Failure of the occupation strategy:

The military commanders during the campaign left the area soon after the campaign.

  This book begins after the spectacularly successful military campaign to topple Saddam Hussain. It is thus important to note at the outset that the decision to invade and the decisions over the makeup of the invasion and occupation forces are not covered in this otherwise highly informative book. However, Linda Robinson, in "Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq" does note that the military commanders during the campaign, Central Command chief Tommy Franks and Army Commander Gen. David McKiernan, left the area soon after the campaign. (Perhaps they understood the mismatch between the occupation objectives and the forces available.)
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Apparently, nobody involved in the political decisions had a clue about the complexities of Iraq society and Middle East systems of governance.

Withdrawal was to begin as soon as possible.

  So, what went wrong during the occupation? Apparently, nobody involved in the political decisions had a clue about the complexities of Iraq society and Middle East systems of governance. (Army deputy secretary Paul Wolfowitz expressed astonishment in Congressional testimony that anyone would believe it would take more troops to occupy Iraq than to take it.) Many of the political policymakers didn't want to hear about such complexities. The Bush (II) administration had elections to fight in 2004 and 2006 and made it known that unpleasant news was unwelcome.
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  The military was conscious of the limitations of its reduced size and didn't want to contemplate any substantial long term commitment. (For such reasons, Sec. of Defense Rumsfeld never wanted to get involved in nation building.) The military remained committed to building an Iraqi army so that the security problem could be turned over to the Iraqis with just some minimal U.S. support and advice. Withdrawal was to begin as soon as possible.
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Bremer's efforts are viewed by Robinson as uninformed and frequently counterproductive.

Since the Bush (II) administration didn't welcome unpleasant news, it of course didn't get any.

National Security Adviser Condolezza Rice insisted disastrously that the fractured Iraqi society had to instantly become a democracy.

The Shia government quite reasonably believed that after a thousand years as an underclass, it was now their turn to dominate the state and enjoy control of Iraq's resources.

  For three years this charade was maintained while the level of Iraqi sectarian conflict and the slaughter of Iraqi civilians increased and coalition casualties rose. Paul Bremer as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority and Gen. George Casey as coalition commander presided over the disintegration in Iraq. Their policies left the previously dominant Sunni with nothing to hope for in the new Shia  dominated regime and much to dread. The Sunni quickly took up arms to resist the new Shia regime and the coalition forces that supported it. Bremer's efforts are viewed by Robinson as uninformed and frequently counterproductive.
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  Since the Bush (II) administration didn't welcome unpleasant news, it of course didn't get any. At any rate, the administration was anything but united in the effort.

  "The neoconservatives in the White House and the Pentagon looked upon the State Department's Arabists as supporters of the region's Sunni regimes; some of the neocons saw themselves as the liberators of the Shia and promoters of democracy, and in other cases they merely distrusted the State Department."

  National Security Adviser Condolezza Rice insisted disastrously that the fractured Iraqi society had to instantly become a democracy. This resulted in an interim government dominated by Shia Islamists determined to take revenge against their Sunni oppressors. The Shia government quite reasonably believed that, after a thousand years as an underclass, it was now their turn to dominate the state and enjoy control of Iraq's resources. Middle Eastern nations know of no other form of governance.

  "There was no time to create electoral districts, and the closed-list system favored parties over individuals with local standing. The Islamist Shia and Kurdish parties thus dominated the assembly that would write the constitution, which provided for a weak central government and potentially powerful regions and set the stage for deadlock. As the new government was formed, hundreds of cronies and militia members began filling the ministries, their security forces, and the police."

All available intelligence resources were initially tied down in the futile search for weapons of mass destruction.

"Khalilzad's efforts were complicated by the competing view, and backdoor maneuvers, of some officials at the White House and State, who believed the United States should throw in its lot with the Shia against the Sunni.

  The U.S. military needed intelligence to fight the growing insurgency, but all available intelligence resources were initially tied down in the futile search for weapons of mass destruction. In November 2003, when the CIA issued a report accurately describing the nature of the blossoming civil conflict and the minor role al Qaeda was playing, Bush (II) and Sec. of Defense Rumsfeld expressed their displeasure with the message. Their only concern was how to spin Iraq for the 2004 election.
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  By this time there was at last a competent ambassador in Baghdad. Zalmay Khalilzad had good connections in Washington and was a long time associate of Vice Pres. Dick Cheney. Unfortunately, Bremer had been initially chosen instead of Khalilzad, and John Negroponte had ineffectively followed Bremer, so by the summer of 2005, Khalilzad had two years of mismanagement to deal with. "It is almost certain that 2003-2005 would have turned out quite differently if Khalilzad, who understood Iraq's complex dynamics," had been chosen instead of Bremer.

  "Khalilzad strove mightily to convince the majority Shia to offer an olive branch to the minority Sunni. He won concessions that diluted the influence of Islamic law, postponed the creation of powerful regions that would carve up Iraq, and promised constitutional revisions within four months of the new parliament's convening. Largely on the strength of those commitments, the constitution was narrowly ratified and Sunnis came out to vote in the December 2005 elections."

  After strenuous diplomatic arm-twisting, Nouri al-Maliki was chosen prime minister in April, 2006. He was the least Islamist of the possible choices.

  "Khalilzad brokered hard-won agreements on two nonsectarian security ministers, a broad-based political council for national security, and a national reconciliation agenda with a timetable for implementing it. By then it was October 2006. Amid the raging violence, the rival politicians openly called each other 'enemy.' Khalilzad managed to eke out agreement on a foreign investment law, but drafts of an oil framework law and a new de-Baathification law ran aground."

  With the country exploding in violence and the Bush (II) administration refusing to give him the latitude and support for an occasional hard-ball approach needed to undo the many errors of his predecessors, there were very real limits on what Khalilzad could accomplish.

  "Khalilzad's efforts were complicated by the competing view, and backdoor maneuvers, of some officials at the White House and State, who believed the United States should throw in its lot with the Shia against the Sunni. The Shia leaders would call their friends in the White House and play them off against Khalilzad whenever he sought to extract concessions from them. Iraqi leaders accused the Sunni Afghan American of being partial to the Iraqi Sunnis, and White House officials suggested that he lower his profile."

"The fault lay at the strategic level, with the military and civilian leadership."

  Meanwhile, the military fought the insurgency tactically - without any strategic vision about the nature of its opponents or how the conflict could be resolved. They trained Iraqi soldiers, but the Iraqis had no logistical or intelligence capabilities or heavy brigades. Thus, there was no possibility of U.S. forces being complimented by - much less replaced by - Iraqis. There was a "mechanistic" approach to the problem from the President on down
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  More than military strength, what was needed were negotiations for power-sharing arrangements among the factions. (This may well have been impossible until the Sunni factions were sufficiently bloodied to realize they might lose in an all-out civil war.) The Sunni had been given no reason to support Iraq as a nation. Holding early elections and writing a constitution without Sunni input was practically irrelevant.
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  Military analysis was extensive, but officers outside Iraq had no way to understand the complex realities and those inside Iraq understood at best only the part of the elephant they were dealing with. Intelligence resources were at first too preoccupied with hunting for weapons of mass destruction to bring it all together. Tactical successes were many and were invariably abandoned as military units rotated out of Iraq or went elsewhere within Iraq.

  "The fault lay at the strategic level, with the military and civilian leadership. These islands of progress could not be sustained without a strategic approach that knit them together and addressed the underlying cause of the conflict. No one at the top of the totem pole grappled effectively with what was happening to America's first major war since Vietnam."

The election of a Democratic Congress in 2006 forced the administration to face reality. They had to come up with a winning strategy quickly or Congress would force withdrawal.

  There was a tendency of top officials to live in a state of denial as conditions worsened. (This is an unfortunately frequent affliction for Washington leadership.) Units were being withdrawn in 2006 even as violence escalated. (It was an important Congressional election year.) The initial Iraqi government under the constitution was formed in the late spring of 2006. It was highly sectarian and offered nothing to the Sunni. Violence increased explosively from that point. Fortunately, the election of a Democratic Congress in 2006 forced the Bush (II) administration to face reality. They had to come up with a winning strategy quickly or Congress would force withdrawal.

  "The Shia had been progressively empowered, while the Sunni were left with no hope and no reason not to pick up guns. There was no political strategy to address that reality, and absent one the war would continue until the Sunni were dead, gone, or defeated."

  Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was frustrated that there was no new thinking from Gen. Casey's command in Iraq. Ignorance of Iraq realities incredibly remained widespread until intensive studies began in the fall of 2006. With the electoral defeat that November, it was finally clear within the administration that their approach was not working and that a change of course was essential. Robert Gates replaced Rumsfeld as Sec. of Defense in November 2006.
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The Surge decision:

  There was a wide range of views within the various evaluation groups.
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 A group comprised of 16 colonels with Iraq theater experience came up with four options. They rejected "going big" as beyond U.S. manpower capabilities. Withdrawal was also rejected as leaving Iraq as a failed state embroiled in civil war. They accepted the need for a long-term commitment that would ultimately be drawn down to about 60,000 troops and would rely on Iraqi forces as those were built up. A second version of this option included the initial surge in troop strength to gain security for civilian populations. This was what Gen. Pace ultimately recommended. However, the military would not evaluate the complex political questions involved in the effort to cobble together Iraq's disparate groups into an acceptably cohesive state. This was viewed as someone else's problem to solve.
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  In fact, local civilian support had always appeared in Iraq whenever military security had been provided. However, when the military moved on, the insurgents moved back in. Lacking measurable purpose, there was considerable opposition within the military to the surge. "The strains of the war were beginning to show on the ten division army."
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In December 2006, Bush (II) finally directed a shift that emphasized the stopping of sectarian violence.

  Bush (II) opted for the plan that offered a possibility of victory. (After all, what else did he have to show for his two terms in office?) In December 2006, he finally directed a shift that emphasized the stopping of sectarian violence. Timetables and conditions were rejected as obviously self-defeating. However, a wide range of tactical possibilities were being considered.
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  The primary advocate for the surge was Gen. Jack Keane (Ret.), former vice chief of staff of the army. Permanent security for civilians was essential. The "short war strategy" using "kill and capture" tactics couldn't succeed. At a strategy meeting he told the president bluntly:

  "The Iraqis cannot handle the level of violence that's being inflicted upon them. The only way we can bring down the level of violence is, for the first time ever, finally agree to conduct proven counterinsurgency practice by protecting the population."

  These "proven" counterinsurgency practices had been around for decades, and were incorporated in the Marine Corps Small Wars manual. The army, too, for over two decades had had a counterinsurgency manual. Petraeus had been revamping it in cooperation with the Marine Corps. (The Bush (II) administration has no excuse for waiting four bloody years to employ these tactics.)
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  Actually defeating the insurgency was not contemplated by anybody. Even Keane recognized that total elimination of sectarian violence could not be achieved. The question was how far the U.S. would go to rein it in.

  "We have to understand," Keene continued, "that in the context of one thousand years of domination, revenge is a major ingredient in the political culture and compromise is a minor ingredient."

  The option chosen by Bush (II) was the bold surge of 5 army brigades and 2 marine battalions. This involved a more intensive effort at training and advising Iraqi forces with U.S. military advisory groups permanently assigned to Iraqi units to maintain Iraqi proficiency. However, Gen. Casey would not be kept around to lead this effort. He was kicked upstairs as chief of staff of the Army and was replaced by Gen David Petraeus. Robinson summarizes the reasons for failure under Gen. Casey.

  "He would most likely be remembered for fighting the war with too few troops, accepting the constraints Rumsfield placed on him, and banking on the ramp-up of Iraqi forces that in the end proved insufficient. - - - The way in which forces were employed often did not match the declared strategy and very often the effects canceled out one another. New commanders and units undid the gains of their predecessors. Troops were quartered on large bases, away from the population. When they sallied forth, it was in full kit and armored vehicles and very often to conduct some type of combat operation. Most effort and resources were expended in sweeps and search operations for 'bad guys,' and too little  attention was paid to the feelings engendered in Iraqis. The troops did not know the people, the culture, or the neighborhood, and hasty counterinsurgency training for a few weeks could not remedy this deficit. Most were highly dependent on the talent and empathy of their interpreters."

  Bush (II) had to face down a firestorm of political opposition to implement Keane's plans. Keane, too, had aroused opposition.

  "Keane's military peers were furious at him for breaking ranks and lending his stature to a policy they believed would not work and would, in their view, quite possibly break the army. Keane was bucking virtually the entire military establishment and most of the foreign-policy elite, who favored drawing down troops and shifting to an advisory mission."

  However, Gates, as the new Sec. of Defense, met the needs of the surge head on. The army had to expand - at least by 30,000. Enlistment rates had stayed high, but retention of noncommissioned officers and junior grade officers was slipping. As Gen. Petraeus took command in Iraq, Adm. William "Fox" Fallon took over as his superior officer in Central Command covering Iraq, Afghanistan and much else in the troubled Middle East.
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"Our troops will have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs."

  Bush (II) explained the surge strategy for the public and acknowledged past failures.

  "These troops - - - will work alongside Iraqi units and be embedded in their formations. Our troops will have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs. - - - This time we will have the force levels we need to hold the areas that have been cleared. In earlier operations, political and sectarian interference prevented Iraqi and American forces from going into neighborhoods that are home to those fueling the sectarian violence. This time, Iraqi and American forces will have a green light to enter those neighborhoods -- and Prime Minister Maliki has pledged that political or sectarian interference will not be tolerated."

  Reconstruction efforts and economic aid would be expanded and the number of governance experts would be doubled. The Iraqi government was expected to similarly increase its efforts. However, success at this late stage was anything but assured, and political opposition to the war was rapidly escalating.
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Gen. David Petraeus:

&

  Petraeus' biography is summarized by Robinson. His fast-track military career culminated in his two tours in Iraq, first as commander of the 101st Airborne. He had immediately realized that the most challenging phase of the war would be the occupation and started routinely asking: "Tell me how this ends?"
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De-Baathification was supported by Paul Wolfowitz and Shia exile leader Ahmed Chalabi, among others. Chalabi headed a de -Baathification commission that blocked all reconciliation efforts.

Recreating the Iraqi army meant creating the entire infrastructure of a functioning military: higher echelons of command, an officer corps, and a cadre to handle the staff functions to pay, feed, clothe, house, train, and equip the army.

  Plans to reformulate and support Iraqi civil society in the Mosul region where he was assigned were rapidly implemented. Pursuant to a "Commander's Emergency Response Program," he quickly and effectively expended $57 million on over five thousand projects.

  "While the massive and ambitious projects to build power plants, water plants, and other major infrastructure became bogged down and were often subject to graft or mismanagement by contractors and subcontractors, the [Commander's Emergency Response Program] projects were judged by the U.S. special inspector general for Iraq to be the most effective aid the United States provided in the postwar period."

  Petraeus vehemently opposed Paul Bremer's blunderbuss and disastrous de-Baathification decree and the dissolution of the Iraqi security forces. These policies shredded existing Iraqi civil society and government institutions. However, de-Baathification was supported by Paul Wolfowitz and Shia exile leader Ahmed Chalabi, among others. Chalabi headed a de -Baathification commission that blocked all reconciliation efforts. Petraeus readily foretold how de-Baathification and the dissolution of the Iraqi army would feed an insurrection. After the 101st was replaced by a smaller unit, all the progress in Mosul unraveled.
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  Petraeus returned for a second tour in Iraq in 2004 as commander of the effort to train and equip the new Iraqi army.

  "Petraeus immediately realized that his job would entail not only churning out more troops but also creating the entire infrastructure of a functioning military: higher echelons of command, an officer corps, and a cadre to handle the staff functions to pay, feed, clothe, house, train, and equip the army. That meant, in turn, overseeing a massive $2 billion construction project to rebuild the looted and destroyed barracks and training facilities. Equipping a force two and a half times the size of the British army with uniforms, body armor, vehicles, arms, radios, and ammunition would become a major headache and a source of graft within the new defense ministry."

  Rebuilding an army from the ground up is a twenty year job. In Iraq, a wide variety of cultural and practical obstructions had to be overcome. The ongoing sectarian conflict and al Qaeda attacks made it especially difficult and slow.

  "Sunni Arabs were leaving the Iraqi security forces due to intimidation of their families, kidnappings, and murder. Busloads of recruits were killed by improvised explosive devices and ambushes. Officials in the defense ministry and upper echelons of the army were killed. At the same time, Petraeus was under constant pressure to build more units faster."

"If a government was not or could not be made legitimate in the eyes of its population, there was little chance of defeating a determined insurgency."

"One of the key exhortations of the manual had not been fulfilled in Iraq: the need to have a clear view of the cause of the conflict. 'Knowing why an insurgent movement has gained support - - - is essential in designing a counterinsurgency campaign.'"

The replacement of Sunni dominance by Shia dominance created unique problems. The political task of reconciliation between the new Shia government and its Sunni minority was both difficult to arrange and utterly essential.

"Petraeus thought it was vital that there be a surge in four areas: not just from the military but also from the civilian side of the U.S. government, the Iraqi forces, and Iraqi political will.

  The extensive revamping of the Army counterinsurgency manual under Petraeus are covered at some length by Robinson. It was a wide-ranging effort including civilian as well as military experts. In a "Military Review" article, legitimacy was identified as the key requirement.

  "If a government was not or could not be made legitimate in the eyes of its population, there was little chance of defeating a determined insurgency. The article formulated nineteen other principles, imperatives, and paradoxes for conducting counterinsurgency, including the primacy of political over military goals and means and the importance of providing security for the populace and of separating them from the insurgents. The paradoxes included warnings that use of force can generate more insurgents than it vanquishes, that perceptions can be more important than the actions themselves, and that tactical successes do not guarantee victory."

  The revision of the manual ranged widely from military to civil to human rights concerns. Input was obtained from hundreds of sources. It emphasized political and civil factors, money as a key weapon for a wide range of constructive purposes, and the importance of encouraging participation by "the host nation" even if they can't do things as well as U.S. units. Field Manual 3-24, "Counterinsurgency," was published in December 2006, just before Petraeus was given the job to put it into practice in Iraq.

  "It recommended a multifaceted approach to counterinsurgency rather than relying only or even principally on military operations. These 'logical lines of operations' all aimed to increase the legitimacy of and support for the host nation government. They included not only combat or security operations but improvement of host-nation security forces, essential services, governance, and economic development, as well as information operations. Enhancing a government's legitimacy required above all an understanding of the population's sentiment and the culture. One of the key exhortations of the manual had not been fulfilled in Iraq: the need to have a clear view of the cause of the conflict. 'Knowing why an insurgent movement has gained support - - - is essential in designing a counterinsurgency campaign.'"

  Napoleon's six year occupation of Spain was referred to as a primary example of failure. Iraq, however, was admittedly a special case. The replacement of Sunni dominance by Shia dominance created unique problems. The political task of reconciliation between the new Shia government and its Sunni minority was both difficult to arrange and utterly essential. Military force would be essential but was clearly not sufficient.

  "Petraeus thought it was vital that there be a surge in four areas: not just from the military but also from the civilian side of the U.S. government, the Iraqi forces, and Iraqi political will. He was fairly sure he could create a window of perceived security, but whether the Iraqis could take advantage of it was much less certain."

  Petraeus now became one of the long line of military commanders tasked with leading American forces at critical times. These include Nathanael Greene in the Revolutionary War, Winfield Scott in Mexico, Grant in the American Civil War, John J. Pershing in WW-I, Eisenhower in WW-II, and Matthew Ridgway in Korea.
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The Command:

Whole sections of Baghdad had been torn apart and emptied.

  The sad state of affairs in Iraq on February 10, 2007, when Petraeus took command is summarized by Robinson. Sectarian violence was claiming thousands of Iraqi lives each month and U.S. casualties were considerable. Whole sections of Baghdad had been torn apart and emptied of commerce and even of residents. The five surge brigades would not all be on scene until June. New Iraqi units arriving in Baghdad were under-strength.
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Unlike his predecessors, Petraeus would not lowball his needs. The original 21,500 troop surge had ballooned to 31,000. This escalation did not go unnoticed by the surge opponents in Congress and the military.

The Sunni were leaderless, bent on fighting, and opposed to accepting their demoted status. The Shia, for their part, were starting to flex their power and were disinclined to make any concessions."

  Special support units - military police, a combat aviation brigade, a division HQ, and much more - were also needed. Unlike his predecessors, Petraeus would not lowball his needs. The original 21,500 troop surge had ballooned to 31,000. This escalation did not go unnoticed by the surge opponents in Congress and the military. Congress was debating a fixed date for withdrawal.
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  One of Petraeus' closest aides was Col. - now Brig. Gen. - Bill Rapp. Col. Mark Martin, his staff judge advocate, provided legal advice and worked on strengthening the Iraqi justice system - a vital component of the effort to boost the government's legitimacy. The Rule of Law complex included a new detention center, modern courtrooms, and secure lodging for Iraqi judges and officials of the major crimes unit.
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  Perhaps most valuable was Iraq expert Derek Harvey, a retiree from the Defense Intelligence Agency. Harvey was a persistent presence in Iraq. He was pessimistic about chances for success, but supported the surge because he understood that the stakes were too high for failure to be a responsible option.

  "He knew there were no easy answers in Iraq and fought the pressure to reduce the complex struggle to a clean and manageable formulaic policy prescription. The Sunni were leaderless, bent on fighting, and opposed to accepting their demoted status. The Shia, for their part, were starting to flex their power and were disinclined to make any concessions."

  Petraeus had his aides analyze the current situation. There was a newly elected Iraqi government. A wide range of operations had to be understood and merged with some strategic plan. Petraeus attacked the problem with his usual energy, but paid equal attention to the analytical and evaluation efforts. At the top, his command was a vast bureaucracy, but it was a bureaucracy operating under military command structure. Petraeus absorbed information, asked questions, and became actively involved in guiding military operations and civilian and political initiatives. Robinson outlines his frenetic schedule. Once focused on a problem, Petraeus would stay on it until it was resolved.
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  Besides morning briefings, Petraeus would circulate twice a week or more to chosen locations around Iraq, dispatch hundreds of emails each day and take bi-weekly five mile runs with selected officers during which he asked questions and gave instructions.

  "He had a finger in every pie, but he also gave subordinates room to implement and improvise on his orders. During battlefield circulations he ate lunch with company commanders of whatever unit he visited  -- without their superiors present -- to ask the captains what was on their minds, what was working, and what was not."

All the top officers on his staff realized the need for a long term commitment and a beefed up advisory and support relationship with Iraqi forces.

  Petraeus ran a "flat" organization, Robinson notes. Company commanders had direct contact with him. Inevitably, he made some mistakes, but his ability to absorb good ideas from all sources served him well. At the top, he had generals with long experience in Iraq.
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  Robinson describes the experience and strategic beliefs of the top five generals under Petraeus. They all realized the need for a long term commitment and a beefed up advisory and support relationship with Iraqi forces. British Gen. Graeme Lamb drew on Britain's 38 years of experience with the insurgency in Northern Ireland, and had already begun reaching out to negotiate with insurgent leaders. His "strategic engagement initiative" recognized that broad-scale reconciliation was essential in Iraq. Ambassador Khalilzad was an early supporter of this approach which depended critically on embassy resources. As Petraeus put it, "you can't kill your way out of an insurgency." Along with the British ambassador and a few others, an ad hoc organization - "Force Engagement Cell" - was formed of intelligence and special operations personnel to implement the strategic engagement initiative.
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  Meanwhile, a Joint Strategic Assessment Team (JSAT) headed by Col. H.R. McMaster was reviewing military strategy. McMaster had already engaged in a successful clear and hold operation in Tal Afar, a strategically located little city near the Syrian border. Also on this team was David Kilcullen, an Australian with extensive counterinsurgency experience who also favored "population-centric" rather than "enemy-centric" strategy. Civilian experts included Robert Ford, Molly Phee and co-leader David Pearce, all from the State Department, oil expert Richard Wadell, and Toby Dodge from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. These experts from outside the military could challenge Petraeus and question suspect conclusions.
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  Military operations were commanded by Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno from the sprawling Multi National Corps - Iraq (MNC-I)  base near Baghdad airport. Robinson provides a description of this mammoth congested complex. Odierno and Petraeus worked well together. A particular problem was the annual turnover in Iraq of both top commanders and ordinary soldiers.
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  A major positive factor was the revolt of the sheiks in 14 tribes in Western Anbar province that had chased al Qaeda out of the area. However, al Qaeda operatives just moved into Diyala province.
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On the Iranian border, the problem was complicated by the extensive cross-border commercial, religious and civilian traffic between the two Shia-controlled countries. By late February, diplomatic talks had been initiated with Syria and Iran concerning Iraq issues.

  Forces had to be dedicated to suppression of insurgents as well as to securing population centers in Baghdad. Ultimately, twenty six battalions were used for enemy-centric operations outside Baghdad and twenty eight for population centric operations within Baghdad. The availability of special operations and intelligence forces with Iraqi and Arab partners for work with conventional U.S. and Iraqi units greatly increased effectiveness and then provided the heft to secure ground gained.
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  A joint U.S.-Iraqi force was assigned to the western  border to block the flow of foreign fighters from Syria. On the Iranian border, however, the problem was complicated by the extensive cross-border commercial, religious and civilian traffic between the two Shia-controlled countries. By late February, diplomatic talks had been initiated with Syria and Iran concerning Iraq issues. This was one of the key recommendations of the 2006 Iraq Study Group. Ambassador Ryan Crocker arrived in late March 2007 to replace Khalilzad.
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The U.S. would not shy away from influencing the policies and activities of the Iraqi government. This had been a vital component of previous small wars efforts, and had to be undertaken in Iraq, especially to root out sectarian influences.

  In early April, the JSAT was ready with its analysis and recommendations. It recognized the full complexity of the conflict.

  "The main recommendations were (1) to adopt a political strategy of seeking cease-fire agreements with individual groups or key actors, (2) to apply a military strategy of protecting the population and attacking those who would not come to the table, (3) to engage in active regional diplomacy, (4) to build government capacity, and most controversially, (5) to root sectarian actors out of the government, if necessary unilaterally using the authority vested in the coalition under the U.N. Security Council Resolution. The proposal to purge the government reflected the frustration and pessimism many group members felt over the sectarian violence the Maliki government had permitted, as well as its general failure to move forward notably in the past year."

  The U.S. would not shy away from influencing the policies and activities of the Iraqi government. This had been a vital component of previous small wars efforts, and had to be undertaken in Iraq, especially to root out sectarian influences. Military brigades were to have operational control of the military advisory teams assigned to Iraqi units in their area. New provincial reconstruction teams would be embedded in brigade HQs and would report to the brigade commander. There was also to be a large expansion of the Iraqi army sufficient to replace the 170,000 coalition troops that would soon be leaving. The assumption was that the conflict would not be ending anytime soon so they would be needed.
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  The report also recommended fusing the embassy staff with the military under the joint command of Ambassador Crocker and Gen. Petraeus. The strategic problem was, after all, about 80% nonmilitary. Petraeus favored close coordination of effort instead. He also rejected any effort at wholesale purging of sectarian influences. It was hoped that if a few examples were made of the worst actors, that would be enough. However, even that would prove difficult.
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The Baghdad Security Plan:

  Petraeus wasn't the only officer thinking along these lines. Lt. Col. Doug Ollivant returned to Baghdad with the 1st Cavalry Division for his second tour. Tasked with coming up with appropriate military strategy, he led a team that drew up Operation Fardh al-Qanoon (Enforcing the Law).
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  The plan involved a grid of embedded units conducting networked operations in ten security districts. The battalion became the central unit. Each battalion would work with an Iraqi brigade based at district joint security stations. Responsibility was further delegated down to company level. Captains and noncommissioned officers in daily contact with the people would work with Iraqi forces to provide security and help local officials with governance, public services and reconstruction. Elements as small as ten soldiers would be based at joint security stations with Iraqi soldiers to meet particular threats. They would successively "clear," "control," and "retain" one neighborhood after another. Special Stryker brigade elements would partner with Iraqi forces to clear out armed antagonists.

  "Once Iraqis were capable of retaining the gains, U.S. forces would progressively back out, leaving enhanced embedded adviser teams and moving to tactical, then operational, and then strategic overwatch positions. This last phase was more or less what Casey and [Gen.] Chiarelli had attempted in 2005-2006, but without first establishing adequate security."

  It was vital to both appear and be even handed. Continued Shia sectarian violence was as damaging to reconciliation efforts as Sunni sectarian violence. Both had to be suppressed.
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  Typically, Petraeus recognized and adopted Ollivant's plan. Baghdad was the key battleground, and the 1st Cavalry Division was on the spot. Everyone knew they had only one more chance to get things right. With some adaptations, the Baghdad security plan was implemented in the following months and adopted by other divisions outside Baghdad.

  "The battalion-based scheme was adopted and the troops spread out among Baghdad's neighborhoods and settled into buildings they called combat outposts. The battalions in turn sent one or two platoons to live, on rotating schedules, in the smaller joint security stations, most of which were blue-and-white painted cinder-block police stations, which the troops first worked to fortify by various means."

The battle for Baghdad:

  Troop strength remained below what was thought necessary even with the surge. Half the surge forces were used outside of Baghdad to pursue al-Qaeda linked insurgents. There was inevitably a tug-of-war over resources.
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Campbell's most difficult job was to nudge and maneuver the Iraqi military chain of command into doing what needed to be done. He had to take the measure of individual Iraqi commanders throughout the Baghdad chain of command, cultivate those most likely to get the job done, and try to neutralize others' detrimental effects."

  The critical effort to coordinate with the growing Iraqi forces is covered in some detail by Robinson. Brig. Gen. John Campbell was the key man in this effort.

  "Commanding his own brigade commanders in charge of the ten security districts was the least difficult part of Campbell's job. They were full colonels who sat atop the most well-trained, highly functioning military force in the world. Virtually every one had served a tour in Iraq already. Campbell's most difficult job was to nudge and maneuver the Iraqi military chain of command into doing what needed to be done. He had to take the measure of individual Iraqi commanders throughout the Baghdad chain of command, cultivate those most likely to get the job done, and try to neutralize others' detrimental effects."

  The new high-tech heavily armed and armored Stryker personnel carriers were invaluable in the clearing operations. Stryker brigades had 4,000 soldiers in three maneuver infantry battalions with cavalry, artillery and support units. Each brigade had 310 of the 19-ton eight-wheeled Strykers. It would operate with the battalions tasked to hold the cleared district. When not involved in clearing operations in Baghdad, Stryker battalions were often used to support operations outside Baghdad.
 &

Progress in a district meant fixing water and electric lines, collecting trash, getting Shia authorities to hire Sunni personnel for police as well as development work, and watching as commerce and people began to fill the streets.

  Robinson describes an early clearing operation that took place prior to the arrival of all the surge battalions. There were many false leads, but over time hundreds of weapons and explosives components were found. Everything depended on being able to hold the ground. The Iraqi brigades were essential for that task. However, they were far from fully manned and in any event permitted 25% of their men to be on leave at any one time.
 &
  The Iraqis, too, had competing interests for the use of their men. Their professional skills were far from developed. The frustrations of working with them were great, but American advisers doggedly stuck with the task.
 &
  Progress in a district meant fixing water and electric lines, collecting trash, getting Shia authorities to hire Sunni personnel for police as well as development work, and watching as commerce and people began to fill the streets.
 &
  Iraq is not a real nation. It is a collection of ethnic groups, religious sects, factions and about 150 tribes that have been fighting for domination and killing each other for thousands of years. It was cobbled together by the British as an oil-rich mandate possession after WW-I. Over 30,000 Iraqis were killed in 2006.

  "The magnitude of that bloodletting made peace a distant prospect. The basic theory of the surge as put forth by the White House was that population security would provide Iraqi leaders the breathing room to work out their differences, but the Petraeus-Crocker team did not have the luxury of proceeding sequentially. They had to make headway on both fronts simultaneously."

Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker had to both support and browbeat the Iraqi government to move towards reconciliation. It was a delicate balancing act.

  Yet victory depended on widespread political compromise and accommodation among the factions and sects. Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker had to both support and browbeat the Iraqi government to move towards reconciliation. It was a delicate balancing act.
 &
  Iraqi officials feared for their lives and surrounded themselves with bodyguards. They struggled for power and influence and could trust few outside their immediate circles. American troops and private security guards provided essential protection within the Green Zone compound. Sunnis in the government were targeted not only by Shia extremists but also by Sunnis who considered them traitors. When killers couldn't get at them, their families were targeted. Yet many soldiered on with great courage and commitment. To justify their participation in the government, Sunni politicians had to begin to show there were some benefits for the Sunnis to be a part of Iraq. Robinson provides details of this political mélange.
 &

The complexities of reconciliation:

  There are three main Shia factions - and they themselves are riven with sometimes rival factions. Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) won a narrow plurality in parliament and eleven governorships. The radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's party and Dawa were close behind. ISCI and al-Sadr have close relations with Iran.
 &

All of these parties and factions were inexperienced and had little inclination towards the compromise and accommodation of functioning democracies. The Middle East knew only winner-take-all governance followed by rule by terror.

  Al-Sadr nevertheless threw his support to Dawa to deny ISCI the prime minister position. Malaki, a long-time opponent of Saddam had run an underground guerilla movement from Syria. DAWA was the most secular party, but only in comparison to the other two. All of these parties and factions were inexperienced and had little inclination towards the compromise and accommodation of functioning democracies. The Middle East knew only winner-take-all governance followed by rule by terror. Sunni and Shia alike had survived Saddam by trusting no one outside their intimate circles.
 &
  This was the political landscape faced by Ryan Crocker. Fortunately, he had considerable experience and knowledge of the Middle East where he began serving his fifth term as ambassador on March 29, 2007. He had the vital task of encouraging reconciliation where before there had only been conflict, fear and loathing for thousands of years. He and Petreaus quickly implemented a unified team effort. They worked together frequently, had offices next to each other, and met jointly with Prime Minister Maliki. Separately, they both frequently toured the country outside of Baghdad. There had been little team effort between Bremer and Rumsfeld.

  "Crocker knew the key Iraqi politicians, but even more important, he had a deep grasp of the country's history and the psychological scars that had made it so hard to bring peace to Iraq. The western notion of compromise was simply not palatable, or even rational, to a group of men who had spent thirty-five years -- their entire adult lives -- as conspirators, guerillas, and insurgents, trying to topple a dictator while staying alive."

  The most prominent dissident Sunni party suffered under Saddam just as much as the Shia parties. "There is this pervasive fear that the Baath will be back," Crocker explained. "There is a Baathi behind every lamppost."
 &

  The U.S., too, had a record of double dealing in Iraq. It had encouraged both Shia and Kurdish uprisings and then stood aside as Saddam crushed them. The DAWA had been listed as a terrorist group when the U.S. favored Saddam during the Iran-Iraq war.
 &
  And now Sunni bombs were killing hundreds of Shia and Shia death squads were chasing Sunni out of Baghdad.

  "[Crocker] found ordinary Iraqis surprisingly outspoken, and he listened. He heard how bad their lives were, how the only medical care some of them received was from U.S. medics, since all the Iraqi doctors had fled the country. It was Lebanon all over again."

  Petraeus urged Maliki to visit Ramadi in Anbar province where Sunni sheiks had turned against al-Qaeda. Maliki had never been there. On March 13, 2007, Maliki arrived in Ramadi to meet with dozens of sheiks from all over Anbar.
 &

The Washington bureaucracy was so slow in delivering military equipment that Maliki purchased 150,000 AK-47 automatic rifles from China.

  Maliki had some real gripes with the Americans. The Washington bureaucracy was so slow in delivering military equipment that Maliki purchased 150,000 AK-47 automatic rifles from China. The Iraqis were finally spending more on their own armed forces than the U.S. was providing.
 &
  The Americans had real problems removing sectarian Shia militias from key ministries from where the Shia ran death squads and kidnapping rings against the Sunnis. These militias had political influence. Efforts to remove them from the ministries or move against them outside the ministries aroused political opposition.
 &
  The U.S. was trying to establish a nonpolitical professional military, but Maliki took direct control of Iraqi military units. Petraeus had to personally intervene to convince Maliki to rescind orders purging Sunni officers and men from key units. It was a constant struggle to gain reversals of such policies.
 &

  Maliki governed secretively with a few select advisers. This angered others in the coalition government who were cut out of the action. Some of Maliki's closest advisers were responsible for the sectarian actions of his government. "The national unity government was a sham."
 &
   Barham Salih, an Iraqi Kurd, was one of the most active and effective secular Iraqi officials. He worked continuously for reconciliation between Sunni and Shia and for the creation of a really united Iraq. He funneled government funds to provinces that had been ignored - especially Sunni provinces - and traveled widely to obtain assistance for Iraq.
 &

Captured computers and interrogation of captured militia leaders confirmed the depth of support received from Iran's al-Quds Force. Iran was the source of the deadly shaped charge explosives and 204mm and 107mm rockets, as well as surface-to-air missiles and rocket propelled grenades.

  U.S. and Iraqi special forces units had launched concerted efforts against Shia militias in 2006. The Iraqi special forces units were the best units in the Iraqi military and worked closely with U.S. advisers and units. Most of the militias were Sadrist. They used a combination of brutality and services to local populations to increase their influence. Using torture and death squads, they were driving Sunnis out of mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad.
 &
  By the summer of 2007, the special forces operations were picking these militia groups apart. Al-Sadr had fled to Iran and the Sadrists had left the coalition government. Captured computers and interrogation of captured militia leaders confirmed the depth of support received from Iran's al-Quds Force. Iran was the source of the deadly shaped charge explosives and 204mm and 107mm rockets, as well as surface-to-air missiles and rocket propelled grenades. Iran was also supplying training in Iran and up to $3 million a month. Hezbollah was acting as an Iranian proxy in this effort. An important Hezbollah leader was captured in the southern city of Basra.

  "The information on Iran's activities drove a wedge between Maliki and Iran, and between Maliki and Sadr. Maliki became far more willing to allow the targeting of [Sadr] special groups, and twenty-one senior [Sadr special group figures] were captured. - - - The aggressive campaign was coupled with an effort to open a dialogue with Sadr moderates -- and in a major departure from its previous policy, the Bush administration decided to begin a dialogue with Iran about Iraq."

  The ultimate outcome of this effort on the Sadrist movement, Robinson notes, remains in doubt.
 &

The political offensive:

  Crocker drew the most experienced and capable foreign service people in the State Department into his staff. He pushed the vital tasks of reconciliation and economic development and local governance.
 &

The second tier leaders realized the seriousness of the situation and were less frozen in established positions. Iraq was on the verge of becoming a failed state.

  The new American embassy compound was soon accommodating a thousand embassy personnel. Several people gave up ambassadorial positions elsewhere to join him.

  "Because the relationships among the top Iraqi officials were so toxic, Crocker and [Arabist Matt] Tueller tried a different gambit. They convened the second tier leaders from the major parties and proposed a series of working groups to discuss each of the core reconciliation issues in depth. The embassy would contribute papers outlining possible solutions or compromises that might break the various logjams."

  The second tier leaders realized the seriousness of the situation and were less frozen in established positions. Iraq was on the verge of becoming a failed state.
 &
  Meanwhile, economic specialist Charlie Ries geared up to make sure U.S. and Iraqi reconstruction funds flowed quickly in areas cleared and secured by surge forces. Electricity, oil, water and agriculture were high priority areas. The effort was closely coordinated with security operations.
 &

Once again, people like Othman, a Palestinian-American - were demonstrating the immense benefits for the U.S. of its openness to immigration and its acceptance of peoples of all ethnic, religious and racial backgrounds.

  The persistent support that Bush (II) gave Maliki from Washington turned out to be very unhelpful. The two held bi-weekly video teleconferences and Bush (II) was too heavily invested politically in the relationship for Crocker and Petreaus to credibly apply pressure on Maliki.

  "By establishing such routine contact, the administration had devalued a major diplomatic tool. Normally, foreign leaders meet with a U.S. president to reach substantive agreements after months of staff work, or to seal a deal their cabinet officials have struck. Bush's routine presidential contact produced no significant breakthrough. Furthermore, the regular videoconferences had become a trap: White House officials were reluctant to stop them because they feared losing influence over Maliki. - - - The administration had gambled the president's prestige on the hope that giving a bear hug to Maliki would empower and embolden him to take the steps the United States wanted. But no one reckoned with the downside if he did not, or could not, respond accordingly."

  All of this frustration was included in the July 15, 2007 report Petraeus delivered to Congress. Progress with ten of the eighteen benchmarks established to judge the situation were "unsatisfactory," including the vital reconciliation benchmarks.

  "The report bluntly stated that sectarian behavior was rife within high levels of government. It found ongoing 'sectarian bias in the appointment of senior military and police commanders' and 'sectarian-based decisions - - - evident through intelligence channels.' It bluntly stated that in the ministry of interior, 'some senior officials responsible for abuse continue to hold positions of responsibility' and that efforts to detain them had been 'inadequate.'"

  Sadi Othman, an American Muslim of Palestinian lineage, was an important senior adviser to Petraeus. He was thoroughly invested in the need for reconciliation between Americans and Muslims and worked tirelessly to generate personal relationships with a wide range of Iraqis. He had a knack for establishing relationships of trust. Once again, people like Othman were demonstrating the immense benefits for the U.S. of its openness to immigration and its acceptance of peoples of all ethnic, religious and racial backgrounds.
 &

The Defense Intelligence Agency had finally gotten its act together and fully staffed Iraq with 400 Middle East specialists. There was also some movement towards moderation in the dominant ISCI political party.

  Unable to make progress on reconciliation from the top, Petraeus decided to do it from the bottom - one area at a time - as areas were cleared and secured.

  "The essential concept was represented by a puzzle diagram in the campaign plan that showed three circles. The first circle represented the near-term goal of localized security via accommodations that would be sought through whatever combination of security, political, economic, and diplomatic operations made sense in a given area. Demobilization, jobs programs, infrastructure repairs, representation on governing councils, and other measures could be brought together in a deal that suited the needs of a province, city, or even neighborhood."

  By the middle of 2009, it was hoped that these localized circles would cover the whole country for "sustainable security." That would be the second circle. The final circle was reconciliation at the national level. This might take a generation or more. Reconciliation elevated the importance of negotiated settlements with adversaries.
 &
  The Defense Intelligence Agency had finally gotten its act together and fully staffed Iraq with 400 Middle East specialists. There was also some movement towards moderation in the dominant ISCI political party.
 &

The surge:

&

 By June 2007, all five surge brigades were finally in place. Operation Phantom Thunder began in the belts around Baghdad and Diyala province to the north. The continuous series of operations kept the insurgents on the run through the summer. Operation Phantom Strike followed pushing further north.
 &

The walls were extensively criticized by Muslim clerics. A large protest was organized and was covered by Iraqi and international media. There were public denunciations from politicians, including Maliki. However, privately, Maliki, the Iraqi military and the neighborhood council all approved the wall.

  Technology now gave U.S. forces possession of the night. By immediately following up on intelligence, entire insurgent and al-Qaeda cells could be rolled up. On one night, 27 al-Qaeda targets were successively captured. The military operations were immediately followed by reconstruction and service unit operations.
 &
  Robinson provides extensive coverage of the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment - the "Blue Spaders" - posted in the middle of 2006 to Adhamiya, one of the most violent Sunni districts in Baghdad. It was home to many Saddam regime officials living in middle class homes. Battles with attacking Shia militias quickly wrecked the infrastructure and extensively damaged the homes. At first, Americans got no help from the inhabitants and suffered numerous casualties.
 &
  In February 2007, the Battalion established a joint security station with Iraqi police and began joint patrols with them. Residents soon began coming to the station with information. A second security station in another neighborhood, however, quickly came under siege from snipers and mortars. The residents were uncooperative, patrols dangerous and counter-insurgency operations usually frustrating. The Battalion pressed their operations, scoring heavily against bomb factories and rounding up many senior al-Qaeda insurgents. There was also an Iraqi battalion, but not as well equipped or trained as the U.S. units.
 &
  Shia militiamen, having chased Sunni residents out of two neighboring districts, began targeting the 1st Battalion district. The district advisory council was targeted and many were killed, but others bravely determined to stay on. They worked on reconstruction and fielded complaints. Construction units began to wall off entire neighborhoods with 12' concrete barriers.
 &
  The walls were extensively criticized by Muslim clerics. A large protest was organized and was covered by Iraqi and international media. There were public denunciations from politicians, including Maliki. However, privately, Maliki, the Iraqi military and the neighborhood council all approved the wall. Residents had been setting up their own makeshift barriers for a long time. Civilian casualties declined dramatically with the completion of the wall. Casualties in neighboring districts declined because Shia fighters were being kept apart. However, it was not enough. Adhamiya was not succumbing to the tactics used elsewhere.

  "Adhamiya was the home of the hard-core Sunni insurgency, and it would not give up so long as it believed the Maliki government was bent on the Sunnis's destruction. Resolution of the conflict there required a national settlement."

Cooped up within the walls, the insurgents turned on the Americans assigned to the area, hitting them with increasingly powerful explosives. The Sunni had been the dominant religious group in Iraq and many would never forgive the U.S. for overthrowing them and permanently empowering the majority Shia. It is not pleasant being a dominated minority in the Middle East.

The Sunni grew tired of the battles raging in their streets, tearing up their infrastructure and preventing reconstruction. Intelligence became more effective at identifying the insurgents, and roundups became increasingly effective.

  The young American soldiers absorbed their losses, internalized their grief, and maintained discipline. They swallowed their frustrations and did not strike out at the Sunni population. Robinson relates the bloody campaign that followed in Adhamiya. Cooped up within the walls, the insurgents turned on the Americans assigned to the area, hitting them with increasingly powerful explosives. The Sunni had been the dominant religious group in Iraq and many would never forgive the U.S. for overthrowing them and permanently empowering the majority Shia. It is not pleasant being a dominated minority in the Middle East.
 &
  However, time was taking its toll on the Sunni, too. They grew tired of the battles raging in their streets, tearing up their infrastructure and preventing reconstruction. (They probably also began to suspect that they would be the losers in a civil war with the Shia.) Intelligence became more effective at identifying the insurgents, and roundups became increasingly effective.
 &
  The Adhamiya battalion saw some of the toughest fighting and suffered some of the highest casualty rates of this phase of the war. In July, they were relieved by the last surge battalions to arrive in Iraq. Charlie Company of 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, had lost two dozen men. "They had worked around the clock, detaining hundreds of high-value targets, hundreds of low-value targets, and [discovered] more weapons caches than they could recall." They were replaced by an entire battalion reinforced by Alpha Company from the 1st Battalion. Alpha Company, too, then took heavy casualties.

  "Nearly every day of their 443-day tour was a combat patrol. Of the battalion's 800 soldiers, 35 had been killed in action and 122 wounded, three times the casualty rate of [the regiment's] previous deployment to Iraq in 2004-2005. It was the highest casualty rate any battalion had suffered since the Vietnam War. Six soldiers had lost one or both legs, and many more suffered lifelong injuries. Thanks to Doc Welchel and the medics, many wounded men had survived, but there were grievous injuries, including ones that would not surface for months. Many traumatic brain injuries caused by bomb blasts were not diagnosed until later."

   The strain of constant combat and the loss of so many men took a heavy psychological toll on these units. Operations officer John Meyer explained:

  "The lesson learned for a small unit is that it all comes down to leadership, discipline, doing the basics well. To get your soldiers to go out the gate is nothing but pure leadership. To get them to do the right thing is pure discipline.  - - - The discipline to come back, clean your weapon, make sure your vehicle is fueled, make sure the ammo is clean, make sure your radio and kit are taken care of, to scan your sectors, to go out there day in and day out."

There were numerous factions and they were as callous with their Sunni adversaries as they were with the Shia and Americans.

  The Sunni insurgents were not a unified group. There were numerous factions and they were as callous with their Sunni adversaries as they were with the Shia and Americans. Eventually solid intelligence began to flow in from disgruntled Sunnis.
 &
  Iraqi units went into several local mosques and uncovered huge weapons caches. The Americans had known the mosques were being used by insurgents but had been forbidden from searching them. The hostile chief Imam fled to Syria and was replaced by a moderate. By August, dozens of Adhamiya men were taking security guard positions to protect the hospital, construction sites and other facilities.
 &

At the end of May, there was a local uprising against al-Qaeda and their allies. About 40% had recently been insurgents and had been targeting Americans but the Americans smoothly shifted into a supporting role with their new allies.

  The conflict in Ameriya, an upscale district where many Saddam functionaries lived, followed a similar course. Ultimately, as elsewhere, al-Qaeda and its allies overplayed their hand.

  "Neither Ameriyans nor the nationalist insurgents had bargained for the harsh measures Al-Qaeda extremists began to impose on the local population, or the degree to which they were willing to target Iraqi civilians to enforce them. The strictures alienated a population that, although Muslim, was modern and western in most of its habits. The Al-Qaeda insurgents started imposing edicts, enforced under threat of violence, that were reminiscent of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan. Women were forbidden to wear brightly colored clothing, and simple pleasures like buying fruit ices from the sidewalk stand were banned. The Al-Qaeda-affiliated insurgents attacked a dozen or more women who were out in Ameriya's streets without hijabs, or headscarves, and burned their faces with acid. They threw boiling water on women whose legs were not covered. The attacks against the population steadily increased. They kidnapped some of the local residents, some for money and some to force into action as suicide bombers. In one case a $65,000 ransom was paid. One man was handcuffed to the steering wheel of an explosives-packed car. The breaking point was reached when two prominent Ameriyans were kidnapped at the end of May and a house was blown up."

  At the end of May, there was a local uprising against al-Qaeda and their allies. About 40% within the uprising had recently been insurgents and had been targeting Americans but the Americans smoothly shifted into a supporting role with their new allies. Many in the uprising militia had been in the Iraqi military and proved to be impressive soldiers. This uprising took considerable courage because al-Qaeda and the remaining insurgents began targeting them. The Iraqis, of course, had better intelligence concerning who their opponents were. Dozens were being killed and rounded up every day, including several top al-Qaeda leaders.
 &
  There was no guarantee that these people would not subsequently turn on the Americans or the Iraqi military units. Collaboration with the Sunni might raise opposition within both the U.S. military and the Iraqi government. However, Gen. Petraeus was quick to support the initiative and authorize its continuation. His neck was on the line, too. In late August, 227 men of the uprising militia became paid members of a local guard force. Each was paid $200 per month.

  "The Sunni had begun to see the Americans as honest brokers in the conflict starting in the latter part of 2006. They were seeking an alliance with the Americans against the extremists on both sides."

Cooperation with American efforts had become the Sunnis best hope for survival and a meaningful future in Iraq. Within a few months, insurgent attacks in Ameriya dropped 90%.

Everything hinged on eventually getting the Iraqi government to accept the Sunni volunteers into the Baghdad police force and to integrate the Sunni of Ameriya with the Shia of Baghdad.

Many Sunni had been alienated by the jihadist groups' rhetoric, strictures, and extreme tactics. They were also afraid of the Shia militia violence that had been unleashed against them in the past two years, and they could see a day coming when the Americans would no longer be there.

  The evolving balance of power in Iraq favored the Shia majority that now controlled the government. Thus, cooperation with American efforts had become the Sunnis best hope for survival and a meaningful future in Iraq. Within a few months, insurgent attacks in Ameriya dropped 90%.
 &
  The Americans shifted to reconstruction. The local advisory council was reconstituted and shops opened for business. Corruption was combated by involving battalion officers in reconstruction project management. It was a success for classic counter-insurgency tactics. However, everything hinged on eventually getting the Iraqi government to accept the Sunni volunteers into the Baghdad police force and to integrate the Sunni of Ameriya with the Shia of Baghdad. Only that could transform this tactical success into a successful strategic end state for Iraq.
 &
  Petraeus moved quickly that summer to replicate the tactics of Ameriya in other Baghdad districts.

  "By the end of August, seven thousand Iraqis had come forward in Baghdad and eight thousand more in the surrounding 'belts' from Yusufiyah to Tarmiya. Iraqis were ready to turn to the Americans as protectors and allies for several reasons. Many had been alienated by the jihadist groups' rhetoric, strictures, and extreme tactics. They were also afraid of the Shia militia violence that had been unleashed against them in the past two years, and they could see a day coming when the Americans would no longer be there. The Americans were now offering them a new option instead of treating them as the enemy."

  As almost always in the last century, the greatest strategic advantage enjoyed by the U.S. has been the character and atrocious conduct of its opponents. It is that that assures that the U.S. will find many allies, some inevitably of extreme importance, even though the U.S. is far from faultless. A few particular incidents of bad conduct by U.S. forces are kept alive in a mindless press, but in no way can be compared to the intentional continuous viciousness of its adversaries.

Petraeus was attempting to be a bridge - moving the Iraqi government and the Sunni volunteers towards acceptance of each other.

  With increasingly reliable intelligence, Petraeus was pounding al-Qaeda and remaining insurgent groups. However, the strategic emphasis was clearly on reconciliation. Petraeus was attempting to be a bridge - moving the Iraqi government and the Sunni volunteers towards acceptance of each other.
 &
  Critics cast doubt on the permanence of reconciliation and asserted Petraeus was just rearming the Sunni for a coming civil war. The various groups had good reason to hate and fear each other. Prime Minister Maliki doubted that the Sunni could be trusted. It was a daunting gamble - but it was the only chance for success available. An extensive process - "Operation Blue Shield" - was implemented to qualify large numbers of Sunni volunteers for police training.

  "The goal was to persuade Iraq's government to accept 12,671 volunteers for police training within six months. Acceptance of a substantial number of volunteers would convince many Sunnis that there was a place for them in the system, and the many safeguards would reassure the government. Thus, the Americans hoped to lessen the paranoia on both sides step by step."

  Lt. Gen. John Campbell was Petraeus point man in this effort. He worked tirelessly month after month bringing top Iraqi officials to visit and accept the volunteers around Baghdad. However ultimately it was Petraeus, in a personal emotional confrontation, who got Maliki to approve the acceptance of the first Sunni volunteer group into the Iraqi police academy. Suspicions remained high, and Americans had to constantly investigate allegations that insurgent attacks had come from armed volunteers.

  "Operation Blue Shield was a perfect example of how change occurred in the country: slowly, with great expenditure of time, effort, and talk, and always with a high possibility of setbacks. It had taken six months to get the first class of volunteers accepted for police training. That inchworm progress would be the standard for measuring the success of operation Blue Shield -- and much else in Iraq."

  It was the Shia sectarians that were the problem in northwest Baghdad. With complicity from the  police and military, they were attacking the Sunni neighborhoods and cleansing the area of the Sunni presence. Naturally there were radical Imams behind the atrocities, and they were untouchable. By September, counterinsurgency tactics had secured the Sunni areas, but they were still being denied basic city services - power, water, sewage, food deliveries. There were common problems in many mixed Baghdad neighborhoods. Elsewhere in Baghdad, "small oases of hope" began to appear as commerce returned to the streets and shops and restaurants reopened. However, Baghdad was still a mess.

  "All over central Baghdad, streets remained littered with the rubble of war, and buildings with bullet holes stood as reminders of the violence that had ravaged the city and might return. Navigating the city was a tortuous affair, with long waits at gas stations and numerous checkpoints and frightening encounters with careening convoys full of armed guards."

It was clear that only the U.S. effort was holding everything together. In one locality after another, young American officers down to the platoon lieutenant level reached out to establish relationships with local Iraqis and began achieving local diplomatic miracles on a regular basis.

  Robinson summarized the substantial but still tenuous progress made in 2007 in each area. Where Iraq police and/or military units were good, they were immediately helpful. However, that was not always the case, and it was clear that only the U.S. effort was holding everything together. In one locality after another, young American officers down to the platoon lieutenant level reached out to establish relationships with local Iraqis and began achieving local diplomatic miracles on a regular basis. In the vast belts around Baghdad, similar operations with similar problems were in progress.
 &
  Even the American officers were surprised at the extent of their accomplishments in the summer of 2007. However, everyone knew that all they had really accomplished was to buy time. The Iraqi government would have to take advantage of the opportunity, or all would ultimately disintegrate again. The increased security, far from complete, had to somehow be translated "into the political deals that would produce lasting peace." It could also be that faction leaders were simply biding their time until the Americans left.
 &

The insurgents and al-Qaeda attempted to dominate the locals in Anbar with their usual ruthless ham-handedness that turned the local sheiks and populace against them.

Iraq could not really become united, but at least their big political parties could learn to live with each other and begin resolving their big political issues.

Even in Fallujah, the locals ultimately preferred the Americans to domination by al-Qaeda, and reconciliation and reconstruction to continued fighting and trashing of their city.

  The process had all begun in Anbar province in 2006. The U.S. had made a hash of things in Anbar and lost it to the insurgents and al-Qaeda, but the latter attempted to dominate the locals with their usual ruthless ham-handedness that turned the local sheiks and populace against them. Col. Sean MacFarland, brigade commander in Ramadi, the provincial capital, provided support during the fierce fighting. The Anbar Awakening chased al-Qaeda out and transformed most insurgents into cooperative volunteers. Reconstruction and reconciliation efforts followed along with reconnection to the central government and the resumption of the flow of resources from the central government to the province.
 &
   This brief summary, of course, doesn't do justice to the difficulties and loss of life involved, but the end result was surprisingly successful. The task was to replicate that success. Iraq could not really become united, but at least their big political parties could learn to live with each other and begin resolving their big political issues.
 &
  Robinson goes at some length into the difficulties experienced in the battered city of Fallujah, but even there, the locals ultimately preferred the Americans to domination by al-Qaeda, and reconciliation and reconstruction to continued fighting and trashing of their city. One of the control measures was the banning of unregistered vehicles from the city. Only registered vehicles and drivers can drive within the city.
 &
  The U.S. forces suffered no casualties in Fallujah in the summer of 2007 and turned over security in Fallujah to Iraqi forces that September. Now it was the local Iraqis and their sheiks whose courage was tested and who suffered from occasional al-Qaeda retaliation. As long as the Americans were there for support, that courage was only reinforced by the al-Qaeda attacks.
 &
  Progress in Baghdad depended crucially on isolating districts that were being secured. Massive concrete walls have been carving up Baghdad in a manner similar to those dividing Israel from the West Bank. The walls permit controlled access and egress. Volunteers hired within them are all fingerprinted, photographed and registered.
 &

Maliki personally went to Karbala and led the Iraqi special operations forces in suppressing the Sadrists in Karbala.

  Ambassador Crocker was the point man on pushing the reconciliation and reconstruction agenda of the central government. The multiple factions in parliament and in the coalition government made progress excruciatingly slow and complex. However, by September 2007, there was draft legislation on the terms for release and reintegration of tens of thousands of detainees and modification of the de-Baathification laws and the laws defining provincial powers. Mechanisms to end the governments paralysis and the terms of a long-term security accord with the U.S. were also taken in hand.
 &
  August was also when Maliki felt he had the forces - and reason - to turn on the Sadrist militia. The Sadrists had launched an attack on the holy city of Karbala while it was packed with pilgrims. There were hundreds of casualties. Maliki personally went to Karbala and led the Iraqi special operations forces in suppressing the Sadrists in Karbala. From his safe haven in Iran, Sadr saw the handwriting on the wall and called on his militias to stand down for six months. Maliki had become a national leader.
 &

The Saudis despised Maliki and feared his Shia government. Perhaps 40% of the suicide bombers were young Saudis who infiltrated through Syria.

Maliki intensely disliked the Iranian regime. They were Persian and he was a proud Arab.

  Robinson also covers the extensive diplomatic efforts involved in the Iraq theater. Crocker and other high level embassy personnel negotiated extensively with officials from all the neighbors -especially Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia. The Saudis despised Maliki and feared his Shia government. Perhaps 40% of the suicide bombers were young Saudis who infiltrated through Syria. They were killing thousands of Iraqis. Maliki intensely disliked the Iranian regime. They were Persian and he was a proud Arab.
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  Nevertheless, Iranian commercial ties with Iraq were extensive and growing. The Iranians continued to deny that they were trying to destabilize Iraq although by now Crocker had solid evidence of their support for Shia and even Sunni insurgents. Both Iran and Syria viewed Iraq as a wonderful opportunity to inflict losses on the U.S.
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  However, the Shia Allawite regime in Syria had reason to be wary of the Sunni fighters flowing through their territory. They had wiped out the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood in Syria a quarter of a century earlier by annihilating the population of Hama - the fourth largest city in Syria -and Sunnis both inside and outside Syria have not forgotten.
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Clinton was running for president and was being wrong-footed about the war for a second time - having supported the military operation in the beginning when it fell short and now opposing it when it had chances for success.

  The next report to Congress came in September. Robinson goes into some detail about the opposition in the military and the mainstream press and among democratic legislators, particularly Barbara Boxer and Hillary Clinton.
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  Clinton was running for president and was being wrong-footed about the war for a second time - having supported the military operation in the beginning when it fell short and now opposing it when it had chances for success. There were many generals who had become personally identified with opposition to the effort in Iraq and now continued that opposition. Ad hominem attacks against Petraeus circulated in the media.
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  More important was the real concern about military overstretch and impact on readiness to meet other challenges. However, Bush (II) was the boss, and he was clearly committed to achieving success. He backed Petraeus and Crocker.
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  Petraeus and Crocker told it like it was. The progress - political and military and with civil security - was real but limited and tentative. Most of it had begun to appear just in August. The surge forces could be withdrawn in the next six months, but a timetable for subsequent drawdowns would not be forthcoming until March 2008. The events in August had come just in time to support continuation of the mission. The alternatives being proposed ranged from clearly inadequate to catastrophic.

  "The basic question facing the United States was whether it could assist Iraq in finding a political solution that would permit a more substantial drawdown and, if so, what type of military and other resources had to be devoted to that end. In the hearings both Petraeus and Crocker had framed the fight as a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. 'This competition will take place,' Petraeus said, 'and its resolution is key to producing long-term stability in the new Iraq.' Crocker agreed, saying, 'It is the balance of power that has yet to be sorted out.' But, as Republican Lugar of Indiana had observed, a strategy for doing so was still wanting."

Drawdown:

   The drawdown of the surge forces was a complex process. Remaining forces would have to expand their territory and rely more heavily on Iraqi military and police units.
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Volunteers were soon forthcoming to provide intelligence and neighborhood security. The populace was photographed and identified and the volunteers and their weapons were include in a registry. 5,000 of the volunteers were accepted for police training with more to come - a significant reconciliation objective. 

Iraqi sheiks and other leaders, at great personal risk, felt emboldened by the surge to begin reconstructing civil life in their neighborhoods.

  Creating an army and police force from scratch is incredibly complex since it takes years to train officers at all levels and give them experience. However, by now, thousands of trained soldiers and hundreds of trained officer from Saddam's army had been accepted back into service, and an increasing number if Iraqi units were climbing the readiness ladder.
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  Successful clear and hold operations were conducted in Ninewa province and especially in southern Baghdad where some of the heaviest fighting and highest casualty rates occurred. Finding sheiks to cooperate, reconstruction of infrastructure and assisting in the restoration of street commerce were all essential to the success of the military effort. Volunteers were soon forthcoming to provide intelligence and neighborhood security. The populace was photographed and identified and the volunteers and their weapons were included in a registry. 5,000 of the volunteers were accepted for police training with more to come - a significant reconciliation objective. Now it was time for the Iraqi government to extend regular city services into the area.
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  In one southern district, after some hard fighting and the shredding of the Sadrist leadership, written agreements were successfully negotiated with many of the local Sadrist factions setting forth terms for a cease fire and reconciliation and reconstruction efforts. Throughout Baghdad, neighborhoods were spontaneously coming back to life as security increased. Iraqi sheiks and other leaders, at great personal risk, felt emboldened by the surge to begin reconstructing civil life in their neighborhoods.
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  However, deep distrust remained between Shia and Sunni and especially between Sunni and Iraq's government. Once the Americans left, it was feared everything would come apart.
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Petraeus command was expending significant resources investigating atrocity rumors, most of which - but not all - proved false. Petreaus had to keep pushing the Iraq bureaucracy, but thousands of volunteers were being accepted for police training and other thousands were being offered vocational training.

"The  much-criticized concrete walls around markets, neighborhoods, and key routes, additional checkpoints and X-ray machines, curfews, temporary vehicle bans, and dramatically increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles and sensors all helped separate the fighters from the civilians, catch the former, and protect the later. Technology helped, but just as effective were the soldiers who simply took a notebook computer full of photographs around  the neighborhood to learn who was whom."

  By the end of 2007, there were 73,000 volunteers on the U.S. Army payroll. There were those in the Iraqi government who feared these men. They slowed the pace at which the volunteers were taken into the police force. Three-fourths of the volunteers were Sunni. Petraeus' command was expending significant resources investigating atrocity rumors, most of which - but not all - proved false. Petreaus had to keep pushing the Iraq bureaucracy, but thousands of volunteers were being accepted for police training and other thousands were being offered vocational training.

  "Sunni neighborhoods wanted policemen they knew and trusted to secure them. And former insurgents had to be dissuaded in one way or another from resuming armed opposition to the government. Otherwise Iraq's 'bottom-up' peace would certainly unravel."

  Iraqi and U.S. forces were increasingly dispersed among the people, providing security and engaging in local political efforts to achieve reconciliation with those who were reconcilable and with fence sitters.

  "These were inherently political activities that produced political effects that Petraeus massed rapidly to pressure the Iraqi government to in turn take political action that would affect the war's strategic level. The emphasis on the political line of operations at all echelons stood in stark contrast to past practices, which mostly consisted of sitting at the local advisory council meeting for a long hot afternoon of debate. Petraeus waded into politics as no general before him had done and directed his troops to do the same."

  Military tactics concentrated on identification and control.

  "The biometric registry of military-age males and household surveys on a wide scale, using automated systems, allowed for the creation of reliable, shared databases. For the first time in the war, the U.S. military began to develop a comprehensive picture of the human environment that was the battlefield: positive identification of the enemy, the ethnographic composition of the population, and the status of services in a given area. The  much-criticized concrete walls around markets, neighborhoods, and key routes, additional checkpoints and X-ray machines, curfews, temporary vehicle bans, and dramatically increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles and sensors all helped separate the fighters from the civilians, catch the former, and protect the latter. Technology helped, but just as effective were the soldiers who simply took a notebook computer full of photographs around  the neighborhood to learn who was whom. The most precious commodity was the intelligence that came from the population and the volunteers as they began to trust the Americans who lived among them instead of kicking down their doors and leaving."

  Soldiers at all levels joined in the political effort.

  "Troops were employed in Iraq in an unprecedented capacity as neighborhood diplomats. Battalion and company commanders rose to the challenge with extraordinary skill and intuition, aided by civilian advisers, intelligence officials, and retired trainers."

Better intelligence was the key to accurate targeting of al-Qaeda and insurgent groups. Staying in cleared areas to provide security prevented the return of these groups. However now, the Iraqi government had to use the opportunity to implement a national reconciliation program.

  Maliki was increasingly directing Iraqi forces against Sadrist elements. Efforts in Basra, an important southern city, began poorly but ended well (Later efforts in East Baghdad came after the period covered by this book.)
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  Better intelligence was the key to accurate targeting of al-Qaeda and insurgent groups. Staying in cleared areas to provide security prevented the return of these groups. However now, the Iraqi government had to use the opportunity to implement a national reconciliation program. Robinson goes at some length into the Byzantine Iraqi politics and persistent American efforts that finally got reconciliation legislation passed in early 2008. The sweeping Baath Party purge was reversed and a provincial powers bill was passed along with the 2008 budget and an amnesty bill. Fortunately, the dominant Shia majority was sufficiently fractured at all political levels by its various factions that there were real prospects for cross-sectarian alliances in the Iraqi political process. The Sunni and Kurdish minorities, of course, had their own factional divisions as well. 
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  Real but slow progress was being made by the Iraqi military as 2008 began. However, Shia sectarian influences continued to prevail in key police units that committed widespread atrocities.
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  Petraeus now turned north to sweep al-Qaeda out of its last safe havens in Iraq. He found the Sunni population fed up with al-Qaeda insurgents and ready to cooperate. Great progress was being made at spreading security across Iraq, but the political situation remained murky and fragile.

  "Petraeus and Crocker's main achievement was that they identified the right goals -- political accommodation among Iraqis -- and then bent all their efforts to that task. They forged the first true political-military strategy of the war and implemented it at the campaign level. Counterinsurgency principles, which are fundamentally about the political nature of war, had previously been applied primarily at the tactical level."

Continued U.S. influence will be needed.

  The political changes that Iraq needs if it is to achieve internal stability are summarized by Robinson. Her opinion is that the Iraqis are too faction-ridden to achieve the needed compromises and accommodation on their own. Continued U.S. influence will be needed. Most critical is the need to bring Sunni volunteers - "the Sons of Iraq" - into the police forces and find jobs for the rest. Iraqis - understandably  - feel more comfortable with local residents in charge of neighborhood security. A professional non-sectarian military and progress at reconstruction and development are also essential. Sectarian agendas must be discouraged.
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  Over time, Iraq is becoming increasingly independent. However, the U.S. retains significant leverage with which to influence events. These include:

  "[Ensuring] the personal security and safety of the leaders and their homes in the Green Zone; conducting counterterrorism raids against insurgents; providing vital combat enablers including air support, surveillance and intelligence, and medical evacuation; training and advising Iraqi security forces; supplying U.S. military equipment under the foreign military sales program; and helping defend Iraq and its borders against foreign aggression."

 Provincial and national elections are vital to broaden representation and increase the legitimacy of the Iraqi government. A more open electoral process will be vital.

  "Many Shia are disgusted with the incompetence, corruption, and sectarianism of the current government. The Shia population is not a monolith, as facile analyses from afar have suggested, and it is not clear that a majority of the Shia prefer an Islamist government, or at least one that imposes strict islamic practices and alienates or excludes non-Shia constituencies."

Political solutions and civil development are essential elements of these conflicts.

  Reorganization of the U.S. military to deal with low intensity wars and development of capacity in the State Department and other civilian agencies to support such efforts is essential. Political solutions and civil development are essential elements of these conflicts. Robinson offers a wide array of recommendations -- without revealing how many of them come from Petraeus, Crocker and other officials.

  "The Iraq war was a folly as egregious as Vietnam. But it was a war with far higher stakes, and the consequences of defeat would reverberate throughout the Middle East. Petraeus gave Iraq a chance to climb out of its civil war and America a chance to redeem itself for the errors it made there. The next president can seize that chance to bring the country together after this bitter experience. The opportunity should not be squandered."

  The U.S. has considerable experience with nation-building efforts, many of which have failed. This experience indicates that, unless substantial military and political influence is retained, the odds are that Iraqi politics will turn chaotic, popular support will decline, and some officer will use the army to take control of the nation. See, Boot, "The Savage Wars of Peace,"
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  Where the U.S. has been successful, as in Germany, Japan and Korea, it retains significant diplomatic influence and substantial military force to this day. FUTURECASTS has frequently used 80 years as a rule of thumb for the minimum duration of such efforts measured from the end of hostilities. That was one lesson, most dramatically, of events in Yugoslavia. Not until everyone over five years of age during the period of conflict is dead or in his dotage, and generations have engaged in peaceful commerce and their young have found each other and intermarried, can a fractured state like Iraq become a unified nation. Unfortunately, that clock has not yet begun to run.