Small wars abroad

Barbary Pirates

Trade & commercial fishing

Beginnings of empire

Boxer Rebellion

Philippine Insurrection

Banana wars

Pancho Villa

Russian Revolution

Augusto Sandino

China before WW-II

"Small Wars Manual"

Vietnam

Current small wars strategy

A martial nation:

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  Boot "tries to relate the past to the problems confronting the United States today." Although somewhat gung-ho in his presentation, he is largely successful in achieving this objective.
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  Not covered are the major conflicts - the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Civil War, WW-I and WW-II - as well as lesser conflicts against organized armies such as the Mexican War - the Spanish American War - the Korean War - and the first Gulf War. The numerous conflicts of the Indian Wars within the continental territory of the U.S. are also not covered.
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While there will certainly be many unique aspects to this new conflict, there will also undoubtedly be many similarities with small war conflicts of the past.

  The history of the nation's many small wars and military engagements abroad is essential context for any understanding of the nature of the current War on Terrorism. For, while there will certainly be many unique aspects to this new conflict, there will also undoubtedly be many similarities with small war conflicts of the past.

  The differences are important - indeed, vital. For example, there is an exponential increase in human and financial cost involved for the United States now that the British Empire is gone and the Royal Navy no longer rules the waves.

• Now, the United States is essentially the only nation bearing the costs for any substantial and active small war military engagements in a worldwide theater. Allies like Great Britain can be of important assistance, but the great bulk of the burden ultimately falls on the United States.

• Problems and costs also increase exponentially when any particular small wars cannot be isolated from the outside influences of states    or private groups that for various reasons may engage in stirring the pot. Until Vietnam, the United States was always able to avoid such small war situations - and Boot's view of Vietnam as essentially a small war situation is dubious at best.

• Now, the ruthless strategy and tactics used successfully against population segments that supported insurgencies are no long countenanced - making the military suppression of such insurgencies far more difficult.

  The author grossly overestimates the very real limits of the ability of the United States to bear such human and financial costs for small war purposes.

"[Most] of these campaigns were fought by a relatively small number of professional soldiers pursuing limited objectives with limited means."

  In "The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power," Max Boot introduces readers to the long tradition of U.S. military "small war" engagements abroad.

  "Between 1800 and 1934, U.S. Marines staged 180 landings abroad. The army and navy added a few small-scale engagements of their own. Some of these excursions resulted in heavy casualties; others involved almost no fighting. Some were concluded in a day or two; others dragged on for decades. Some were successful, others not. But most of these campaigns were fought by a relatively small number of professional soldiers pursuing limited objectives with limited means. - - - [As author Bob Shacochis has said of such conflicts,] 'there are no friends and no enemies, no front or rear, no victories and, likewise, no defeat, and no true endings.'"

There have in fact been only 5 declarations of war in the nation's history.

Imposing an artificial exit deadline is a certain prescription for defeat, since adversaries will simply await till the deadline passes.

"Soldiers have also often acted as colonial administrators -- in the Philippines, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Veracruz, to say nothing of post-World War II Germany and Japan or the post-Civil War South."

"If ground forces win a battle and go home, as the Powell Doctrine advocates, and as actually happened in the [first] Gulf War, the fruits of victory are likely to wither on the vine."

"Although American imperial rule was subject to its share of abuses, U.S. administrators, whether civilian or military, often provided the most honest and efficient government these territories had ever seen."

Democratic institutions and physical infrastructure - roads, hospitals, telephone systems - quickly crumbled upon the exit of U.S. forces from a multitude of locations.

  Misconceptions and ideological myths cloud understanding of these engagements. Boot clears up some of the most blatant.

• Conflicts fought without a declaration of war are not a modern transgression of Constitutional requirements. Boot emphasizes that there have in fact been only 5 declarations of war in the nation's history.

  "All the wars chronicled in this book were undeclared, starting with the Tripolitan War, when Thomas Jefferson initially sent a naval squadron to the Mediterranean without bothering to ask for congressional approval." (Boot elsewhere relates that Congress did declared war against Algiers in 1815.) 

  However, Congress has other ways of approving such engagements - as it ultimately did in the Tripolitan War. Arguably, every time Congress appropriates funds for an imminent or ongoing conflict, it is giving its consent. As Boot points out, it can always bring such engagements to a halt by cutting off funds or threatening to cut off funds. On several occasions, that is precisely what it did.

• Engagements fought without an exit strategy are also nothing new. "The U.S. military stayed continuously in Haiti for 19 years, in Nicaragua for 23 years, in the Philippines for 44 years, in China for almost 100 years." They remain in Germany, Italy, Japan and South Korea more than half a century after their initial arrival - with no exit in sight.

  Most important, Boot emphasizes that imposing an artificial exit deadline is a certain prescription for defeat, since adversaries will simply await till the deadline passes. (The advocacy of such deadlines is a transparent tactic advocated by those who seek the failure of U.S. military efforts.)

• Engagements fought with limited objectives, limited resources, and limited public commitment are also nothing new. None of the small wars prior to WW-II involved the commitment of overwhelming force. There were no massive mobilizations, and only small numbers of professional soldiers were committed. The largest of them - dealing with the insurrections in the sprawling Philippine Archipelago - never involved more than 70,000 soldiers, all of whom were volunteers.

• U.S. soldiers invariably act as "social workers" whenever they are ordered to remain in control for any length of time. Moreover, they have almost invariably done an excellent job at it - providing the best governance ever enjoyed by the people of several Caribbean and Central American states.

  "Throughout U.S. history, marines at home and abroad have found themselves providing disaster relief, quelling riots, even guarding mail trains. Soldiers also have often acted as colonial administrators -- in the Philippines, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Veracruz, to say nothing of post-World War II Germany and Japan or the post-Civil War South.
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  "In fact occupation duty is generally necessary after a big war in order to impose the victor's will on the vanquished. If ground forces win a battle and go home, as the Powell Doctrine advocates, and as actually happened in the [first] Gulf War, the fruits of victory are likely to wither on the vine. Only boots on the ground can guarantee a lasting peace."

  The author further points out:

  "Although American imperial rule was subject to its share of abuses, U.S. administrators, whether civilian or military, often provided the most honest and efficient government these territories had ever seen."

  However, long term efforts were required for any lasting administrative success. Only in Germany and Japan after WW-II were democratic institutions firmly established. (Moreover, these nations had had some prior if unsuccessful experience with democratic systems - and needed U.S. military protection from communist neighbors.) The long term commitment in the Philippines also now seems to be paying off. On the other hand, democratic institutions and physical infrastructure - roads, hospitals, telephone systems - quickly crumbled upon the exit of U.S. forces from a multitude of other locations.

  "This should be no surprise; it has been true whenever technologically advanced imperialists leave a less sophisticated area, whether it was the Romans pulling out of Britain or the British pulling out of India. Veracruz provides a vivid illustration of this phenomenon. The U.S. Army cleaned up the city and reduced the death rate from infectious diseases. - - - But as soon as the army left, the residents resumed throwing garbage into the streets and back came the vultures."

  As for the quick failure of democratic institutions, as Boot points out, short-term occupations "are unlikely to fundamentally alter the nature of a society." These peoples could be given republican government, but they were incapable of keeping it.

Kosovo was not some great departure in U.S. foreign policy. Among other things, Boot's book is "a record of U.S. involvement in the internal affairs of other states, from Samoa to Nicaragua to China."

Military experiences in Mexico and during the Banana Wars proved invaluable on the battlefields of WW-I and in the Pacific in WW-II.

• However, criticism that the U.S. intentionally installed the dictators - such as Duvalier and Samosa - who subsequently grabbed control is clearly false, Boot emphasizes. "But it is true that the marines could not create institutions strong enough to prevent their being usurped by a Duvalier or Somoza in the absence of American intervention."

  The U.S. will probably have to retain some significant presence in Afghanistan and Iraq for decades to come to prevent military coups that use the indigenous forces currently being developed. The governments of these states will certainly prefer being guarded by U.S. Navy Seals or Marines or Army Special Forces rather than indigenous units that might be infiltrated by Taliban or Baathists or al Qaeda.

  Nevertheless, short term interventions frequently ended chaotic - sometimes murderous - conditions and gave these "Banana Republics" a period of good governance and an initial experience with democratic elections that may ultimately prove of more lasting influence.

• Considerations of sovereignty have not deterred the U.S. from intervening in the internal affairs of other nations. Kosovo was not some great departure in U.S. foreign policy. Among other things, Boot's book is "a record of U.S. involvement in the internal affairs of other states, from Samoa to Nicaragua to China."

• There were no "vital national interests" involved in most of these engagements, as that concept is currently narrowly defined by realpolitikers and isolationists. Of course, Boot notes, "it all depends on how one defines 'national interests.'"

  For example, U.S. trade with China never amounted to more than 4% of total U.S. trade during the almost 100 years of U.S. military involvement in China. It was primarily missionary interests that kept the tiny U.S. military presence in China. Almost all of the "Banana Wars" fought in Central America and the Caribbean took place in states where the U.S. economic interests were comparatively minuscule. There was concern with keeping European powers out and away from the sea lanes leading to the Panama Canal, but Boot emphasizes that almost always, there was a strong moral component to these engagements.

  For propaganda purposes, military efforts to safeguard national interests are almost always cloaked in moral overtones. What is clear is that - without national interests at stake - the people of the U.S. will rightfully refuse to sustain any military efforts that incur substantial costs in money or lives.

• Popular unconcern was more prevalent than support in most of the small war engagements that Boot chronicles.

  "When small wars aroused any notice back home, it was usually due to opposition mobilizing -- particularly notable in the case of the Philippine War, the 1918 deployment to Russia, the occupation of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and the Sandinista war in Nicaragua. But small numbers of professional soldiers were able to function well far from home even in the face of domestic sniping."

• U.S. troops have served under foreign command - under British command - in Samoa (1899) and north Russia (1918-1919). The real question is whether that command is competent. The failure of international forces to accept a unified command can result in costly disorganization - as during the march to Peking in 1900.

  Today, it is not Britain but the U.S. that is the superpower providing the bulk of resources for actively engaged international forces. It is thus the U.S. that provides the command structure in these instances. The alternative of a United Nations force not under U.S. command is completely unacceptable except for peacekeeping forces in inactive theaters. By its very nature, the United Nations is an unreliable vehicle for active military operations.

• Military readiness has not been undermined by small war and peace keeping engagements. The U.S. Marines don't have any trouble filling their ranks. Military experiences in Mexico and during the Banana Wars proved invaluable on the battlefields of WW-I and in the Pacific in WW-II.

  However, recruiting for and readiness of regular army units and national guard units -especially for needed specialty skills - are currently suffering from mission overstretch.

"Small wars:"

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  "Small war" is a literal translation of the Spanish word "guerilla." This refers to the tactics used, not the scale of the conflict. In many ways, according to Boot, Vietnam thus qualifies - and he thus includes extensive coverage of that conflict. He notes four primary purposes - sometimes individually and sometimes in combination - that have led the U.S. into such conflicts.

1. "Punitive - to punish attacks on American citizens or property."

2. "Protective - to safeguard American citizens or property."

3. "Pacification - to occupy foreign territory."

4. "Profiteering - to grab trade or territorial concessions."

  Vietnam was fought for big war purposes as a part of the Cold War. Actually, it was fought primarily because the Johnson administration did not want to spend the political capital to avoid it and accept the loss of South Vietnam. See, Lobel, "Presidential Judgment," segment by Francis M. Bator on Pres. Lyndon Johnson. The price for such political cowardice was huge - and in some ways is still being paid out today.

  For purposes of analysis, Boot divides these wars into three distinct periods:

1. The period of increasing commercial power, through the 1890s;

2. The Great Power period from the end of the 1890s to Pearl Harbor.

3. The Superpower period from Pearl Harbor to the present.

• In the 19th century, enterprising U.S. whalers and merchants sent whaling ships and fast clipper ships across the world's oceans. Although small in size, the U.S. Navy was thus provided with many causes for action. They avenged transgressions and insults, opened markets, and assisted the British Navy in defending the freedom of the seas and eliminating the commerce in slaves.

• In the first four decades of the twentieth century, the U.S. had its short fling as an imperial power, established itself as the hegemon of the Caribbean and Central America, and found itself militarily involved in China - then as now an alluringly vast market of seemingly limitless commercial potential.

• After Pearl Harbor, the U.S. military was engaged primarily with fighting and deterring major conflicts. However, in Vietnam, the U.S. faced a "small war" problem, according to Boot, and tragically chose a big war strategy that was unsuited to the conflict.

The possibility of a major conflict with a growing China or a resurgent Russia lies well into the future. Until then, the author points out, it is small wars that will occupy the U.S. military.

  The U.S. has many tools for dealing with the world - diplomatic, cultural, economic, etc. However, "when all else fails the use of force cannot be ruled out." The possibility of a major conflict with a growing China or a resurgent Russia lies well into the future. Until then, the author points out, it is small wars that will occupy the U.S. military.

  "If you want to see what lies in store for the armed forces in the future, you could do worse than to cast your gaze back to the past."

The Barbary Wars (1801-1805, 1815):

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As would become usual prior to any actual hostilities, Congress was determined not to spend on a military establishment.

The U.S. Navy was created "to fight a small undeclared war halfway around the world."

  The Barbary pirates worked like privateers operating out of the Barbary states of Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. These states were tributaries of the Ottoman Empire, which was by then so weak that these states were actually independent. Unlike Western privateers, the Barbary versions worked at the trade full time as a money making venture rather than just occasionally as participants in some national conflict. They targeted all shipping, not just the shipping of a particular adversary. They were thus really a part of pirate states, and their corsairs had been harassing shipping in the Mediterranean for centuries.
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  The European states preferred to pay off the Barbary states - ransoming their hostages and purchasing "pass ports" for their merchant ships. The thirteen colonies had a thriving Mediterranean trade under the English tribute and the protection of the Royal Navy - until the Revolution.
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  Soon, American merchant ships were being captured and scores of seamen were being held as slaves in Algiers. Horror stories of the conditions of these men inflamed public opinion. As would become usual prior to any actual hostilities, Congress was determined not to spend on a military establishment.
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  The U.S. was thus totally unprepared when the seizure of U.S. merchant ships by Algiers drove insurance rates unbearably high and forced the matter to a head. March 27, 1794, was the birthday of the U.S. Navy. On that day, Pres. George Washington signed Congressional authorization - passed by "the narrowest of margins" - for the construction of six warships. It was created, Boot emphasizes, "to fight a small undeclared war halfway around the world."
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  These were not "ships of the line" - the battleships of the day. However, they were the most advanced, powerful, fastest frigates in the world. Three were to carry 44 guns, three 36 guns. Construction was carefully allocated to shipyards in many different states - establishing a practice that would continue to this day to assure broad support for the government's major construction programs.
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  However, diplomacy had its day. The U.S. began making sizable tributary payments to Algiers and Tripoli and ransomed the 88 of 119 surviving seamen. Congress stopped construction of three of the ships, but let the other three continue.

  "Alas, this policy of appeasement, far from sating the demands of the North African rulers, only whetted their appetite for more."

  The demands for tribute increased, and other insults multiplied. The public was incensed. Pres. Jefferson reluctantly decided it was time to fight.
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  Due to a quasi-war at sea against France between 1798 and 1800 arising out of the early stages of the Napoleonic Wars, the Navy had grown to respectable size during the administration of Pres. John Adams. However, Jefferson opposed any large oceangoing Navy. He had immediately trimmed it back to just six  frigates and a bunch of small gunboats suitable only for coastal defense (and actually worthless for that purpose, too).
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  Jefferson did not deign to call Congress into session for a declaration of war. Instead, in 1801, he dispatched a small fleet - the frigates President (44), Philadelphia (36), and Essex (32), and the sloop Enterprise (12) - to safeguard merchant shipping in the Mediterranean and "chastise" any insolence offered by the Barbary states. Even before the ships arrived, a more than suitable "insolence" had occurred. Tripoli was put under blockade in July.
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  In August, the Enterprise won a naval victory against the sloop Tripoli (14) after a lengthy battle that demonstrated the superior gunnery and seamanship of the Americans. After hours of combat, the Tripoli finally surrendered. It was a battered hulk, its crew decimated. There were no injuries aboard the Enterprise.
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  When Congress convened, it refused to issue a declaration of war - "just as it had refused to vote one during the quasi-war with France." (Formal declarations of war can have terrible diplomatic consequences, and so are generally avoided.) Instead, it authorized "all necessary force to protect American shipping overseas." This was in effect carte blanche.
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  The blockade achieved some minor successes due to dashing exploits of junior officers, but the two initial commanders of the fleet proved ineffective. After two years, Jefferson had achieved nothing. He then turned to Commodore Edward Preble, a hard driving martinet. Prebble, in turn, chose young energetic Captains - David Porter, William Bainbridge, Stephen Decatur, Isaac Hull, James Lawrence, William Biddle - many of whom would win notable victories in the War of 1812. He sailed with the frigates Constitution (44), the Philadelphia, three 12 gun schooners and two 16 gun brigs.
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  Preble acted with resoluteness. Refusing to remove his sword or kneel to the Emperor of Morocco, he threatened to blow the fortress, castles and city apart if suitable arrangements could not be reached. Diplomacy quickly triumphed, and one problem was solved.
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  Then, disaster struck. The Philadelphia - while alone on the Tripoli blockade - ran aground on an uncharted reef and was soon captured by a swarm of gunboats. 307 officers and men were hostages of the pasha. The Philadelphia was salvaged and made ready for use by its new owners. Within 4 months, Preble had dispatched Decatur on his daring raid to destroy the captured frigate.
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  Preble aggressively bombarded Tripoli and attacked its ships, but the city was more like a fortress and couldn't be cowed. He was relieved of command by Samuel Barron who now had a respectable twelve ship fleet, with five frigates. Barron was content to just maintain the blockade.
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"The only thing more dangerous than being America's enemy, it is sometimes said, is being its friend."

  However, the U.S. Marines - seven of them - would storm "the shores of Tripoli," with a motley army of about 600 Bedouins and other Arabs and Christian mercenaries. A remarkable character, William Eaton, led this incredible expedition 500 miles across the desert from Alexandria, Egypt, to storm and take Derna, Tripoli's second city. Eaton was a true war dog - capable of remarkable martial feats - an absolutely essential national asset during times of conflict - but totally out of place during times of peace. Boot describes the action.

  "The attack took place on April 27, 1804, with three newly arrived U.S. warships firing broadsides into Derna's fort. Eaton was wounded in the battle but managed to drive off the defenders. At 3:30 P.M., the Stars and Stripes was hoisted for the first time in North Africa, or indeed in any part of the Old World."

  A relieving army of 3,000 men arrived eleven days later but was beaten off. Suddenly, the pasha was anxious to accept a previously spurned $60,000 ransom for the crew of the Philadelphia, and diplomacy triumphed once again. He had been demanding $1.69 million. Eaton - to his consternation - was withdrawn from Derna - abandoning his allies in the process.

  "Eaton raged, 'Our too credulous ally is sacrificed to a policy, at the recollection of which, honor recoils, and humanity bleeds.' It would not be the last time the U.S. would be charged with selling out putative allies, whether the Hungarians in 1956 or Kurds in 1992. The only thing more dangerous than being America's enemy, it is sometimes said, is being its friend." (A whole host of allies would be abandoned in Indochina in the 1970s.)

  Commodore Barron was replaced by Captain John Rodgers who took his fleet - now 16 warships - into Tunis to give the bey an offer he couldn't refuse. Diplomacy triumphed yet again, and peace and a trade agreement were quickly agreed upon.

  "[The bey] even sent an ambassador to Washington, where the diplomat was lavishly entertained, including government-provided prostitutes that Secretary of State James Madison drolly justified as 'appropriations for foreign intercourse.'"

Nations of free men can produce excellent, resilient, bold warriors capable of great initiative and innovative tactics.

  The War of 1812 then intervened, and the ships and captains who distinguished themselves in the Barbary Wars initially distinguished themselves against the far more  formidable British Royal Navy. Algiers sided with the British, and seized several U.S. merchantmen. When the War of 1812 ended, it was time for a reckoning.
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  This time, Congress declared war against Algiers. Two fleets - one under Decatur and one under Bainbridge - were dispatched.
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  Decatur again was a whirlwind of action. He captured a 46 gun Algerian frigate and a brig, sailed into Algiers harbor, and made an offer the bey couldn't refuse. Not only did he gain release of hostages and an end to the tribute the U.S. had paid since 1796, but he received $10,000 compensation from the bey for the troubles caused. This performance was repeated in Tunis and Tripoli, and the Barbary Wars were over.
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  Repeatedly during the Barbary Wars, the U.S. forces  won ridiculously lopsided victories even when out-manned and out-gunned. The U.S. Navy demonstrated a clear superiority in martial skills and gunnery. It was proving that nations of free men could produce excellent, resilient, bold warriors capable of great initiative and innovative tactics. Boot sums up:

  "During the Barbary Wars, 35 American sailors and marines had been killed in action; 64 were wounded. There was also the pecuniary cost: Just between 1802 and 1806 the U.S. had spent $3 million fighting Tripoli. As Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin had suggested at the time, it would have been cheaper, at least in the short term, simply to pay off the North African states. But the naval operations had established an important principle -- freedom of the seas -- and helped end for all time the threat to commercial shipping from the corsairs."

  In those days, active military units generally suffered far more casualties from disease and accidents than from actual combat. Boot does not provide those figures - which were nevertheless a real cost of military conflict.

  "Though Decatur died young [at 41, in a duel], he left an enduring legacy -- and not only in the 20 towns named after him. With Decatur and a handful of others in the lead, the United States had taken its first uncertain steps toward becoming the world's policeman, the protector of commercial shipping, and upholder of international laws against piracy and other transgressions. In the nineteenth century, America could be no more than a junior partner to the Royal Navy, but the seeds of American power had been sown.

In the footsteps of the Royal Navy:

The U.S. would take care of its own interests, but without getting sucked into entangling alliances with European powers.

"[Such officers] were constantly dispatched by the navy to the far corners of the globe to deal with chaotic situations in politically unstable lands populated by people with little understanding of Western notions such as private property and contracts."

  However, it was definitely never "isolationist," Boot emphasizes. The U.S. would take care of its own interests, but without getting sucked into entangling alliances with European powers. And its interests were always worldwide, as its enterprising merchant and whaling captains sought trade and profit wherever they could find it.
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  In their wake followed the U.S. Navy, with its small  contingents of marines. There were never more than 3,000 marines during those times, except during the Civil War. They were used mainly to ensure discipline aboard ship. Sailors made up the bulk of landing parties. This small navy, often operating for years at sea without contact with Washington, had a leadership tradition suitable for the task.

  "Like their cousins in the Royal Navy, many of whose traditions they appropriated, they were largely recruited from the upper -- and upper-middle classes -- only about 1 percent rose from the ranks --; usually lacked formal education, at least until the establishment of the Naval Academy in 1845; trained at sea from boyhood; sometimes acquired a fair amount of riches through prize money; and often married 'well' -- that is, to wealthy women. The navy inculcated in its officers such putatively un-American traits as obedience and reverence for tradition, as well as more common Yankee virtues such as boldness and pluck. The results were not to the liking of some of their more egalitarian countrymen."

  For the ordinary seamen, life was rough, discipline was severe - flogging was not outlawed until 1850 - drinking, gambling and whoring were the primary diversions.

  "The jack-tars were for the most part uneducated and impoverished, the dregs of the waterfront, many of them sailors who could not find civilian births. More than half were foreign-born and most of those were not U.S. citizens. Roughly 14 to 18 percent were black freemen - - -."

Boot describes the typical course of events.

  "Yankees arrive with the best of intentions, but soon find themselves sucked into the vortex of war. During the nineteenth century this pattern would repeat itself, from the Falklands to Formosa, from Sumatra to Samoa, from China to Chile. After killing some natives, the Americans seldom stayed long; nor did they  usually involve themselves much in local politics. What did they achieve? Sometimes a trade treaty; at other times, simply the satisfaction of having instilled fear of the Stars and Stripes.
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  "The U.S. strategy, if that is the right word for such a haphazard enterprise, might best be characterized as 'butcher and bolt' -- a bit of slang popular in Britain's Indian Army to describe punitive expeditions against troublemaking tribes, expeditions designed not to occupy territory but to 'learn them a lesson.'"

  Typical was the experience of Capt. Porter in the Essex during the War of 1812. Coming ashore in the Marquesas in the South Pacific in 1813 to refit, he unavoidably became embroiled in native conflicts that he had to win to complete the refurbishing of his ship.
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  The author sums up the 19th century navy and its mission:

  "To simplify somewhat, the nineteenth-century navy may be described as aristocratic officers spoiling for a fight, leading equally combative, often tipsy enlisted men who were on the fringes of society and, to get to the essence of the matter, would not be missed overmuch if a few died in action. Such men were constantly dispatched by the navy to the far corners of the globe to deal with chaotic situations in politically unstable lands populated by people with little understanding of Western notions such as private property and contracts. Far from home, with no way of communicating in less than a few months' time with their superiors back in Washington, they had almost complete autonomy of action. Is it any wonder, then, that Americans became embroiled in so many small wars abroad? The only wonder, really, is that there were not more."

Pirates of the Caribbean and East Indies:

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  A West India squadron of 14 ships under Commodore James Biddle was sent out in 1822 to work alongside the Royal Navy in suppressing the pirates. They had some notable success, but yellow fever became rampant and they were forced to retire.
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  The pugnacious Porter, now 42 years of age, was given the command. In his 16 ship fleet, he included five 20-oared barges to pursue pirates into their shallow coves. He also deployed the first steam powered warship ever to go into battle. Porter quickly swept the larger pirate ships from the region, but it was impossible to patrol every inlet in every island.
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  However, in 1825, the political situation turned against the pirates, and an intractable problem quickly became resolvable. Instead of sometimes hostile non-cooperation, the Spanish authorities in Cuba and Puerto Rico decided it was in their interests, too, to quell the pirates. Suddenly, there was no refuge anywhere for the pirates, and by 1826 they were no more.

  This experience would be frequently repeated. Engagements involving intractable situations - such as the futile hunts to find Augusto Sandino and Pancho Villa - are frequently resolved favorably for the U.S. simply by the passage of time and favorable changes of conditions. The U.S. has many ways to triumph even when military means prove futile. This was how the Cold War was won - and how the War on Terror is being fought.

  The fifth squadron saw action in the South Atlantic protecting U.S. whaling and seal-hunting rights in the Falkland Islands. The Argentine governor had seized U.S. whalers and seal hunters operating in the region. Master Commandant Silas Duncan in an 18 gun sloop spiked the forts guns, released the captured American seamen, recovered property seized from American ships, captured some Argentine colonists, and left suitable warnings against further interference with commercial rights.
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  The Falkland Islands became a minor part of the expanding British Empire in 1833. Nevertheless, when American captains were arrested in 1854 in another dispute over seal hunting rights, the U.S. warship Germantown arrived and threatened to bombard the courthouse. Diplomacy quickly triumphed, and the American captains were released upon payment of a light fine.
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  Pirates were also a problem for the pepper trade with Sumatra (which is still an area of piracy). In 1832, the Potomac (44), already in the area on a visit to China, disguised itself as a Dutch merchant vessel and dropped anchor in the port where an American vessel had been seized. Soon, three of the forts had been taken and the town set ablaze. The next day, the fourth fort was bombarded, and diplomacy finally triumphed. A peace agreement with the local rajahs was soon negotiated - and soon broken.
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  So ended this first U.S. battle in Asia. Two Americans had died and eleven were wounded. About 100 Sumatrans had died in the futile effort to defend their port. This action, during the administration of Pres. Andrew Jackson, initiated a debate - to be repeatedly renewed - over Presidential war powers. 
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  However, Sumatran piracies continued, so in 1838, two U.S. warships - the frigate Columbia and the sloop John Adams - paid a visit to three Sumatran towns and soon convinced the local rajahs that honesty was indeed the best policy. By 1846, the Dutch had taken over Sumatra and closed its ports to foreign merchants. The U.S. began to see the wisdom of an "open door" policy, lest the expanding European empires close off all profitable overseas trading opportunities.
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  Boot touches upon the wide variety of other activities of the little U.S. Navy during this period.

• The sloop Peacock in 1832-1833 peacefully facilitated trade treaties with Siam (Thailand) and Muscat (which at that time stretched from Arabia to Zanzibar). These were the first trade treaties for the U.S. in Asia and the Middle East.
• Lieutenant Charles Wilkes, with the 6 ships of the U.S. Exploring Expedition, lasting from 1838 to 1842, surveyed the South Pacific. The expedition's vast store of specimens and artifacts "became the foundation of the Smithsonian Institution," and their charts were of inestimable value during WW-II. They also fought engagements with hostile natives in Fiji, Samoa and Drummonds Island.
• Capt. Lawrence Kearney, commanding a small U.S. East India Squadron, arrived in China after the British-China Opium War (1840-1842) and negotiated favorable trading agreements similar to those won by the British. American ships - usually about 3 in number - inevitably became embroiled ashore in the subsequent rebellions and saw some action alongside the men and approximately 30 ships of the Royal Navy. Boot briefly relates their involvement in the Taiping Rebellion in 1854 and the Arrow war in 1856. Both trade and missionary rights were advanced by subsequent treaties.
• The U.S. joined the British Royal Navy in 1820 in crushing the slave trade off West Africa. U.S. vessels captured 24 slave vessels between 1842 and 1861. The Royal Navy captured 595.
• In Smyrna, Turkey, in 1853, the sloop St. Louis (18) forced the release from a Hapsburg warship of a Hungarian who was an American resident. He had been involved in the 1848 revolution, and was captured while on a business trip to Turkey. Diplomacy proved fruitless, until the St. Louis trained its guns on the Hapsburg vessel. The Hapsburg Empire was most unhappy with this incident, but Congress gave the popular Capt. Douglas N. Ingraham a gold medal and a promotion.
• Commodore Mathew C. Perry took his black ships into Tokyo Harbor in 1853 and 1855 and "opened" Japan to trade -- with consequences that were truly extraordinary.

In foreign waters, the U.S. Navy was frequently willing to lend a hand to the Royal Navy in its pursuit of empire and freedom of the seas.

"In short, naval captains were doing more or less the same job performed today by the World Trade Organization: integrating the world around the principle of free trade. It just so happened that trade negotiations in those days were a slightly bloodier affair than they are today; - - -."

  The U.S. and Great Britain still sometimes came close to blows during this period. Boot refers to three such incidents, including the Oregon boundary dispute of 1845-1846. Nevertheless, in foreign waters, the U.S. Navy was frequently willing to lend a hand to the Royal Navy in its pursuit of empire and freedom of the seas.

• In 1845, the sloop St Louis helped evacuate British colonists from Kororareka, New Zealand, just before it fell to a Maori attack.
• In 1859, the U.S. paddle wheeler Toey-wan lent assistance to a British assault on Chinese forts at the Pei-ho River that led to Peking. The assault failed.
• In 1864, the USS Wyoming joined an international force in chastising a Japanese warlord who had closed a shipping channel.
• In 1874, landing parties from the USS Tuscarora and HMS Portsmouth helped put down a rebellion in Honolulu, Hawaii.
• In 1882, 150 American sailors and marines landed in Alexandria, Egypt, under the guns of the Royal Navy, to restore order and protect American residents after a nationalist uprising.

  Boot sums up:

  "Congress maintained only a small navy whose peacetime mission was to police the world, enforcing Western standards of behavior, protecting U.S. commerce, and serving as a general adjunct to U.S. diplomacy. No matter how tiny, the navy had little trouble overawing various pirates and tribesmen with its vastly superior technology and training. With the navy's help, U.S. exports soared from $20 million in 1789 to $343 million in 1860. In short, naval captains were doing more or less the same job performed today by the World Trade Organization: integrating the world around the principle of free trade. It just so happened that trade negotiations in those days were a slightly bloodier affair than they are today; hence 'butcher and bolt.' Since the Royal Navy was engaged in more or less the same task, it made sense for the two services to cooperate from time to time."

  While the Royal Navy expanded the British Empire across the globe, the U.S. Navy carved out an "empire of the seas" - an informal empire based on trade and influence.
 &

The beginnings of an imperial reach:

&

  By 1881, the U.S. Navy was down to just 50 vessels, "most obsolete hulks." The decline of the U.S. merchant marine was one reason for this naval decline. While overseas trade soared, it was being carried in foreign ships.
 &
  There were only 12 marine landings abroad between 1861 and 1881, and diplomatic negotiations by naval officers declined to 101. There had been 201 between 1841 and 1861. The landings in Latin America were predominantly in response to turmoil ashore. Boot explains:

  "A familiar pattern developed: A revolution takes place; violence breaks out; American merchants and diplomats feel threatened; U.S. warships appear off-shore; landing parties patrol the city for several days; then they sail away."

  The author recounts two of the more formidable expeditions. One, in 1871, attempted to force Korea to open itself to trade, and another, in 1885, put down a revolt against Columbia that had shut down the vital cross-Isthmus railroad. While the Korean effort was not immediately successful, the ease with which Korean forces had been beaten led to regime change and subsequent trade agreements.
 &

A steam-powered, armored ship navy in those days required overseas "coaling stations" for supply and repairs.

  Not until official recognition of the closing of the Western frontier - with Indian tribes beaten and railroads crossing the continent - did attention again turn abroad. It was stimulated by the publication in 1890 of "The Influence of Sea Power on History" by Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan.
 &
  An influential group, including Henry Cabot Lodge, philosopher Brooks Adams, Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, and a young politician, Theodore Roosevelt, succeeded in convincing the government to undertake "the first major peacetime arms buildup in the nation's history, a buildup that gave America a navy capable of sinking the Spanish fleet in 1898."
 &
  A steam-powered, armored ship navy in those days required overseas "coaling stations" for supply and repairs. Alaska and Midway Island had been acquired in 1867. American interests in Hawaii kept increasing until, in 1893, American residents took over the Islands. However, several other efforts to acquire overseas territories had come to naught.
 &

Samoa:

&

American troops in distant lands were now encountering much more substantial opposition than they had in years past, due to the diffusion around the world of Western ideals, such as liberalism and nationalism, and Western technology, such as rifles and cannons.

  In 1899, the Islands were divided between Germany and the U.S. Germany was expelled in WW-I, and the German Samoan Islands became independent in 1962. American Samoa remains a U.S. territory. Boot emphasizes the significance of Samoa.

  "First, the U.S. was abandoning the old strategy of 'butcher and bolt;' now U.S. forces were staying in foreign countries and trying to manipulate their politics, if not annex them outright. - - -
 &
  "A second and perhaps related point is that American troops in distant lands were now encountering much more substantial opposition than they had in years past, due to the diffusion around the world of Western ideals, such as liberalism and nationalism, and Western technology, such as rifles and cannons. In 1841, Lieutenant Charles Wilkes' men had burned three villages and killed countless Samoans without suffering any casualties. Fifty-eight years later, Admiral Kautz's party was almost annihilated by Samoans firing rifles with great accuracy. - - - During the Boxer rebellion, German marines would be killed with Mauser bullets and Krupp artillery. America had the misfortune of joining the imperial game just as it was becoming more dangerous."

The Boxer Rebellion:

The U.S. had decided to join in the imperialist effort to maintain privileged positions in China.

  As the rebels swept the countryside, the danger was woefully underestimated by the diplomatic legation in Peking. At the last minute they realized their danger and summoned help from the warships off the Pei-ho River. Just before the siege of the Legation Quarter began, 350 soldiers and sailors - including 56 Americans - arrived.
 &
  Typically underestimating the task, a first relief column of 2,100 officers and men, including 112 seamen and marines from the USS Newark, set off by train from the port. The Boxers swarmed the relief force. However, the Boxers were armed only with swords, pitchforks and clubs. The relief column had rifles and some Maxim machine guns.
 &
  Nevertheless, with supplies running low, the relief column was forced to fight its way back towards the port. When well-armed Chinese regulars joined the attack, casualties began to mount. The column captured a well supplied Chinese military installation - the Hsiku Arsenal - and holed up - in turn in need of relief.
 &
  Then, the old Empress decided to support the Boxers. Boot goes into some detail over the conflicting theories of why she did this. The important point for this book, however, is that the U.S. had decided to join in this imperialist effort to maintain privileged positions in China.
 &
  The siege of the foreign legation began on June 20, 1900, and lasted 55 days. The legation area was 85 acres.

  "Besides legations representing 11 foreign powers, there were also numerous businesses serving the foreign community. Into this compound were jammed almost 900 Europeans -- including 148 women and 79 children -- plus at least 3,000 Chinese Christians."

  There were thousands more Chinese Catholics sheltering in a cathedral just outside the compound.
 &

  The details of the siege are provided by Boot. The Chinese attack was poorly coordinated, poorly led, and poorly equipped. They never used their modern Krupp cannons. These could have quickly reduced the legations to rubble. Boot attributes this to dissension in the ranks of the Chinese military officials. Southern and Central China ignored the Empress's orders and never joined the Rebellion.
 &
  The 56 U.S. Marines were the third largest military contingent after the British and Russians. Marine Capt. John Twiggs Myers, from a military family running back to the Revolutionary War, directed the defense of one of the most critical points on the perimeter walls - the Tartar Wall - and was immortalized by Charlton Heston. Boot tells of his successful efforts and his wound. He had a successful military career, eventually retiring as a Major General. He died at a ripe old age in 1952.
 &
  There were other marine heroes as well, including private Dan Daly, who won the first of his two Medals of Honor for a long single-handed defense of an exposed position. Boot especially notes the performance of the Japanese contingent - an omen of things to come.
 &
  Another siege was going on at the large Tientsin concession part way between Peking and the port. The Boxers, driven by a spiritual frenzy, slaughtered all the foreigners they could find. However, the chief casualties were the Chinese Christians.
 &

  A second relief column - also underestimating the task at hand - set out for Tientsin. A small U.S. Marine battalion of 132 men and 8 officers, joined by about 400 Russians, actually reached the outskirts of Tientsin before being attacked by a large Chinese force and forced to retreat. They suffered 4 men killed and 9 wounded.
 &
  A third relief  column with the marines and 2,000 soldiers finally broke through to Tientsin. Among the civilians in the city was a young mining engineer named Herbert Hoover. About 2 1/2 weeks later, they reached the Hsiku Arsenal and relieved the first column. That column had suffered 342 casualties, including 62 killed.
 &
  By July 1, the allied relief force totaled more than 12,000 - half from Russia and Japan. From the Philippines had come 2 battalions of the U.S. 9th Infantry Regiment - 15 officers and 575 men - and the 1st U.S. Marine Regiment - 18 officers and 300 men.
 &

  The battle to clear Tientsin of about 30,000 Chinese defenders was symptomatic of coalition warfare. The Chinese were armed with modern rifles, the initial plan of attack was inept, and the two U.S. infantry battalions suffered heavy casualties - almost a quarter killed or wounded. These veterans of fighting in the Philippines, the Indian Wars, and some from as far back as the Civil War, had never before experienced the heavy rate of fire of modern rifles. The marines did little better, and the attack failed.
 &
  However, the next day, the Japanese blew open the South Gate in a suicidal effort, and the coalition forces poured into the city. "The allies suffered 750 men killed and wounded, almost half of them Japanese." Discipline broke down, as the coalition forces looted and pillaged the city.
 &

"The U.S. sector was so well run that people flocked there from other parts of the city."

  A relief column of 20,000 men - including 2,500 Americans - set out from Tientsin for Peking on August 4. For once, the task was not underestimated. It was overestimated. They brought along 70 field guns and a long supply train.
 &
  Although the British and Americans got along well, there was widespread disunity of command. The American force included 2 infantry regiments, a marine battalion, the 6th Cavalry Troop, and "Reilly's Battery" of six 3.2-inch guns. The soldiers were inexperienced, but the officers and NCOs were veterans of conflicts running back to the Civil War. The commander was Maj. Gen. Adna Romanza Chaffee, a grizzled veteran who had fought at Gettysburg and Brandy Station. They were well supplied and were typically excellent marksmen. However, it was the Japanese who were again most impressive for discipline and bravery.
 &
  The march to Peking was made more difficult by the summer heat. Two battles were fought along the way. The Japanese cleared out one Chinese force, and the Americans another. Both Chinese commanders committed suicide. The Chinese intensified their attacks on the legation compound as the relief column neared. Casualties in the compound mounted and the situation became increasingly desperate.
 &
  The Americans in the relief column found an unprotected part of the Peking City Wall, scaled it, cleared a gate, and pushed forward with their artillery. However, it was the British who won the honors as the first to reach the compound. Unlike in the Hollywood version, the real relief forces "were tired, sweaty, and dirty" from their exertions. The diplomats greeted them in full diplomatic attire. Boot tells what happened next.

  "As soon as the allies had secured Peking, the looting began. Everyone, military and civilian, missionary and diplomat, Asian and Westerner, joined in stealing everything of value they could get their hands on."

  While the Germans took brutal revenge on the Chinese inhabitants, in the American administrative zone, the American military did what they it would generally do after its 20th century successes.

  "American troops enforced sanitary regulations to stop epidemics, opened charities and hospitals, set up a court run by the Chinese, created schools, policed opium dens and gambling houses. The U.S. sector was so well run that people flocked there from other parts of the city."

"America had abandoned its old unilateralism. Uncle Sam was now willing to take part in military coalitions with other Great Powers."

  The American force was quickly reduced to 150 men guarding the U.S. legation. The Japanese, too, behaved well in Peking. Boot sums up:

  "Ever since the Civil War the U.S. had been an economic juggernaut. But it was a slow process to convert economic carbohydrates into military muscle. Most of the U.S. campaigns abroad in the nineteenth century had been small affairs. That had changed when the U.S. had grabbed the remains of the Spanish empire in 1898. Now something else had changed as well: America had abandoned its old unilateralism. Uncle Sam was now willing to take part in military coalitions with other Great Powers."

The Philippines:

The Americans retaliated in kind with all the ruthlessness exercised in the Indian Wars.

  In the Philippines, the U.S. got its first dose of what overseas guerilla warfare is all about. That conflict established patterns repeated in many of the small war conflicts that were to follow, and Boot provides considerable detail about it.
 &
  The insurgents were decentralized and ferocious. They offered no targets of strategic value. They ruthlessly struck at Americans, suspected Filipino sympathizers, rivals, and the Spanish clergy. The Americans retaliated in kind with all the ruthlessness exercised in the Indian Wars.
 &
  Malaria, homesickness and boredom afflicted the Americans. This was broken by moments of terror and frantic action from surprise attacks and ambushes. The usual screw-ups within the military establishment frequently resulted in dead and wounded on widespread battlefronts. Monk relates the events of the Balangiga "massacre" in 1901, when an American company of about 77 men and officers was practically wiped out in a surprise attack.

  "The news of the Balangiga 'massacre' made front page headlines in the United States. The press compared it to the Alamo and the Little Bighorn in the annals of the country's military disasters. As they read the gruesome details, more than a few Americans must have wondered what their sons were doing 7,000 miles from home, still fighting and dying in a war whose conclusion had been officially announced more than once. Subjugating the Philippines was turning out to be a lot harder than promised." (Does all this sound familiar?)

As usual, the task ahead had been grossly underestimated.

  As a result of the peace treaty with a shattered Spanish Empire, the U.S. got Guam, Puerto Rico, and the 7,108 islands and 7 million inhabitants of the Philippines. They also inherited an ongoing Filipino insurrection led by Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy that had pinned the Spanish into Manila just before the American troops arrived to take over. Boot tells what happened next.

  "[The] U.S. occupation army undertook a wide variety of improvements in Manila -- cleaning up the unsanitary conditions left behind by the Spanish, vaccinating the inhabitants, repairing roads, building schools, and generally making the city bustle again. This work was only partly altruistic, since its larger purpose was to make Manila more livable for the army occupation. But most Filipinos had no desire to be 'assimilated,' benevolently or otherwise. Tensions mounted between the U.S. troops in Manila and the Philippine soldiers who surrounded them. Some of Aguinaldo's men attacked American soldiers; some American soldiers attacked Aguinaldo's men."

  As usual, there was a substantial pacifist political movement in the U.S. - an Anti-Imperialist League. It included Grover Cleveland, Andrew Carnegie, Samuel Gompers and Mark Twain. However, imperialist fervor was running high, led by Vice Pres. Theodore Roosevelt. The Senate ratified the peace treaty by one vote, 57-to-27.
 &
  As usual, the task ahead had been grossly underestimated. The nation had bitten off more than it was prepared to chew. The 11,000 men sent to tropical Manila were wearing blue flannel uniforms, and had canned provisions that frequently turned out to be rotten. They had some modern Norwegian rifles firing smokeless powder, but also used old single shot, smoke belching Springfield rifles, various old machine guns, and some 3.2-inch breach-loading field artillery.
 &
  They faced about 20,000 insurgents who fought with fanatic courage, but lacked training, discipline, marksmanship, enough rifles to go around, and often, shoes. In the battle that followed, the Americans had the support of Admiral Dewey's heavy naval guns. It was a rout.
 &
  As American reinforcements poured in, they pushed out of Manila into the countryside. However, Aguinaldo just gave way, and reoccupied territory after the Americans retired. Even with 30,000 men, an occupation of the Philippines was impossible - and the term of service for the state volunteers was running out. The rainy season brought fighting to an end.

  "Cholera, dysentery, malaria, venereal diseases, and sheer heat exhaustion ravaged the ranks, depleting some units of 60 percent of their strength. By June, 1899, the war in the Philippines had already lasted longer than the one against Spain and still U.S. control extended only 40 miles outside Manila."

Unlike most other imperial conquerors, the U.S. was both magnanimous and unthreatening to those who were not belligerent or who ceased to be belligerent.

Tactics were flexible and ingenious - devised by the men on the field of battle and suitable for the battlefield they had found. Their marksmanship was - as usual - deadly.

  So, how did the U.S. Army hope to succeed in the Philippines? They sought and found allies among the many Filipino factions. "Luckily for the Americans, their enemies were even more disorganized." Unlike most other imperial conquerors, the U.S. was both magnanimous and nonthreatening to those who were not belligerent or who ceased to be belligerent.
 &
  Many leading upper class Filipinos came into Manila to surrender and make their peace with the Americans. Then, with 35,000 men - all federal volunteers sent to replace the state volunteers - the Americans launched a vigorous campaign across Luzon that shattered the insurgent army. Their tactics were flexible and ingenious - devised by the men on the field of battle and suitable for the battlefield they had found. Their marksmanship was - as usual - deadly. Victory was declared.
 &
  "But the war did not end," Boot tells us. "It entered a new and more dangerous phase." Unable to face the Americans, the insurgents scattered into numerous practically autonomous guerilla bands. The Tagolog-speaking regions of south and central Luzon were hotbeds of insurrection. However, the insurgency failed to spread elsewhere. "[In] nearly half the archipelago's provinces there was no fighting at all."
 &
  Another pattern that would become familiar quickly arose.

  "The U.S. Army tried to exert control by appointing Filipinos to act as police chiefs, mayors, and other municipal officials under the supervision of the local U.S. garrison. But in many provinces, the guerillas set up their own parallel government structure, sometimes run by the very same officials the Americans had selected. In this way, the revolutionaries managed to collect taxes from the townspeople, recruit more men, and keep their forces supplied, all under the noses of the American troops."

  Harsh retribution awaited anyone who earnestly assisted the Americans. "The insurrectos even burned down whole towns on occasion if they refused to pay taxes."
 &

The U.S. had Filipino allies - ethnic groups that didn't get along with the Tagalogs. The U.S. was not intent on total domination, and could thus pursue the usual U.S. two-pronged strategy.

The brutality of the insurgents was met with the brutality that the U.S. Army had been accustomed to employ in the Indian Wars and in their own Civil War.

Aguinaldo had one most bitter complaint - that the U.S. had not sufficiently tyrannized the Filipinos to furnish support for his insurrection.

  The insurgents quickly became familiar with American politics and picked up their campaign prior to the 1900 election. This, too, would be a frequently repeated experience in such conflicts. The Democratic candidate, William Jennings Bryan, opposed the imperialist venture and openly rooted for the insurgents "against our army of subjugation, tyranny and oppression." However, the McKinley-Roosevelt ticket won a massive victory, the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution does not follow the flag into foreign shores, and Gen. Arthur McArthur took command.
 &
  By now, the U.S. had 70,000 veteran soldiers in the Philippines - two-thirds of the entire army. They also had Filipino allies - ethnic groups that didn't get along with the Tagalogs. The U.S. was not intent on total domination, and could thus pursue the usual U.S. two-pronged strategy.

  "Soldiers built schools, ran sanitation campaigns, vaccinated people, collected customs duties, set up courts run by natives, supervised municipal elections, and generally administered governmental functions efficiently and honestly. A thousand idealistic young American civilians even journeyed to the Philippines to teach school in a precursor of the Peace Corps. Despite the use of increasingly harsh measures against the guerillas and their suspected sympathizers, most U.S. soldiers remained on good terms with most civilians. Officers frequently socialized with Filipino notables in their area; and, writes one historian, 'the vast majority of these daily interactions were civil, even cordial.'"

  William Howard Taft played a major role in the carrot part of this carrot and stick approach. The Filipinos were even promised eventual statehood and U.S. citizenship. Many were swayed, and a Partido Federal was formed.
 &
  However, in the field, the conflict turned increasingly vicious. The brutality of the insurgents was met with the brutality that the U.S. Army had been accustomed to employ in the Indian Wars and in their own Civil War. Torture, the killing of prisoners, and the confiscation of property of insurgents and their supporters grew in intensity.
 &
  Ultimately, it was a spectacular dare-devil feat by Army Brigadier Gen. Frederick Funston that snared the insurgent leader Emilio Aguinaldo in his mountain hideaway. The Americans, as usual, treated their formidable adversary with magnanimity, and were rewarded with a surrender and a call to end the insurgency. "More than 4,000 insurgents surrendered and turned in 1363 rifles." Aguinaldo had one most bitter complaint - that the U.S. had not sufficiently tyrannized the Filipinos to furnish support for his insurrection.
 &
  The surprise attack at Balangiga - the worst U.S. reversal of the war - came soon thereafter. This was met with a savage campaign against villages thought sympathetic to the insurgency. Such ruthless tactics had worked in the Civil War and the Indian Wars. However, when an officer summarily executed 11 Filipino porters that he suspected of disloyalty, he found that there would be a significant difference in 20th century responses to such actions. He was charged with murder.
 &

"Zones of Protection" - concentration camps - were created into which 300,000 people were driven. Then, anything of use - anything edible - on the outside was destroyed.

  There was now a modern national press. It had played a major role in building support for the Spanish-American War. Now, it began reporting the atrocities - and Congress responded with investigations. The court martial revealed that the campaign had proceeded upon orders from the top - and Brigadier Gen. "Hell-Roaring" Jake Smith was forced into retirement.
 &
  In Southern Luzon, the insurgency was crushed using other tactics employed successfully in the Indian Wars and by the British in the Boer War. "Zones of Protection" - concentration camps - were created into which 300,000 people were driven. Then, anything of use - anything edible - on the outside was destroyed. Like forcing Indians onto reservations and killing off the buffalo herds, this quickly brought the insurrection to an end. "On April 16, 1902, Miguel Malvar became the last major guerilla commander to surrender."
 &
  The Americans had been unable to control the malaria and cholera epidemics in the camps, and at least 11,000 Filipinos died of disease. The U.S. had been far less brutal than most other colonialists, "but nevertheless the Philippine War was a rude awakening for those Americans who imagined their country was always to be morally superior to the sordid Europeans."
 &

  In the outlying Islands of Mindanao and Jolo, Muslim Moros remained periodically in revolt. The job of suppressing them was eventually turned over to a Filipino force led by American officers. The Americans have left, but not much else has changed on these Islands since then.
 &
  The insurgency had cost far more than the Spanish-American War. In the insurgency, 4,234 Americans were killed - more than ten times the total lost in the war. The wounded numbered only 2,818. (Modern medicine would radically change such ratios in WW-II and thereafter.) The Filipino casualties were estimated at well over 200,000 - mostly civilian. Faced with the reality of imperial power, the American people lost all sympathy for the exercise. 

  Nor would they again countenance the most ruthless of the tactics and strategy successfully used to suppress determined insurrections. The defeat of such insurrections would henceforth become far more difficult.

Unlike other European imperialists, the U.S. "left virtually no legacy of economic exploitation."

  However, the Filipinos benefited immensely from the U.S. victory. The Filipinos were quickly granted considerable autonomy. By 1907, they had become the first Asian state to establish a national legislature. Public schools, a free press, an independent judiciary, a modern bureaucracy, democratic government, and separation of church and state were established. Unlike other European imperialists, the U.S. "left virtually no legacy of economic exploitation." Congress had even barred large landholdings by American individuals or corporations.
 &
  The factors that led to the U.S. victory are reviewed at some length by Boot. Both the carrot and the stick were employed vigorously, and most Filipinos came to prefer the carrot that the U.S. could offer. The insurgents, with a leader from the upper classes of Filipino society, never connected with the mass of Filipino people. They made significant strategic mistakes.
 &
  There were no more than 24,000 U.S. soldiers active in the field at any one time. As Boot points out, "24,000 soldiers could hardly hope to terrorize 7 million people into submission." The conflict was at times vicious, but typical for the conflicts of those days, and far less so than the imperial wars of other European powers.
 &

The Banana Wars:

&

  American military engagements in the Caribbean and Central America underwent a change at the beginning of the 20th century.

  "No longer would U.S. sailors and marines land for  a few days at a time to quell a riot; now they would stay longer to manage the internal politics of nations."

  There were economic, strategic and ideological reasons for this change, but Boot emphasizes a larger reality.

  "American power had already filled up the chalice of North America and, overflowing its confines, naturally spilled into the adjacent region where there were no Great Powers to bar the way."

  Cuba (1899-1902) was one example. The U.S. never intended to stay, so there was no resistance. A plethora of benefits were heaped on the Cubans. Sanitation, schools, the dismissal of corrupt officials, roads, bridges, harbor improvements, etc., were as usual a part of the mix. More important, working on a tip from a Cuban doctor, a U.S. Army doctor, Walter Reed, attacked the mosquito problem, resulting in vast reductions in yellow fever and malaria.
 &
  However, there were strings attached. Cuba became in effect a U.S. protectorate. It had to cede long term leases on naval bases, the right of U.S. intervention "to protect life, liberty and property," and the power of approval of foreign treaties. The Cuban government was required to ratify the acts of the U.S. military government.
 &

  Panama was something significantly different, and is well enough known so that Boot does not go into it in any detail. The U.S. Navy easily assured the success of the Panama revolution, and the U.S. was given control of the Canal Zone on very favorable terms. The Canal, when built, was a huge strategic advantage for the U.S. Navy. Its protection was thus a huge concern. It was thus more important than ever to keep European powers out of the region.
 &
  When European warships - from Britain, Germany and Italy - blockaded the Venezuelan coast to force repayment of debts - a normal practice in those days - Theodore Roosevelt sent Admiral Dewey with 50 warships to the region. He convinced the parties to submit the dispute to arbitration - which the European powers won. However, the conclusion was that, if the European powers were to be kept out, the U.S. would have to police the region.

  "This became known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and it would govern U.S. policy in the region for nearly 30 years, almost until the day when Roosevelt's cousin, Franklin, was inaugurated as president."

One of the outcomes of this intervention was the creation and training of a Cuban army - a practice the U.S. would repeat often in other similar venues.

  In 1905, it was Cuba, again. The political situation had totally broken down under parties that were corrupt to the core. However, by now, even the pugnacious Theodore Roosevelt had had a bellyful of the joys of imperial power, and sought to merely provide diplomatic good offices to resolve disputes. When the Cuban government completely collapsed, 2,000 marines came ashore under Col. Littleton W. T. Waller. Both sides in the Cuban fracas were glad to see him come.
 &
  The U.S. administered the island for almost 2 1/2 years. They ruled through Cuban politicians - who were still corrupt to the core. The marines left after supervising an election in 1908.
 &
  One of the outcomes of this intervention was the creation and training of a Cuban army - a practice the U.S. would repeat often in other similar venues.
 &

  Boot easily debunks left wing criticism that the U.S. Marines were being used to collect Wall Street debts and safeguard U.S. corporate interests. It was in countries that attracted the least U.S. investment that the vast majority of military interventions took place. There were no interventions in Costa Rica or Guatemala, and just one in Honduras - the recipients of most U.S. investments in the region.
 &
  Nevertheless, there were some investments involved in these military engagements, and the investors welcomed U.S. military protection of their interests whenever needed. In Cuba, the Cuban Cane Sugar Corp. and the United Fruit Company were the largest. The marines were back in Cuba in 1912 and 1916 to protect U.S. property during times of unrest, but they did not have to do any fighting.
 &

As in Cuba, however, American support came with enough strings to make Nicaragua in effect an American protectorate.

  Nicaragua was a constant irritant for the U.S. It was run by anti-American tyrants. In 1910, a revolt broke out in the Bluefields district on the Caribbean side. Managua and most of the other population centers are on the Pacific side or in the North. The Bluefield district was a center of U.S., British and other foreign rubber, banana and gold mining companies. A battalion of marines was sent in to intervene.
 &
  In command was Major Smedley Darlington Butler - already a veteran and hero of the Boxer Rebellion. Boot goes into some detail about the life and exploits of this legendary marine.
 &
  The marines, backed as usual by the U.S. Navy, provided the rebels with an invulnerable base. They were soon triumphant across the entire country, and Adolfo Díaz became president. As in Cuba, however, American support came with enough strings to make Nicaragua in effect an American protectorate. The U.S. administered Nicaraguan customs. New York banks provided a $1.5 million loan and in return controlled the national bank, the railroad, and the steamship company.
 &
  Soon, there was a rebellion against Díaz and, in 1912, Butler and the marines were back in Nicaragua. With "verve and bluff," Butler overawed one rebel leader, and stormed the hilltop fortification of another. Casualties to quell the rebellion were 7 marines and sailors killed and 16 wounded out of a force of 1,150 deployed. The marines withdrew, leaving a legation guard of 100 men.
 &

Sanitation improvements ended the regular epidemics of yellow fever, malaria, dysentery, smallpox, tuberculosis, etc., and local police even began fighting crime.

  The port of Veracruz was occupied in 1913 in a futile effort to stop arms shipments from Germany. The shipments were simply diverted to other points on the coast. Boot relates how fumbling and bumbling at all levels - naval, diplomatic and presidential - resulted in the occupation of the whole town. The arrival of Butler and 3,000 marines - and the effectiveness of the big naval guns - put an end to Mexican resistance.
 &
  The result was a boon for the local citizens - "the best government the people of Veracruz ever had." Sanitation improvements ended the regular epidemics of yellow fever, malaria, dysentery, smallpox, tuberculosis, etc., and local police even began fighting crime. In 1914, the incumbent Mexican tyrant was replaced by another, peace agreements were reached, and the U.S. withdrew. "Before long, the residents were again tossing garbage into the streets."
 &

Using Haitian officials, the Americans provided the best administration in Haiti's history.

  In the dysfunctional state of Haiti, revolutions and coups were a way of life. Boot provides some of the sorry details. Between 1857 and 1913, U.S. Marines had visited 19 times to protect foreign residents during these upheavals.
 &
  After a particularly brutal series of revolutions occurred in 1915, the unwarlike Wilson administration was ultimately induced to intervene. The French legation had been violated, and German warships were in the vicinity.
 &
  U.S. investments in Haiti amounted to just about $4 million - a minor consideration even in those days - and had not been threatened. The reasons for the intervention were as usual to stabilize a chaotic situation and prevent European powers from moving into the vacuum. Haiti, after all, lay athwart the Windward Passage to the Panama Canal.
 &
  The marines would stay for 19 years. They fed the hungry, provided free medical care, and dealt roughly with the troublemakers. A few months of aggressive patrolling by Butler and small units of marines chased their more numerous but untrained opponents out of jungle and mountain strongholds. Amnesty, money for those who turned in weapons, and consideration for government employment ended the initial insurgency.
 &
  Using Haitian officials, the Americans provided the best administration in Haiti's history. However, it was deeply resented nevertheless - especially by the upper class mulattoes who were used to running the show - badly - for their own benefit.
 &

  Similar events took place in the Dominican Republic in 1916. With the purchase of the Virgin Islands in 1917, the U.S. flag flew over the Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the Virgin Islands. A few other islands were friendly or in friendly British and French hands. The Caribbean was secure.
 &
  On Hispaniola, improvements in sanitation, health services, education, infrastructure, etc., followed the flag. A constabulary under American officers kept order. Guerillas were hunted down, offered amnesty, and ultimately induced to surrender.
 &
  Inevitably, there were instances of marine abuse of prisoners and locals. Inevitably, resentment grew against the occupations - not only amongst the dispossessed ruling class, but amongst some of the populace as well. Periodic uprisings in the hills were beaten down by small but aggressive marine units and local constabulary. Most of the population stayed on the sidelines. They had never had it so good.
 &
  After elections, the marines left the Dominican Republic. However, treaty arrangements enabled the U.S. to exercise considerable influence. About 800 marines remained in Haiti throughout the 1920s.

  "The 1920s were one of the most peaceful and prosperous decades in Haiti's troubled history. The American administrators, assisted by the increasingly Haitianized gendarmeri - - - ran the government efficiently and fairly. Graft was radically reduced, and the occupiers did not seek commercial gain for themselves or their countrymen. The occupation authorities were so determined to protect the Haitian people from 'exploitation' by large foreign companies that they may even have retarded the republic's economic development."

  However, there inevitably was periodic trouble. Pres. Herbert Hoover decided - wisely - that such occupation was more trouble than it was worth. He had bigger problems at home. After an election cycle on Haiti - won by anti-American nationalists - Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt completed the withdrawal in 1934. The marines left "1,000 miles of roads constructed, 210 major bridges, 9 major airfields, 1,250 miles of telephone lines, 82 miles of irrigation canals, 11 modern hospitals, 147 rural clinics, and on and on."
 &

  Nevertheless, dictators were able to take power in both the Dominican Republic and Haiti during the 1930s.

  "Critics of American intervention later charged that the U.S. had deliberately installed dictatorships in Hispaniola and elsewhere in the Caribbean. Very nearly the opposite is true. The marines tried hard to plant constitutional government but found it would not take root in the inhospitable soil of Hispaniola. - - - Taking those criticisms to heart, Franklin Roosevelt inaugurated the 'Good Neighbor' policy under which Washington would eschew intervention and befriend whoever was in power in Latin America. Unfortunately, those who came to power often were not of the highest moral caliber. The only thing more unsavory than U.S. intervention, it turned out, was U.S. nonintervention."

Pancho Villa in Mexico:

&

Wilson had to respond, both to protect the border area and chastise Villa, but also to avoid looking weak before the 1916 election.

  However, response from the 350 men in camp was immediate, and the raid was turned into a rout of Villa's men. Hot pursuit - permitted under existing treaties - extended 15 miles into Mexico. Villa left behind 100 dead and 30 captured - some of whom were hanged after trials in state court. Eight civilians and ten cavalrymen had been killed, and nine soldiers and civilians had been wounded.
 &
  Boot provides details of the complex mix of forces involved in the Mexican revolution, and the speculation over what induced Villa to burn Columbus and attack Camp Furlong. Villa had been doing poorly in the revolutionary wars. If, for propaganda purposes, he wanted to induce the U.S. to strike back, he got his wish.
 &
  The result was the sort of half-hearted application of force that would become common in Cold War small war engagements. Pres. Wilson had to respond, both to protect the border area and chastise Villa, but also to avoid looking weak before the 1916 election.
 &
  Black Jack Pershing and about 10,000 men were sent to chase Villa around the vast deserts and mountains of Northern Mexico. However, they were instructed to be careful not to offend the government of Mexico while dashing about the territory. With WW-I raging in Europe and threatening to suck in the U.S., Wilson did not want the distraction of a repeat of the Mexican War.
 &

Mexican peasants were amazed when the gringos actually paid for their food.

The Wilson administration put stringent restrictions on operations in Mexico.

Pershing and the rest of the military ultimately came to agree with the wisdom of Wilson's efforts to avoid a wider war with Mexico.

  As usual, the U.S. military was unready and poorly equipped for the task. They were forbidden to use Mexican railroads, so a hodge-podge of trucks and cars had to be quickly acquired to support the effort. The soldiers were not dressed for the cold desert and mountain nights. They were forbidden to forage from the countryside. Mexican peasants were amazed when the gringos actually paid for their food.
 &
  Four cavalry regiments - the 7th, 10th, 11th and 13th - went after Villa's forces in the same manner as when pursuing the plains Indians. They actually caught up with and shattered several units. However, Villa made good propaganda use of the punitive expedition. His forces quickly swelled from about 400 dispirited remnants to 5,000 confident fighters who were scoring substantial victories against a rival revolutionary while avoiding the gringos.
 &
  Nor did the punitive expedition protect the border. Four Texas border towns were raided causing several civilian casualties. These events supported the belief that Germany was instigating a war between Mexico and the U.S. to distract the U.S. from the war in Europe.
 &
  Ultimately, a cavalry captain made a fatal tactical blunder that caused the decimation of a troop of 82 men. The Wilson administration put even more stringent restrictions on operations in Mexico. By February, 1917, the punitive expedition was back in the U.S., having achieved nothing. However, some valuable experience had been gained that would prove valuable for Pershing and his fellow officers on the Western Front.
 &
  Pershing and the rest of the military were livid about the restraints imposed on the expedition by the politicians. However, three months later he was headed for France and WW-I, and ultimately came to agree with the wisdom of Wilson's efforts to avoid a wider war with Mexico.
 &

Russia:

&

Wilson's orders were as vague as his own conflicted views on the intervention in Russia.

  Wilson viewed Lenin and the Bolsheviks as the monsters that they were, and hoped to aid their opponents. He also wanted to help the 70,000 Czechoslovakian soldiers who had taken over the Trans-Siberian Railroad from the Volga to the Pacific in their efforts to escape the Bolsheviks. They had been fighting with the Russians against the Germans and Austro-Hungarians.
 &
  The U.S. military was solidly against any diversion of forces into Russia. However, orders were orders. Unfortunately, Wilson's orders were as vague as his own conflicted views on the intervention in Russia. His commitment of thousands of men to the distant frozen battlefields of Russia was to him "modest and experimental."
 &
  The inexperienced 339th Infantry Regiment - "Detroit's Own" - plus medical and engineering units - about 5,700 men - was sent to Archangel. The British provided the bulk of the forces and were in command of the expedition. Influenza quickly weakened the ranks. The vastness of Russia soon overwhelmed the skimpy forces available, and they settled in to survive the winter.
 &
  November 11, 1917, came and went - the Great War was over - but not for the Allied units in Russia. Morale quickly plunged. Boot provides a good account of the conditions in Archangel that winter. As the Bolshevik army grew in size, outlying positions came under attack and were forced to retreat. This was a significant propaganda victory for the Red Army.
 &
  Allied political leaders had no stomach for a more robust effort in Russia. In France and England, war-weary people would not support such an effort. Republican isolationism was growing in the U.S. Congress. In February, 1919, it was decided to withdraw U.S. forces that Spring. By that time, 244 men had been killed from all causes, and 305 had been wounded in battle.
 &

Sandino in Nicaragua:

Sandino's exploits were making him a hero throughout Latin America and among left wing sympathizers.

  However, one rebel, Augusto C. Sandino, decided to keep fighting. The country was controlled by just 1,800 marines and some poorly trained Nicaraguan guardsmen.
 &|
  Sandino decided to attack the northern town of Ocotal, garrisoned by just 41 marines and 48 guardsmen. When the initial attack failed to achieve surprise, a vigorous firefight broke out and continued through the day. The next day, four marine biplanes appeared to strafe and dive bomb the Sandino positions with 25 pound bombs. It was probably the first organized dive bomb attack in history. The Sandinos were routed. One marine had been killed and several marines and guardsmen had been wounded in the 16 hour battle.
 &
  However, Sandino had the support of the local population, and was able to mount a guerilla campaign in the northern jungle-covered mountains. The marines mounted aggressive patrols and achieved  some successes. Sandino sprung one ambush after another. Slowly - even with the poor marksmanship of the rebels - marine and guardsman casualties mounted. Biplanes were increasingly being used for reconnaissance, strafing and bombing, and even for bringing supplies forward and carrying out the badly wounded.
 &
  Sandino's exploits were making him a hero throughout Latin America and among left wing sympathizers. As for Sandino, his political sympathies remained vague. Boot explains:

  "Sandino was happy to have the communists' support, and he had some communists in his staff, most notably the Salvadoran Agustin Martí, who complained that Sandino 'did not embrace the communist program for which I was fighting.' Precisely what Sandino was fighting for always remained murky; he was fired by hatred of 'that traitor' Moncado [a rebel leader who had surrendered] and the 'machos' -- as he derisively called the Americans -- but he lacked a well-thought out political agenda."

Interventions were the only way that nations such as Nicaragua were likely to see free and fair elections with the losers honoring the outcome.

The National Guard in Nicaragua made possible Samoza's tyranny, but there had been no shortage of dictators in the country's past -- nothing but, in fact -- and all had come to power without benefit of a U.S.-trained constabulary. Dictatorship was indigenous; democracy was a foreign transplant.

  The 1928 election - protected by 5,000 U.S. military servicemen - was a big success - with almost 90% participation - the cleanest in Nicaraguan history. The new government asked the U.S. military  to stay. Small scale guerilla actions continued into 1929. When his chief of staff was captured, Sandino went to Mexico in a fruitless effort to get assistance. By the time he returned to Nicaragua, there were just 1,500 marines in the country.
 &
  However, despite 10 mutinies that had left 5 marine officers dead, the Nicaraguan National Guard had been transformed into one of the best in Central America. Active patrolling led by marine officers Capt. "Red Mike" Edson and Capt. Lewis Burwell "Chesty" Puller kept the rebels off balance, but the rebels could always slip away across the 500 mile Honduras border to regroup. The conflict became increasingly vicious on both sides. By 1933, all support for such interventions had collapsed in the Depression-ravaged U.S., and the marines were withdrawn.
 &
  Sandino undertook negotiations with the newly elected Nicaraguan government. In 1934, he was waylaid with his entourage by guardsmen under Anastasio 'Tacho" Somoza and gunned down. Somoza then led the guard in crushing the remaining Sandinistas. Ultimately, with the marine officers gone, he was able to use the guard to grab control of the entire country.
 &
  Boot emphasizes that Somoza did not attain power because of U.S. support. He attained power due to U.S. indifference under the non-interventionist "Good Neighbor" policy.

  "Ironically, many of the same critics who later attacked the U.S. for supporting tyrannical regimes had earlier criticized the U.S. for interfering in Latin America's internal affairs. Yet those interventions were the only way that nations such as Nicaragua were likely to see free and fair elections with the losers honoring the outcome -- as in 1928 and 1932 --. Once the marines left, those countries reverted to dictatorships. It was hardly Washington's fault. Yes, the National Guard in Nicaragua made possible Samoza's tyranny, but there had been no shortage of dictators in the country's past -- nothing but, in fact -- and all had come to power without benefit of a U.S.-trained constabulary. Dictatorship was indigenous; democracy was a foreign transplant that did not take, in part because America did not stick around long enough to cultivate it."

  The author reports that total marine casualties in this half dozen year conflict were 47 killed in action and 66 wounded. Total deaths were 136. The tactical lessons learned would be put to good use on Pacific Islands from Guadalcanal to Okinawa.
 &

China (1901-1941):

&

Operating amidst the turbulent masses of a dysfunctional China, tiny U.S. units employed tact as well as "bluff and bluster," and a great deal of ingenuity, and generally succeeded in dealing with the problems that arose.

  With Germany and Russia removed from the scene by WW-I, the task fell mainly to the British with American help. The U.S. was materially assisted by the widespread recognition that it alone among the intervening powers had no claims to Chinese territory. Also, the Chinese were too busy fighting amongst themselves to be concerned with the small U.S. forces in their midst. Operating amidst the turbulent masses of a dysfunctional China, tiny U.S. units employed tact as well as "bluff and bluster," and a great deal of ingenuity, and generally succeeded in dealing with the problems that arose.
 &
  In a century of operations in China prior to 1941, the U.S. suffered only one significant loss - the sinking of the gunboat Panay by the Japanese in 1937.
 &
  The gravest moments came in 1926 when combined Nationalist and Communist forces rallied the populace and took over the  country from the local warlords. Upcountry foreigners were imperiled and had to be saved and evacuated by naval forces on the Yangtze River - much to the chagrin of several missionaries who had always deplored the presence of these foreign forces. Inevitably, there were many who could not be saved.
 &
  By 1927, the U.S. presence had swelled to 5,600 servicemen located primarily in Shanghai, Peking and Tientsin. The situation was resolved when Chang Kai-shek suddenly turned on the Communists, slaughtering vast numbers of them. In the 1930s, it was the Japanese who posed the most lethal threats in China.
 &

The "Small Wars Manual:"

"In small wars, diplomacy has not ceased to function and the State Department exercises a constant and controlling influence over military operations."

  In the "Small Wars Manual" of the U.S. Marine Corps, the lessons learned have in fact been compiled. It starts out with a useful definition of U.S. "small wars."

• "Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by [U.S.] foreign policy."
• The mission is "to establish and maintain law and order by supporting or replacing the civil government in countries or areas in which the interests of the United States have been placed in jeopardy."
• Diplomacy remains a preeminent factor. "In small wars, diplomacy has not ceased to function and the State Department exercises a constant and controlling influence over military operations."
• Objectives are to be achieved "with the minimum of troops, in fact, with nothing more than a demonstration of force if that is all that is necessary and reasonably sufficient."
• "Hatred of the enemy" is inappropriate in small wars. "In small wars, tolerance, sympathy and kindness should be the keynote to our relationship with the mass of the population." "Peace and industry cannot be restored permanently without appropriate provisions for the economic welfare of the people."

"The enemy will always have better intelligence and knowledge of the countryside than the Americans will -- and they will choose the best moment to ambush small American detachments."

    Small wars cannot be fought with big war methods, the author emphasizes. They can drag on indefinitely without clear outcomes. Lacking defined battlefronts, they are harder in many ways than conventional conflict.

  "U.S. troops are sent out on policing functions, where the main task is simply to figure out who the enemy is. As the manual points out, American forces will be facing 'members of native forces [who] will suddenly become innocent peasant workers when it suits their fancy and convenience.' The enemy will always have better intelligence and knowledge of the countryside than the Americans will -- and they will choose the best moment to ambush small American detachments."

  As stated above, insurgents now frequently gain significant state or private cross-border support, and Western military strategy and tactics available for suppressing the indigenous population segments supporting insurgencies have been considerably constrained. The confining of masses of people on reservations or in concentration camps was highly successful and widely practiced up to a century ago, but is no longer an acceptable practice for intervening nations.
 &
  These factors can greatly increase the difficulties and expense of nation-building efforts by intervening nations. Indeed, in some instances, they may make the exercise impossible.
 &
  Working in favor of modern nation building efforts is the attractiveness of political and economic freedom, modernity and prosperity. At least in the long run, FUTURECASTS confidently expects these positive factors to win out, but the are far more powerful when generated by indigenous political forces. 

Vietnam:

In South Vietnam, the U.S. was thus confined to a strategy of attrition.

It was not until Congress forbade even logistical and air power support that the South succumbed to the conventional armies of North Vietnam.

  He notes that fear of confronting China - the regional power in that theater - was a primary constraining factor on U.S. tactics and strategy.

  It was a good deal more than that. It was the obvious reason for avoiding any major military commitment in the first place.

    As a result, the Johnson Administration forbade attacks on North Vietnam or even into their bases in Laos and Cambodia. In South Vietnam, the U.S. was thus confined to a strategy of attrition.

  Attrition warfare is in fact a lack of strategy. See, Military Futurecast, segment on "Military Strategy." Half a century after the Battle of Verdun - a battle of attrition and notoriously the most stupidly fought battle of the most stupidly fought war in history - Defense Secretary McNamara was on nationwide television announcing with his usual ignorant self-assurance that the Johnson administration had committed the U.S. to a war of attrition - in Asia, no less - against a small but martial nation with one of the world's highest birthrates, an established line of supply to China, and a demonstrated disregard of casualties.

  The author points out that the attrition strategy wore out the U.S. forces and undermined public support for the war effort (as attrition strategy generally does). After the Tet Offensive and the decision to withdraw, small war pacification methods were finally employed - with considerable success.
 &
  The Viet Cong never succeeded in generating a popular uprising in the South. With U.S. logistical and air power support, the South Vietnamese Army successfully defeated a major North Vietnam invasion in 1972. It was not until Congress forbade even logistical and air power support that the South succumbed to the conventional armies of North Vietnam.
 &

  Boot recognizes all the difficulties unique to Vietnam. However, he asserts that a small war approach from the beginning - employing professional soldiers committed on a relatively small scale - might have proven more acceptable to the American people and might have resulted in a different result.

  "Vietnam was far bigger than any previous 'small war' in U.S. history. The Vietnamese Communists were far better armed, trained, organized, and motivated than any previous guerillas fought by American soldiers. And they enjoyed an invaluable advantage: safe havens in neighboring countries. No one can know if a small-war approach, pursued from the beginning, would have resulted in a U.S. victory. But it probably would not have produced results any worse than the big-war strategy the army employed."

  A small war approach was clearly as doomed to failure in Vietnam as the attrition warfare big war approach. Even small wars eventually lose public support if they drag on inconclusively and incur significant casualties and costs. North Vietnam had the ability and will to keep the pot boiling indefinitely. Unlike in Korea, where a defensive line has been successfully drawn across a peninsula, the long jungle and mountainous borders of South Vietnam could not be secured. Only by destroying North Vietnam could the war have been won.
 &
  Boot notes that China did not in fact intervene in the 1970s when some serious bombing efforts were launched against North Vietnam and when their Laotian and Cambodian bases were attacked. However, by then, the U.S. was already withdrawing from the theater and all that North Vietnam needed for victory was time for the completion of the withdrawal.
 &
  Also by then, the split between China and the Soviet Union had fully matured. The entire Indochina region had been transformed from a strategic front line theater of the Cold War to an insignificant backwater without further strategic significance.

Post-Cold War strategy:

&

"Every time U.S. forces flee some country after suffering casualties, it makes it less likely that the U.S. will be able to accomplish its objectives in the future without using force."

  Boot believes that the U.S. could successfully be far more aggressive in its small war efforts, and should not shy away from open-ended, nation-building commitments. He is critical of decisions to leave Somalia in 1993 and Haiti in 1994 in as chaotic a situation as they were found. He believes it was a mistake not to topple Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf War. He is especially critical of Gen, Powell for succumbing to Vietnam Syndrome fears and for constantly grossly overestimating the difficulties of American military engagements. He is especially critical of a post-Vietnam strategy that so elevates the avoidance of casualties as to undermine all other objectives.

  "If foreign enemies know that killing a few Americans will drive the U.S. out of their country, they are far more likely to target American soldiers or civilians. - - - Every time U.S. forces flee some country after suffering casualties, it makes it less likely that the U.S. will be able to accomplish its objectives in the future without using force."

  He speculates that Osama bin Laden was emboldened to attack the World Trade Towers by the weakness of U.S. responses to earlier attacks on U.S. embassies and warships, and the obvious U.S. reluctance to sustain casualties.

  Today, U.S. intelligence operatives and servicemen in small units are active in a wide variety of third world and developing nations in many ways that the U.S. public never hears about. Thirty years from now, those younger than your publisher can look forward to some very interesting "now it can be told" stories.

"Assuming the cost of action is not too high, it is in the nation's most vital interests to defeat and deter the forces of chaos and spread the blessings of political and economic freedom worldwide."

  Boot believes that "like Britain in the nineteenth century, the United States in the twenty-first century has power to spare." "Assuming the cost of action is not too high," Boot emphasizes, it is in the nation's most vital interests to defeat and deter the forces of chaos and spread the blessings of political and economic freedom worldwide.
 &
  However, he has a considerably robust view of the level of costs that should be acceptable for these efforts. He believes that the U.S. should employ much more than just the balance of powers strategy employed by the British Empire. The U.S. now has the opportunity to police the world and further the  worldwide transformation into modernity - to "enlarge the 'empire of liberty.'"

   For a similar view, see, Barnett, "The Pentagon's New Map."
 &
  The U.S. is a modern welfare state democracy increasingly characterized by single son and single child families. It is for better or worse in no position to exceed the role of 19th century Great Britain. Nation building, as Boot acknowledges, is a difficult task of long duration and dubious prospects. Indeed, it can take decades - until new generations have matured - and may in certain third world states at this time not be a feasible objective.
 &
  The current conflict in Iraq exposes how easily the U.S. can become overstretched in its long term commitments. The power of the U.S. has definite limits. This means that it is still vital to keep priorities in mind, and to carefully husband financial and military reserves.
 &
  Convenient targets of opportunity should, of course, be taken advantage of. Democracy movements should be encouraged wherever they arise. Diplomatic good offices should be extended liberally to help resolve ongoing conflicts in which the U.S. has too little strategic interest to justify the costs of military intervention - as currently in Darfur.
 &
  It is of course too much to expect that France or Germany will risk their commercial interests in the Middle East by taking the lead in such instances, or that the Arab League - with U.S. logistical support - will deign to act so as to make Western intervention in their region unnecessary. For reasons such as this, it is obviously still the United States that is the last best hope for mankind. In any significant conflict, when the world dials 911 - the emergency number in the U.S. - if the U.S. doesn't respond, the odds are that nobody will.
 &
  Those basic dictums of strategy remain true today for the United States: "He who attacks everything everywhere risks gaining nothing anywhere," and "He who defends everything everywhere risks saving nothing anywhere."