Eleventh
FUTURECASTS online magazine
www.futurecasts.com
Vol. 12, No. 1, 1/1/10
Continuation of forecasting excellence: |
The FUTURECASTS record of forecasting excellence
certainly
continues as the publication enters the second decade of the 21st century. |
Health care:
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It's health care industry forecast is now
shown to be particularly on the mark. FUTURECASTS has from its
beginnings predicted that heavy and increasing government involvement
will continue to make health care the most troublesome sector of our
economy.
While success is not yet a certainty, Congress is
now certainly striving mightily to make that probability a reality. |
Credit Crunch:
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FUTURECASTS Credit Crunch forecasts have remained right on the mark. Warnings about the dangerous bubbles growing within the economy have been a constant theme since as early as October, 2002, and the increase in volatility as the business cycle became increasingly unstable has been a primary theme since the Near Futurecast of February 1, 2004.
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The speculative bubbles have brought criticism upon the markets.
However, FUTURECASTS readers know the truth. Those bubbles are the inevitable
result of Congressional budgetary deficits, credit allocation and tax policies
and the monetary policy of artificially low interest rates. Government
guarantees eliminate essential credit market disciplines and have created
dangerous levels of moral hazard. [ The markets certainly have imperfections under the best of conditions, but under modern circumstances they are just a convenient scapegoat for the inevitable consequences of industrial policy and Keynesian and monetarist policies. There are always strong incentives for the reckless abuse of credit. However, artificially low interest rates maintained for years at a time increase those incentives to near-irresistible levels, and credit allocation schemes actually mandate misuse of credit and moral hazard eliminates essential market disciplines. [ No amount of regulation - no administered alternatives - can replace the imperfect but essential disciplines of market interest rates and the normal risks of credit defaults. Who is to blame? Congress is to blame. See, "Heedless Government," "Government by Crisis," "Congress: The Engine of Inflation," [ |
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The upturn in stock and commodities markets were accurately forecast and explained in the Near Futurecast for 2009 on February 1, 2009.
The strength of the dollar - the key factor in the government's response to the Credit Crunch - has indeed been undermined - but not yet fatally.
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The Fed is in fact tolerating double digit unemployment as we enter the election year of 2010 because even Ben Bernanke now acknowledges the limits of monetary manipulation. |
The dollar continues to surge higher during moments of
international crisis, such as the recent Dubai default. Thus, the Fed retains
significant capabilities in conducting monetary policy. |
The markets have reduced the housing inventory overhang from a high of 12 months supply to less than 7 months, with considerably less in most states. Normal is about 4 months. It is this that is providing a basis for the beginning of recovery. Government policies were fundamental causes of the crisis and government has considerably mitigated the crisis, but it is the markets, not the government, that provide economic resiliency and promote recovery. The Near Futurecast for 2009 on February 1, 2009 further advised:
You can't ask for clearer calls than that! Indeed, with
the Fed increasing the basic money supply by more than 100% in just a few
months, the call on gold and the dollar for the last quarter of 2008 and the
first quarter of 2009 was the economic forecasting slam dunk of all time. |
Inflation hedges are inherently bubbly and prone to collapse spectacularly whenever interest rates rise towards positive levels - on a price-adjusted - “real” – basis. |
However, FUTURECASTS is no mere blind gold bug. It must
be emphasized that investing in inflation hedges is not enough during periods of
rapid monetary inflation. Inflation hedges are inherently bubbly and prone to collapse spectacularly whenever interest rates
rise towards positive levels - on a price-adjusted
- “real” – basis. |
Any economist, investment adviser, money manager or other authoritative talking head who did not advise the purchase of gold and other inflation hedges during the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 is revealed as totally incompetent. |
Any
economist, investment adviser, money manager or other authoritative talking head
who did not advise the purchase of gold and other inflation hedges during the
last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 is revealed as totally
incompetent. Many of these incompetents are economists whose brains
have been addled by Keynesian concepts. They hate gold because rapidly rising
gold prices provide the earliest indication of the breakdown of Keynesian
policies They will determinedly ignore these indications until the breakdown
involves high rates of price inflation - at which time they will seek to offload blame onto convenient
scapegoats. |
Gold will be no slam dunk in 2010. Gold will be a bet on the
monetary policy of the Fed and Ben Bernanke. Actually, Bernanke has been talking
a more aggressive monetary policy lately than he has been playing. The Fed's
balance sheet has not increased during these last three quarters. After acting
aggressively to stabilize the financial system a year ago, Bernanke has actually
been conducting a restrained monetary policy. Faced with the realities of the
fundamental problems involved in the Credit Crunch recession, he no long talks
recklessly about the ability of monetary inflation to prevent recessions and their
unemployment. [ However, 2010 is an election year, and the economic recovery will not be permitted to falter. Oil will be the better commodity play in 2010 since it will not be as vulnerable to the first moves that the Fed will make to unwind its expansive monetary positions. [ |
The limitations of neo-classical theory:
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2009 is auspicious as the year when some mainstream
economists could no long ignore the many obvious weaknesses of neo-classical
theory and mathematical economics. Weaknesses that FUTURECASTS has been
explaining since its earliest issues, and that the publisher of FUTURECASTS has
been writing about since the 1960s, have become the subjects of recent books
written by mainstream economists and
reviewed by FUTURECASTS during 2009. |
The
unrealistically narrow focus of mathematical economics is being
increasingly criticized even by Keynesian economists. See, Akerlof &
Shiller, "Animal Spirits," criticizing mathematical economics
for intentional ignorance of obviously outcome determinative psychological and
social factors. Such factors as "confidence" and "trust" and
"corruption" are ignored simply because they cannot be measured or
estimated and expressed as an equation. Mathematical economics thus fails to
even adequately cover the trading markets. The same criticism is raised by Baumol,
Litan and Schramm, in "Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism," This
criticism has been a
persistent FUTURECASTS theme since its inception. See, "Capital as
Purchasing Power." |
The need for a broader focus than mathematical economists can provide and neo-classical economists are willing to provide is obvious.
The assertion that market capitalism "separates economic activities from political views" is a practical impossibility, |
This is summed up brilliantly
in Scott, "The Concept of Capitalism," explaining why we must
broaden our focus back to the study of "political economy." Political
and societal factors must be recognized as outcome determinative elements in the
economy. The need for a broader focus than mathematical
economists can provide and neo-classical economists are willing to provide is obvious. |
Competition is the primary disciplinary force in the
markets. However, Scott perceptively points out that even competition
is hardly all-powerful. The incentives for rent seeking and claims for
benefits from the public treasury are omnipresent, and most efforts at
"reform" in Washington include thinly disguised efforts at promoting
particular interests. |
Krugman and similar Keynesian and mathematical economists are like the blind men attempting to describe the elephant on the basis of only the parts they happen to be in touch with.
The broadened focus of political economy is absolutely essential for understanding the business cycle and economic development.
Learned economists concentrating only on broad economic aggregates like "savings" and "GDP" and "effective demand" miss the essential causative elements in the economic and political and institutional spheres and financial spheres. |
The great strength of Scott's broadened concept of
capitalist economics is thus that it brings into focus the Good, the Bad, and the
Ugly of political sector economic activities. Without focus on the political
sphere, the reasons for the failures and successes of economic development are
inexplicable. The economic differences between the U.S. and Argentina, for
example, are primarily found in the political sphere. |
Economic development is clearly guided by human agency as well as natural forces. |
The five decades of failure of development economics
since WW-II is noted by Scott. He points out that neo-classical theory has proven inadequate as a basis for
development policy. "It is concerned with the operation of markets, not
with how the markets develop," Scott points out. |
The tremendous contraction of purchasing power in the financial system cannot be understood without taking into account the psychological factors encompassed in the concept of "confidence."
The mathematical economists and neo-classical theorists twist reality to fit their theories. |
There were obvious market failures leading up to the
Credit Crunch, but they cannot be understood without taking into account the
gross budgetary, monetary and regulatory failures of government. The tremendous
contraction of purchasing power in the financial system - the collapse of
"velocity" - cannot be understood
without taking into account the psychological factors encompassed in the concept
of "confidence." |
The second decade of the 21st century: |
So now FUTURECASTS must turn its attention to
the future. It is justly proud of its past accomplishments, but its readers
want to know what it can do for them now. [ |
The nature and duration of this
recovery period will be the subject of next month's Near Futurecast for 2010. |
Republication of 2009 FUTURECASTS Review
Understanding the Credit Crunch: |
The development of the Credit Crunch of 2007
is clearly the primary economic event covered by FUTURECASTS online
magazine in its first ten volumes. How did we do? |
Everything needed for an understanding of the
Credit Crunch, its initiation, course and end, and business cycles
in general, has been provided in the first ten volumes of FUTURECASTS
online magazine. This is MUST HAVE knowledge. As the government responds
by monetizing vast amounts of debt and extending guarantees to banks,
pension funds, mortgage lenders, health care and other forms of
insurance and much more, it is creating additional problems. As
FUTURECASTS has repeatedly explained, these policies all depend on the
dollar - and they inherently undermine the dollar. |
WHO WILL GUARANTEE THE DOLLAR? Government policies
increasingly undermine the dollar. Only the productivity of the private
sector of the economy sustains the dollar. |
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Republication of 2008 FUTURECASTS Review
Volatility and dollar devaluation:
By "Near Futurecast VI," in February, 2004, the headline was "Revisiting the 1970s." |
FUTURECASTS promised you greater volatility
in its "Near Futurecast VII" for 2006, written after a quiet
2005 that was truly the calm before the storm. Indeed, the basic
explanation for this phenomenon was provided to FUTURECASTS readers in
the previous year, in "Near Futurecast VI" in February of
2004. This built on initial warnings that were provided as early as
February, 2003, in "Near Futurecast V." |
FUTURECASTS has provided its readers with "today's news yesterday," in time for them to profit from it, as promised. |
FUTURECASTS thus fulfills its primary promise.
It has provided its readers with today's news yesterday. Indeed, a five
year lead on today's financial news has been accurately provided for the
benefit and profit of FUTURECASTS readers |
Vol. 6 No. 2, 2/1/04:
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The fall of the almighty dollar:
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The weakness in the dollar will be the primary cause or a major constraining factor in every major economic and financial problem that arises until the fundamental causes of the decline are addressed and dealt with. |
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The U.S. economy is heading for a period of increased volatility. |
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Vol. 7, No. 2, 2/1/05:
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Keynesian failure - again:
The Fed actually still has the ability to put off or greatly reduce this coming recession, but only if it is willing to tolerate a plunging dollar and price inflation rates that top 5%, with gold above $1,500 per ounce, oil above $150 per barrel and gasoline above $4 per gallon. Obviously, any such effort to put off the inevitable will make the inevitable much worse. |
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There will come a time this year when the Fed will stop permitting its interest rates to rise. |
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Interest rates that would be high enough to support the value of the dollar are now at a point too high to prevent economic decline. |
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Market driven currency devaluation always runs behind the power curve. |
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The Fed can only be as strong as the dollar.
The Fed is powerless to do anything more than determine the sequence and mix of inflation and deflation that will be suffered.
It is these vast budget deficits, not Chinese mercantilist policies, that is to blame for the persistent trade and payments deficits that undermine the value of the dollar. |
THIS IS IMPORTANT - SO LISTEN
UP, BOYS AND GIRLS! |
Currency volatility substantially increases risks and thus makes it more expensive to raise capital.
When political leaders succumb to temptation - when they irresponsibly expand monetary supplies and budgetary deficits pursuant to Keynesian policies - they are playing with fire. |
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Encouragingly, there have been
many economists who have this time been warning of trouble to come
for some time - unlike in the 1960s. Articles about bubble trouble have
been appearing in the financial press for several years already.
However, almost all of these economists have been attributing economic
problems to some particular secondary factor - like inadequate savings
or oil imports or imports in general. Most have avoided attributing
these problems to the government policies that are the primary causes. |
The more the Federal Reserve Board employs Keynesian monetary policy to stabilize the economy and avoid the business cycle, the more unstable the economy MUST become and the more vicious the business cycle MUST become. |
FUTURECASTS readers cannot complain that
they were not adequately forewarned of the current difficulties, or that
the warnings were not adequately explained. They cannot complain that
the warnings were not sufficiently far in advance for them to protect
vulnerable interests or profit from suitable investments. |
The no longer so almighty dollar:
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The importance of a strong dollar has been
emphasized by FUTURECASTS since Near Futurecast I, in 1998. This was
emphasized in no uncertain terms as early as Near Futurecast II in 1999.
A serious recession was unlikely, it pointed out, until the dollar
becomes weak. |
Vol. II, No. 2, 9/1/99:
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Near Futurecast II
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The Fed can only be as strong as the dollar. |
After half a dozen years of strenuous
Keynesian efforts to stabilize the economy by means of monetary
expansion, the world is now awash in dollars and the dollar is now on
its way to becoming a basket case. |
Bubble trouble:
"Because Men Are Not Angels!" |
Bubble trouble has been a constant theme
of FUTURECASTS forecast issues. Long periods of prosperity permit
weaknesses to accumulate. Houses of cards proliferate. These things
happen because, as James Madison so wisely explained in a political
context, "men are not angels." |
FUTURECASTS was emphasizing the many bubbles
observably growing in the economy by February 1, 2001, in "Near
Futurecast III." Three of them - the debt leverage bubble, the bank
lending bubble, and the Freddy Mac and Fannie Mae bubbles - have burst
in 2007. The constraints of the energy market were also then
emphasized. The housing bubble was first emphasized in "Heedless
Government," October 1, 2002. |
Vol. 3, No. 2, 2/1/01: The debt leverage bubbles:
The bank lending bubbles:
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Bubbles:
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The energy market limits on economic growth: |
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Moral hazard at Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac: |
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Vol. 4, No. 10, 10/1/02:
The housing bubble: [ |
Heedless Government
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Vol. 7, No. 7, 7/1/05:
There will be a period of substantial decline in our future. |
"The Coming Generational Storm," by Kotlikoff & Burns
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The employment of Keynesian methods to avoid
recessions just permits excesses to increase and bubbles to grow,
and ultimately adds currency weakness and inflation to the brew. When
currency weakness and inflation get too bad to be ignored, the austerity
policies required to deal with them replace recession with depression.
Political and private business models and economic plans based on easy
money conditions are threatened with collapse. These are the lessons of
the 1970s - now so determinedly ignored by the Fed and numerous
authoritative talking heads on television. |
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Welcome back to the 1970s:
The easy profits are behind us. Major profit opportunities still lie ahead, but caution, and an attention to detail, are again as in the middle 1970s prominent requirements.
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We are now again back in the 1970s,
courtesy of the Fed's irresponsible Keynesian monetary policies and the
major budget deficits incurred by Congress. Are you pleased with
all the favors your government is anxious to bestow upon you? |
1970s lite: |
But the differences have also always been
emphasized by FUTURECASTS and must be kept in mind. |
Increased economic flexibility makes the U.S. economy inherently stronger and more resilient than in the 1970s. |
Floating exchange rates instead of fixed
exchange rates permit adverse currency movements to occur smoothly
rather than in periodic major crises. Marginal tax rates are lower,
regulatory burdens are reduced, globalization is a major asset in
holding down overall inflation rates and long term interest rates. With
labor market flexibility, these factors hold down unemployment rates.
They increase economic flexibility and resilience and make the U.S.
economy inherently stronger than in the 1970s. |
But there are also now extraordinary
weaknesses that were not present in the 1970s. The War on Terror is
not nearly as financially burdensome as the Vietnam war and the Cold
War, but entitlements are vastly more burdensome and due to increase
massively in this next decade. The fiscal side of the problem is thus on
balance considerably worse than in the 1970s - and Congress shows no
signs of the spending restraint that alone can mitigate the nation's
financial problems. |
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Regulatory costs are again on the rise,
especially with regard to efforts to deal with global warming. As each
bubble bursts, Congress rushes in to apply regulatory fixes - some of
which inevitably impose more costs than benefits. Here is one area where
a Democratic administration would be clearly worse than a Republican
administration. |
FUTURECASTS one major forecasting error
for this period was caused by these differences. The surge in stock
prices when the Fed stopped allowing its interest rates to rise was an
obvious call for "Near Futurecast VIII" in February of 2006,
but the extent of that surge was far greater than expected and out of
line with 1970s experience. This was probably due to the many positive
differences pointed out above. |
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As long emphasized by FUTURECASTS, this is not -
yet - a complete repeat of the 1970s. It is still 1970s lite. |
Military matters:
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FUTURECASTS provided a major review of its
material pertinent to the War on Terror and the campaigns in Iraq and
Afghanistan in last year's "Futurecasts Review," and need not
repeat it here. Suffice it to point out that the recent encouraging -
but still very unstable - progress in Iraq has validated FUTURECASTS
material. |
The U.S. can powerfully support and encourage
political and military success in Iraq and Afghanistan, but only the
peoples of those nations can achieve it. |
The Bush (II) administration is the most
Keynesian administration since Jimmy Carter, as FUTURECASTS has
repeatedly pointed out. The Bush (II) administration is also the most
incompetent wartime administration since Lyndon Johnson. |
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Clearly, the Bush (II) administration is at
fault for taking so long to realize the failure of its initial
strategy in Iraq. The "small wars" strategy now being
implemented brilliantly by Gen. David Petraeus has been around for
decades. See, Boot, "The
Savage Wars of Peace," at segment on "The 'Small
Wars' Manual." Waiting until after the 2006 elections to admit
initial failure and change course was unconscionable. |
Success both politically and militarily will at best be a generational matter.
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Time is an important factor in these matters.
Only if the U.S. makes a credible stand somewhere on the field of battle will the growing mass of Middle Eastern people who resent the militants and insurgents and long for a better future have the heart to actively oppose them. |
Success against insurgencies and against
opponents using guerrilla tactics, however, requires more than just
competent strategy, as vital as that is. It is simplistic to assume that
a substantially larger force at the beginning, as useful as that would
have been, could have avoided the subsequent insurgency. Time is an
important factor in these matters. |
War is inherently atrocious. As explained
in Military Futurecast,
in the segment on "Military Strategy - The Power of the
Force," the ability and will to act atrociously is an inherent
factor in military strategy. Middle Eastern combatants entertain no
illusions about this matter, |
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The Shia death squads have played a vital role in impressing upon the Sunni people that it will not be only Shia who suffer from the conflict.
Sunni bombs have been met with Shia death squads.
The attempt to base governance on some level of consensus thus has dubious prospects.
It would be a strategic mistake of vast proportions for the U.S. to abandon its allies among the Middle Eastern peoples. |
It must be understood and acknowledged - as
politically incorrect as that may be - that the Shia death squads have
played a vital role in impressing upon the Sunni people that it will not
be only Shia who suffer from the conflict. |
Governance:
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The inherent ineptness of government has
been a central theme of FUTURECASTS since it summarized in its first
issue the many things that the U.S. government does right and the many
reasons why it does so much that is wrong. See, Government
Futurecast. |
Apparently, the threats of global warming are not sufficient to trump farm state politics. |
Today, global warming is viewed as a threat to
the world, and the U.S. government has sprung into action. Gallant
legislators have appropriated tens of billions of dollars to deal with
the problem - with corn ethanol. |
Vol. 3, No. 1, 1/1/01.
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