treaty.
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Poland:

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  The rebirth of Poland was one of Wilson's 14 points. However, the region was a quagmire.

  "The peacemakers were reaching out hundreds of miles from Paris to impose order on a protean world of shifting allegiances, civil wars, refugees and bandit gangs, where the collapse of old empires had left law and order, trade and communications in shreds."

Besides disunity, all of Poland's borders were in question and it had enemies everywhere. None of its neighbors wanted an independent Poland.

 Józef Pilsudski went from a German jail at the time of the Armistice to change the nation of Poland from a dream to a reality in just three years. He fought for Austria-Hungary during the war as the head of the Polish Legions. At the end, he refused to put his legions under German command and wound up in jail. Now, he used the legions to seize power from the German occupation authorities and reawaken Polish nationalism.
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  However, there was also a Polish army fighting for France. It had a rival leader, Roman Dmowski, and its own general, Józev Haller. Noted pianist Ignace Paderewski became Prime Minister for a short time, and was dedicated to harnessing the two rivals to further Polish interests.
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  Besides disunity, all of Poland's borders were in question and it had enemies everywhere. None of its neighbors wanted an independent Poland. (This is sort of like the Kurds, today.) Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Czechs and Slovaks contested every border. Pilsudski fought six different wars in three years defending a substantial territory with few natural defenses and with supporters of Dmowski plotting in his rear.
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The peacemakers had no real power with which to control events in Central Europe.

  Germany, as usual, had stripped the region of its assets leaving the people impoverished. Different economies, laws, bureaucracies, legislative systems, 5 different currencies, 66 kinds of rails, 165 types of locomotives - somehow, it all had to be brought together. And as with all the other new Central European states, there were instant dreams of a Greater Poland. Fortunately, Wilson's principle of self-determination was available to block much of this overreaching. Poland must have access to the sea although Danzig was 90% German. However, the countryside around Danzig was heavily Polish.
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  France was Poland's biggest supporter at the Peace Conference. A strong Poland would be an ally against Germany and a buffer against Bolshevik Russia. There were 4 million Polish constituents in the U.S. Wilson had met Dmowski and was wary of his grandiose territorial expectations. However, Pilsudski was creating facts on the ground. He was moving troops into German territory to the west, Lithuanian territory to the north and Galicia to the south. Of course, Rumanians, Serbs and Italians were also actively moving to broaden their borders.
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  The peacemakers had no real power with which to control events in Central Europe. They sent military experts to assess the situation and handed the hot potato to a commission on Polish affairs. Large numbers of Poles had become scattered everywhere, and Russians, Ukrainians, Germans and Jews were heavily mixed with the Poles. Statistics as usual were unreliable, and the inhabitants were themselves frequently uncertain of their nationality.

  "Was identity religious or linguistic? Did Polish-speaking Protestants, a significant group in the southern part of East Prussia, identify with their coreligionists, who were German, or with the Poles, who were Catholic? Were Ukrainians really Russian?"

Like a giant vacuum cleaner, the Germany army had just sucked all the power out of Imperial Russia, leaving pygmies with small forces free to dream big dreams.

Leaders all presented their arguments in terms of Wilson's ideals, but were determined to dominate by force as much territory as possible.

  Poland's long eastern border was a mess of competing interests. Like a giant vacuum cleaner, the Germany army had just sucked all the power out of Imperial Russia, leaving pygmies with small forces free to dream big dreams. (Fortunately for Stalin - and for all the WW-II allies - Hitler's incompetence prevented Germany's WW-II eastern front armies with arguably the best generals of the war from operating with the tactical skills of their WW-I counterparts.) Small forces could occupy vast stretches of territory - but as yet none of them could control what they grasped. Territories changed hands frequently, but harsh treatment by temporary victors generated nothing but hostility by despised local populations.
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  The commission on Polish affairs did its best, drawing a border pretty close to where the Polish border is today. This "Curzon Line" was accepted by the Supreme Council in December 1919, but Polish, Lithuanian, German, Ukrainian and several Russian forces kept fighting for advantages on the ground. Dreams of a Greater Poland vied with those of a Greater Lithuania in the northeast, and with Austrian and Ukrainian interests - both red and white - in the South.
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  Here as in the Balkans, no sooner were new nations freed from subjugations than they strove mightily to dominate and oppress peoples in neighboring territories. Their leaders all sanctimoniously presented their arguments in terms of Wilson's ideals, but were determined to dominate by force as much territory as possible. They would achieve neither economic viability nor military security in the midst of the many enemies they were making.
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Even more grandiose than the other new national leaders, Lenin envisioned a Greater Bolshevik revolution extending across Europe and the globe.

  The peacemakers had no way to enforce their will, though a small British flotilla at least bottled up the Bolshevik navy in Petrograd/Leningrad. There was even an effort to employ some German forces that remained in the area, but the Germans acted as beastly towards the local populations as they had during the war and had to be withdrawn. Many of them migrated towards Hitler in the 1920s.
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  While the peacemakers dithered in confusion, the Polish army settled matters on the ground by taking East Galicia in the south and pushing well beyond the Curzon Line. The locals - Catholic Ukrainians called "Ruthenians" - complained bitterly but were far better off under Polish rule in the 1930s than under Stalin.
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  The Poles pushed all the way to Kiev in the east, but it was more than they could chew. The Bolshevik counterattack caught them overextended and pushed them back to the gates of Warsaw. By this time, the Poles had worn out their welcome in Paris with their stubborn refusal to compromise their dreams for a Greater Poland. Their pleas for help went unanswered. Poland was fighting with all of its neighbors, and Lloyd George thought them as bad as the Irish. He even speculated on whether Bolshevik Russia might eventually be a useful balance against a reviving Germany.
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  However, Lenin had different ideas. Even more grandiose than the other new national leaders, he envisioned a Greater Bolshevik revolution extending across Europe and the globe. He viewed Poland as the vulnerable gateway for the spread of the Bolshevik revolution into western Europe.
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  Fortunately, a skillful Polish counterattack drove the Soviet forces back and forced Lenin to sue for peace. Communist dreams of a Greater Soviet Russia would have to await WW-II. The Treaty of Riga pushed Poland's eastern border about 200 miles beyond the Curzon Line and gave Greater Poland dominion over additional minorities - 4 million Ukrainians, 2 million Jews, 1 million Byelorussians.
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  When the fighting ultimately exhausted itself, the Baltic states and Poland settled within borders reasonably close to those drawn by the commission. Poland lost the territory east of the Curzon Line during and after WW-II.
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Czechs and Slovaks:

  During the Bolshevik coup in Hungary, Czechoslovakia took some additional choice territorial morsels from Hungary, much of which the Hungarians quickly took back. However, they wound up with about a million Hungarians and the predominantly German town of Bratislava which was an important port on the Danube.
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  The little ethnically mixed sector of Teschen was particularly troublesome. Rivalry over possession of the rich coalfields and a vital railroad junction transformed Poland and Czechoslovakia from friends to warring enemies. The peacemakers finally divided it up in a manner that would leave everyone unhappy.
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  Czechoslovakia wound up with about 3 million Germans, 700,000 Hungarians, 550,000 Ruthenians, and some Poles and Gypsies, out of a population of about 14 million. The Czechs and Slovaks, too, were not exactly united in outlook. Slovakia, suddenly cut off from Hungarian markets and coal, immediately descended into depression. Democratic Czechoslovakia had to use force to maintain control of Slovakia, and the two inevitably divided after the fall of the Soviet Union. The Ruthenian parts of Slovakia shifted to Russia and then to the Ukraine.
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Austria:

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The entire economic structure of which Vienna was the hub had fallen apart, with much of the populace rendered impecunious, unemployed and starving.

  World War I shattered an empire of 50 million people that was already full of fracture lines. Austria was now too small and too poor to be a threat. While its new government was socialist, it at least was at peace with its neighbors, unlike Bolshevik Hungary.
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  The entire economic structure of which Vienna was the hub had fallen apart, with much of the populace rendered impecunious, unemployed and starving. The alarmed Allies quickly lifted their blockade and sent in food, clothing and funds. Germany, Poland and Belgium received more aid, but their needs were much larger than those of the 6 million Austrians. The aid was just in time. A communist effort to seize power in June 1919 was easily put down.
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  Austria in essence threw itself on the mercy of the peacemakers. It lost Galicia to Poland and Bohemia to Czechoslovakia along with 3 million German speaking Austrians. Italy was awarded the southern portion of the Tyrol - all without benefit of plebiscites. Autonomy for the Austrian peoples was a part of one of Wilson's 14 points. Not all of the Austrian people would be granted the promised autonomy. Austria was forbidden to join Germany.
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  The Austrian treaty was in essence an afterthought. It was dependent on the prior arrangements for the surrounding states. It was too poor even to be assessed reparations. At least they saved their art treasures.
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  At Wilson's insistence, a small area in the south was saved through plebiscite from a grasping Yugoslavia. Austria also got a strip of territory from Hungary that happened to have a German majority. There was little sympathy among the peacemakers for Bolshevik Hungary. The Austrian treaty was signed in September 1919.
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  Austria remained an economic basket case. It thus welcomed Hitler in 1938, but returned to neutral independence after WW-II, when it prospered as a neutral in a world of borders that were increasingly open to trade.
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Hungary:

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  Hungary had maintained the most repressive system in Europe. A wealthy class of aristocratic landholders repressed Hungarian peasants and dominated various minorities that made up about half the population. It had been the most militarily intransigent segment of the Empire.
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  Now, it was rapidly melting away and had few friends. Only Italy was sympathetic - as it was of all the states bordering Yugoslavia. Hungary's borders were largely drawn as what was left over from the establishment of its neighbors - Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Rumania. The greatest loss was the wealthy region of Transylvania which comprised almost half the kingdom and went to Rumania. Although Hungary had ruled the region since the eleventh century, Rumanians made up more than half the population, the Hungarians less than a quarter.
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The populace was more nationalistic than communist, but the government was communist nevertheless and was soon in contact with Lenin.

  When the territorial losses became known, the new Hungarian republic lost all domestic legitimacy. The communists took over without firing a shot. The populace was more nationalistic than communist, but the government was communist nevertheless and was soon in contact with Lenin.
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  Clemenceau was adamantly favorable to Rumania and opposed to Hungary. Wilson and Lloyd George were suddenly uncertain how best to respond to these events.. Kun solved their problem by a considerable dose of leftist economic and sociological incompetence and heavy handedness which undermined his public support. He lasted just 133 days.
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  As Rumania and Czechoslovakia attacked to grab as much of Hungary as they could, the Council of Four remained distracted by the far more important business of the German peace treaty. In June, they decided to inform the belligerents what the borders were and that they would not be changed regardless of military outcomes. However, the conflict continued until the Hungarian army collapsed. Kun fled to Russia where he was executed in 1939 in a Stalin purge.
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  The peacemakers had no forces for Hungary and no credibility with the occupiers who looted whatever there was left to loot. The occupation lasted until November 1919. In June 1920, a new Hungarian government signed its peace treaty in Paris. It had lost two thirds of its population, was cut off by its new borders from markets and suppliers, and was expected to pay reparations.
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  Autonomy for the Hungarian people was a part of one of Wilson's 14 points that was largely disregarded. As a result, 3 1/2 million Hungarians were now dominated minorities in neighboring antagonistic lands. Hungary was thus naturally attracted to the Axis powers, and briefly regained territory during WW-II. The war lost, the territories were again gone.
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Italy:

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Italians were contemptuous of Wilson's 14 points and thought it ridiculous to depend on the League of Nations for future security.

  Italian troops had shown considerable initiative after the war in occupying the territories promised them in the wartime Treaty of London and then some more. Some of this territory, including ports along the eastern shores of the Adriatic and territory in Croatia and Slovenia, was now sought for the new state of Yugoslavia. However, Italy had proven of little military use during the war, and now the other Allies felt little need to live up to the grand territorial promises made to get Italy to join the Allies.
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  The Italians were now scheming to create discord that might shatter Yugoslavia into the constituent pieces that ultimately spun off from Serbia during the 1990s. Italians thought it ridiculous to depend on the League of Nations for future security. The Balkans and Mediterranean were not regions amenable to Wilson's ideals. Wilson had no understanding of the Italians and they had no understanding of the U.S.
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Wilson tried to go over the head of the Italian government by explaining his ideals directly to the Italian people. The Italian delegation packed their bags and went home. The Italian people sided with their government in an outpouring of nationalist fervor.

   Britain and France ignored Italy's North African dreams as they divided up the German colonies in Africa.. This was a slight that Mussolini would subsequently make propaganda use of. The bit of Austria south of the Brenner Pass - the South Tyrol and the Trentino - were available, however. Even though the Tyrol was largely German, Wilson acquiesced. As a result, 250,000 Germans would be subjected to policies of forced assimilation when Mussolini came to power.
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  Their North African ambitions could wait, but Italy considered their Adriatic position of vital strategic importance. Wilson favored the Yugoslavs where Slavic peoples were in the majority. The Italians and Wilson were immediately in fundamental opposition. The Italians adamantly rejected any compromise within this sphere. Their tactics were tactless. They bluntly opposed all Yugoslav border claims and thus made many enemies within the Peace Conference - most importantly including the others on the Council of Four. Heavy handed repression in the Slavic areas that Italy coveted was countered by Wilson by the withholding of aid to Italy.
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  The Italian delegation had raised all manner of expectations at home and found itself hemmed in politically. Socialist and fascist forces were growing and were clashing in the streets. Somehow, the dispute was allowed to focus and harden over the little port of Fiume at the head of the Adriatic. There were just 25,000 Italians out of a population of about 500,000 serving a Slavic hinterland. Wilson dug in his heels and the Italians were unbending.
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  The Italians threatened to reject the all-important German treaty. Belgium was upset about reparations and Japan was upset over German possessions in China. The Germans were due in Paris on April 29, and the smaller members of the Alliance were splintering away. On April 23, Wilson tried to go over the head of the Italian government by explaining his ideals directly to the Italian people. The Italian delegation packed their bags and went home. The Italian people sided with their government in an outpouring of nationalist fervor.
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Suddenly, it was possible for previously intractable disputes with Greece over the Dodecanese Islands and Albania to be settled. Fiume became a neutral city and Italy withdrew its claims in Dalmatia.

  However, the new Italian government had its hands full domestically. It sought to resolve all foreign disputes. Suddenly, it was possible for previously intractable disputes with Greece over the Dodecanese Islands and in Albania to be settled. Fiume became a neutral city and Italy withdrew its claims in Dalmatia.
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  But Italy was descending into chaos. Italian nationalists took over Fiume and Italian troops remained in Albania and Dalmatia. With isolationist Republicans in the White House, there could be no help from the Allies. Yugoslavia accepted a compromise favorable to Italy. Fiume remained independent, but Italy kept a strip of coastal land that gave it access. The Istrian Peninsula, the port of Zadar and some islands also went to Italy. Except for Trieste, all this was lost after WW-II.
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  See, MacMillan, "Paris 1919," Part II covering Greece, Turkey, the Arab Middle East, Palestine, Japan, China, and the Treaty of Versailles." See, also, Keynes, "The Economic Consequences of the Peace," to be reviewed in November.